Seattle Times Abets ST East Link Debacle

 A previous post opined the Seattle Times had abetted the Sound Transit Board of Directors adopting a “Transit Development Plan 2022-2027” exemplfying a decade of transit system incompetence.  However, the most egregious example of Seattle Times abetting Sound Transit incompetence is the paper’s Traffic Lab response to the East Link debacle.  

 The paper heralds it as follows:  

Traffic Lab is a project that digs into the region’s thorny transportation issues, spotlights promising approaches to easing gridlock, and helps readers find the best ways to get around.  

Clearly the “region’s thorny transportation issue” is the congestion on I-5 and I-90 into and out of Seattle.  A competent Traffic Lab would have recognized the folly of Sound Transit’s decision to confiscate the I-90 Bridge center roadway for East Link.  That two-way bus only routes on bridge center roadway would have 10 times light rail capacity, 10 years sooner, at 1/10th the cost.  

That Sound Transit compounded the capacity problem by choosing to route East Link beyond Chinatown station through DSTT to UW, Northgate, and eventually to Mariner P&R near Everett.  The result being rather than adding transit capacity into Seattle, Central Link lost half of the DSTT capacity.    

What’s absurd is rather than using East Link to add cross-lake transit capacity into Seattle, Sound Transit will use it to replace bus routes into the city.  Apparently not recognizing I-90 Bridge congestion is not due to too many buses.  Spending more than $3B on a transit system that halves Central Link capacity and is used primarily to replace bus routes surely qualifies as a debacle.

 Sound Transit could avoid Central Link losing half DSTT capacity by terminating East Link at Chinatown.  Doing so would allow Sound Transit to adjust the number of cars in each train and schedule frequency to meet the demand from commuters with access along route through Bellevue.  I-90 corridor buses could be routed into and out of Seattle rather than terminated on Mercer Island.  The Chinatown Station would also provide easy access for returning East Link riders.

The modification could be implemented during the delay due to the contractors need to redo the track attachments.   As of the November 17th meeting, the Board didn't know how long the delay.  A competent Traffic Lab would advocate using the delay to terminate East Link at Chinatown.

Instead, they'll likely abet Board's November 17th plan to implement a Starter 2 Line for East Link on east side of Lake Washington.  Typical of the Board, it's not clear why the need for the Starter Line.  Rapid Line 2 already provides far better access to transit into Bellevue than Starter Line 2.  Many transit commuters will also be dissuaded  by the need to transfer to and from buses at South Bellevue or Mercer Island P&R's to commute into and out of Seattle.  

The bottom line is  the contractor's need to redo attaching tracks delays Sound Transit's demonstration they should have never confiscated the I-90 Bridge center roadway for light rail.  However, the delay gives them a chance to mitigate the damage by terminating East Link at Chinatown.  Instead, Sound Transit will likely  use the delay to spend additional billions on other similarly flawed "voter approved" extensions.

Again, another Sound Transit folly, abetted by Seattle Times Traffic Lab. 

New ST CEO Continues Rogoff Debacle

A previous post opined a public transit system CEO’s responsibility should be to oversee providing transit for those who can’t or don’t choose to drive and to reduce congestion for those who do.  A competent transit CEO would recognize that spending billions on “voter approved” light rail spine extensions won’t do either.  Instead, the new CEO’s leadership has resulted in a “2023 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget” that continues a decade of Sound Transit failure.

 

The 2023 budget’s “Long Range Financial Plan” continues expanding the funding requirements from the $54B voters approved in 2016 to $149.1B in 2046.  It ends with a “Tax Backed Debt” of $29B in 2046 with ST3 taxes that “Backed that Debt” ending in 2041.   

 

The long-range plan’s “Fare Revenue 2017—2046” chart claim Link Light Rail fares would increase from $20 million to $370 million in 2046 reflected delusional projections Link ridership would increase from 22 million to 150 million.  It also showed Sound Transit’s failure to recognize the benefits of added bus service with no anticipated fare revenue or ridership increase.  

