Sound Transit's Northgate Link Debut Dilemma

 The Sound Transit Board decided to replace a review of the 2022 "Financial Plan and Proposed Budget" on the November 18th meeting agenda with the following:

7. Business Items                                                                                   A. Resolution No. R2021-19 Adopting the 2022 Service Plan, and authorizing the chief executive officer to implement recommended service changes in 2022.

The 2022 Service Plan schedule for October 2 2021--March 19, 2022 included 125 trips from Northgate.  A significant increase from the 84 trips the board had approved during the November 19th 2020 meeting.  The new schedule has trains every 8 minutes during  the 3 1/2 hour morning and afternoon peak commutes, 10 minutes during ~ 9 hours off-peak, and 15 minutes during early morning and late night.  The Board chose to have the meeting "off-air" so there was no way to learn why they implemented the 2022 service plan changes.   

Several posts on this blog have opined the Northgate Link debut would demonstrate Sound Transit should have never extended Central Link beyond UW station.  The PSRC in 2004 concluded the DSTT limited capacity to 8880 riders per hour in each direction, far less than needed to reduce I-5 congestion during peak commute.  Spending $2.7B over 5 years to reduce congestion on 5 lanes of I-5 with 4-car trains every 8 minutes has always seemed absurd.   Light rail car operating costs will result in the extension from UW to Northgate adding ~$1000 to round trip costs

The only access for the vast majority of commuters is parking near light rail stations.  Sound Transit has