 

The video of the November 10^th System Expansion Committee meeting only addressed the new CEO’s 2023 budget.  The 172-page budget was more about process than product, having extensive details on the process of how more than $3 billion will be spent on transit mode expansions and total operating costs but nothing on the product.  The product being what service will each transit mode provide, how many riders do they expect, how much it will cost for each rider, and what is each modes expected fare box recovery?   

 

A major portion of the 2023 budget is the ~$1,250 million spent funding “voter approved extensions” to Lynnwood, Redmond, and Federal Way. None of those extensions increase transit capacity with more light rail cars per minute or more riders per car.   Yet, the 2023 budget in the “Ridership by Mode 2017—2046” chart predicts Link light rail ridership will increase from 24 million in 2017 to 62 million in 2026 when the extensions are completed.

 

The new CEO’s 2023 budget also exemplifies Sound Transit decade of failing to recognize reducing freeway congestion requires attracting more commuters with added access to transit.  The access comes from stations within walking distance of transit stations, parking near light rail stations, or access to bus routes to stations.

 

None of the potential Link stations are within walking distance of the number of commuters needed to reduce congestion.  All the parking with access to Link stations or bus routes to the stations is already "fully in use".  The additional commuters needed to reduce congestion won’t have access without added parking, access to Link stations or bus routes to stations.

 

The Northgate Link debut exemplified Sound Transit's lack-of-access problem.  As with all of the light rail spine extensions, they attempt to make up for the failure to add parking for access by requiring bus riders using existing parking ride Link rather than bus routes into Seattle.  Replacing bus routes does nothing to increase transit ridership, reduce I-5 congestion, and reduces total transit capacity into Seattle.

 

The failure to provide access was presumably reflected in the Northgate Link’s failure to attract ridership.  Yet, Sound Transit refuses to release a quarterly Service Delivery Performance Report that would have shown only a fraction of the predicted 41,000 to 49,000 daily riders were added by the three Link stations.  Portending a lack-of-access problem with all the light rail spine extensions.  In response the 2023 budget spends $13 million on a System Access Policy attempting to “manage parking demand” by “maximizing efficient use of available parking resources".  A dubious process at best.

 

To be fair, much of the 2023 budget pre-ordained the new CEO’s arrival.  However, the November 10^th video of the 2023 budget presentation to the Board’s “System Expansion Committee indicates she’s willing to continue the debacle with this year's installment.  

ST System Expansion Committee Incompetence

 The November 10th System Expansion Committee agenda includes the following:

Review of the Proposed 2023 Budget for system expansion projects 

It’s a follow-up to the same agenda item in the November 3, 2022, Executive Committee Meeting.  Both deal with the 2023 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget proposed $3.1 billion expenditures with $2,369 million on “Projects” and $500 million on “Transit Operation.”  That $1,686 million of the project’s funding would be spent on Link system expansion in 2023.   

 

It's the 2023 version of Sound Transit’s plan to spend $149.1B from 2017 to 2046 on “voter approved extension” for the “largest transit system expansion in the country”.  That the result in the 2023 “Ridership by Mode 2017--2046” chart is an increase in Link ridership from 22 million to 150 million.  A “Capital Expenditures by Mode 2017—2046” chart showed about 90% will be spent on “Link Light Rail”.  

 

The 2023 budget showed Sound Transit intends to increase light rail expenditures from ~$1,700 million in 2023 to ~$3,200 million in 2024 and ~$3,100 million in 2025 completing extensions to Lynnwood, Redmond, and Federal Way.  Yet none of those track extensions will increase the number of light rail cars per hour or the number of riders in each car.  Thus, the extensions don’t increase a light rail train’s capacity into Seattle. Yet, the 2023 budget’s “Ridership by Mode 2017—2046” chart predicts the funds spent will increase ridership from 30 million in 2023 to 62 million in 2026.  

 

The committee compounds their failure to recognize capacity limits with plans  to use light rail trains to replace bus routes into Seattle.  They initiated that approach using Northgate Link trains to replace ST Express Bus and KCM routes into the city.  It’s more than a year since the Link debuted.  Yet Sound Transit refuses to release their Quarterly Service Delivered Performance reports with how many of the predicted 41,000 to 49,000 riders the Link’s three stations added.  Instead, whatever riders were added reduced access for University Link riders.

 

Sound Transit could increase the number of light rail cars into Seattle by terminating East Link at Chinatown Station.  Instead, they intend to use the extension to replace all the I-90 bus routes into Seattle on light rail trains routed to Mariner P&R near Everett.

 

The bottom line is Sound Transit's Link ridership claims are delusional.  The board's System Expansion Committee is about to approve a 2023 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget with another year of $500 million spent on operations and ~$1,700 million on light rail extensions that do nothing to increase capacity.  That using light rail to replace buses will reduce the number of transit vehicles, transit capacity into the city, and access to transit for current riders.

The result of a transit board of well-meaning elected officials with no understanding of what constitutes effective public transit.

Sound Transit’s Delusional Ridership Projections

One of the more incongruous Sound Transit statements comes from their annual “Financial Plan and Proposed Budget” regarding long range transit ridership projection:

 

For long-range ridership forecasts, Sound Transit uses a travel demand forecasting model. In this model, transit ridership forecasts are based on observed origins and destinations of transit riders, observed transit line volumes, and a realistic simulation of observed transit service characteristics.

 

The latest example is the $142B, 2023 budgets total long-range prediction,  “Ridership by Mode” Boardings will increase from 24 million in 2022 to 170 million on 2046.  That “Link Light Rail Boardings” will increase from 19 million to 150 million.  It's not clear how Sound Transit uses a “travel demand forecasting model” to assess the various “mode boardings” or why the steps in “demand” from the Link extensions.

 

The steps in “demand” from extensions ignore the reality that extending light rail tracks extensions do nothing to increase the number of light-rail cars per hour or the number of riders in each car.  Thus, while the Link may increase the “demand”, it won’t increase the capacity so its “unclear” how they extensions will satisfy the demand.  

 

Sound Transit’s other ridership “demand” problem is commuters need access to the light rail train cars.  Yet, Sound Transit’s long-range plan neglects to add parking, despite the fact all the parking with access to transit has been full for years.  Instead, they intend to use the light rail link to replace bus routes into Seattle. Commuters who currently use the parking for access to bus routes are required to transfer to light rail, reducing bus routes and transit capacity into Seattle.

 

The bottom line is not only that light rail extensions do nothing to increase transit capacity, using them to replace bus routes reduces transit capacity into Seattle and access for current link riders.  The Northgate Link debut has already reduced bus transit capacity with future extensions adding to that loss.  The most egregious example is the East Link operation which will not only end I-90 bridge bus transit capacity into Seattle, it will also halve Link transit capacity to and from SeaTac.  Using that Link to replace bus routes from south of Seattle will add to the capacity loss.

 

Sound Transit needs to explain how they will meet transit ridership “demand” with their light rail spine.

ST Should Terminate East Link at Chinatown Station

The previous post opined Sound Transit needs to do more to “justify’ transit projects.  Assure the result of a transit project was a “product” that reduced congestion. At this point it’s too late to point out the result of the East Link project, an 1-90 bridge center roadway confiscated by light rail, is a product that won’t reduce congestion.  

 

This post details Sound Transit exacerbates that failure by extending East Link light rail train routes as Link Line 2 through the DSTT and eventually to the Mariner P&R.   The result will be a “product” whose operation will share Line 1’s DSTT train capacity and incur problems merging with Central Link trains to UW and beyond.  

 

For example, Link Line 1 trains currently run northbound every 8 minutes from Angle Lake to Northgate from 5:30 to 8:46 am.  When East Link trains begin operation as part of Line 2 will Sound Transit replace half of the Line 1 trains, with both lines every 16 minutes, or double the frequency with both every 8 minutes?   A “product” with 4 minutes between trains and capacity that far exceeds the number of I-5 commuters with access to transit and operating costs that dwarf fare box revenue.   That will also be difficult to safely merge, with trains returning from different route lengths through DSTT with the 4-minute intervals.

 

Sound Transit could avoid both problems by terminating East Link at the International District Chinatown Station.  Those wishing to go further can transfer to a Line 1 train.  Central Link commuters won’t have to share whatever the DSTT train capacity when East Link debuts. 

 

Separating East Link also allows scheduling its operation with number of light rail cars in each train and their frequency adjusted to meet east side demands rather than what’s needed along Line 2 to Northgate and beyond.   Doing so has significant cost savings with light rail trains cars costing ~$30 per vehicle mile.  The 16-mile East Link and Redmond extensions cost nearly $1000 for each car-round-trip.  Limiting number of cars would enable more frequent trains, especially during off-peak operation.

 

Limiting operation to meet Bellevue transit requirements would also end Sound Transit need to use East Link to replace I-90 corridor buses for riders.  It would end the need for Sound Transit to insist on a “Bus Intercept” agreement with Mercer Island, despite nearly universal islander objections.   I-90 corridor transit riders would no longer be forced to endure the hassle of transferring to and from light rail for their commute into and out of Seattle.  Mercer Island would no longer be forced to share its access to light rail or have their station inundated with thousands of transferees. 

 

The bottom line is, terminating East Link at International District/Chinatown Station, ends a “project” that spends billions for a “product” that reduces transit capacity into Seattle and increases I-90 corridor congestion.  The following from an October 5^threlease of, “Agency Progress Report: Capital Progress, August 2022” facilitates doing so: 

The East Link critical path this month continues to run through track remediation on E130, which is holding up E750 access to complete OCS and signal installation. The time required to complete all repairs is still being determined, which may result in an even longer path to completion. Other East Link Civil Contracts continue to be closely monitored for potential impacts to the E750 schedule. 

Sound Transit should use the delay to implement terminating East Link at International District/Chinatown Station and mitigate the East Link debacle.

Sound Transit Needs to Justify Transit Projects

                   I emailed the Sound Transit System Expansion Committee the      10/07/22  post on this blog.  It included the following conclusion:

A competent transit CEO would recognize the Sound Transit TDP won’t reduce congestion.  The next System Expansion Committee meeting will indicate whether she does.  If not, the East Link debut will demonstrate the result of the eastside and south Seattle having to split the number of DSTT trains.  Central Link commuters will lose half their current capacity and east side bus commuters will lose all bus transit routes into Seattle.   

A competent Julie Timm could hasten that result and save billions.

The video of the October 13^th System Expansion Committee reported the committee reported they’d received the email as part of “public comment”.  It was released as the “written in" comment “What the New Sound Transit CEO Could Do”.

The lack of any response and subsequent agenda was a clear indication neither the committee nor the new CEO had any interest in the issues it raised. Instead, the meeting consisted of presentations about “process” not “product”.  About how to proceed with “voter approved extensions” rather than whether those extensions would relieve roadway congestion.

The first was a “Comprehensive Review” by the Sound Transit Technical Advisory Group (TAG).   The “Key Takeaway” was the conclusion Sound Transit had “not got there as ready to proceed”.  That Sound Transit needed more “guidance” with a final report to be released early next year.   

One would have thought such a critical review of both Sound Transit Staff and Board would merit some response.  Instead, Board Chair, Kent Keel, called it “Refreshing and looking forward to hearing more details”.   

The next presenter concluded his review of all the Sound Transit’s reports led to a Cost Savings Plan to replace quarterly reporting requirement.  He was more pompous than probative as his plan to no longer release Quarterly Service Delivery and Financial Performance Reports ignores the need to update the public.

The next item detailed Sound Transit’s Chinatown International District Station engagement process. What was included in the CIP engagement tool kit.  Nothing that justified the decision the station was needed.

The last was a briefing about the “Delivery Methods” Sound Transit uses for transit projects.  That different delivery methods were chosen to assure the construction contract matched the needs of the project.  

Again, all about process for completing the project but nothing to justify the project.  For example, improving the process to construct the "product", the 130^th St Infill station, ignores the fact the $270B Station has no parking for access to trains.  Even more basic the Lynnwood extension it’s on does nothing to increase light rail capacity into Seattle.  

That nearly all those using available parking with access to extension are currently already riding buses to Northgate for the Link into Seattle.  Thus, the Lynnwood project will do little to reduce congestion no matter the benefit of the process improvements.  That none of the extensions will increase transit capacity into Seattle despite improving the process.

Sound Transit needs to do more to justify the projects.

 

Northgate Link Begins the Debacle

This post was prompted by the fact it’s over a year since the Oct 2, 2021, Northgate Link debut.  It was the first demonstration of Sound Transit’s ability to use Prop 1 funded light rail spine trains to reduce I-5 and I-90 congestion into Seattle.  ST’s website had predicted the 4.3-mile, $1.9B link would add 41,000 to 49,000 riders.  The Seattle Times Traffic Lab had heralded the debut as “Transit Transformed” claiming 42,000 to 49,000 commuters would be added by the Link’s three stations.  

 

Yet neither Sound Transit nor the Traffic Lab have provided any Link ridership results. (ST no longer releases the Quarterly Service Provided Performance Reports with ridership added by each station.)  Like all the extensions, the Northgate Link did nothing to increase the number of train cars per hour or the number of commuters who could ride in each car. Thus, like all the spine extensions, the Northgate Link did nothing to increase transit capacity into Seattle.

 

Sound Transit also did nothing to increase access to transit.  An Oct-Dec 2016, WSDOT “Park and Ride Inventory” reported all the parking with access to transit was essentially already “in use”.   Rather than add parking Sound Transit chose to require those using the existing parking to ride bus routes into Seattle to use the Northgate Link for the commute into and out of the city.  

 

King County Metro ended KCM 41 from Northgate.  Sound Transit’s ST511-513 from Everett was rerouted to Northgate and ST522 from Woodinville to Roosevelt Station. Ending the bus routes reduced total transit capacity into Seattle and nothing to reduce GP lane congestion.  Those former bus riders also reduced access for University Link riders.

 

Again, without Q4 2021 or later service provided reports it’s not clear have many commuters chose to ride Northgate Link.  However, the pre-pandemic ridership levels for the ST 510-513 and ST522 bus routes who rode the Link totaled less than 14,000 daily.  

 

Thus, with all the available parking essentially “In use”, the maximum possible terminated bus route commuters riding the Link would have been a fraction of Sound Transit and Traffic Lab predictions.  A precursor to a Lynnwood ridership access “problem” that only adds 500 stalls at the two Shoreline stations for Sound Transits claim for 37,000 to 55,000 riders. 

The other Northgate Link problem is the loss in farebox recovery from longer route operating costs. Sound Transits 2021 budgets Light Rail Car Revenue Vehicle Mile costs as $30.17. Thus, every mile of extension adds two miles and $241 for a 4-car round trip. The Northgate Link’s 4.2-mile extension from UW Stadium adds $1012 per trip, $126,500 for their schedule of 125-weekday trips.

  

Thus, even if the Link had attracted pre-pandemic ridership the cost per boarder would have been $9.00.  Whatever the costs per Northgate Link boarder, they’ll be dwarfed by those with Lynnwood extension.  The 8.5-mile Lynnwood extension will add $253,000 to the for 125-weekday trips, yet add only 1000 stalls for access. 

 

The bottom line is effective public transit requires providing the access needed to attract the number of commuters needed to reduce traffic for those driving.  The Northgate Link did nothing to increase light rail transit capacity or add access to public transit.  The debut demonstrated Sound Transit attempts to provide access by diverting bus riders to light rail reduced transit capacity into Seattle and still didn’t provide access needed for projected ridership claims.  

What remains to be demonstrated is that light rail train’s limited capacity means commuters added by extensions will end access for current riders without significantly reducing multilane freeway congestion.   What should have been obvious will apparently take billions and years for Sound Transit to "demonstrate".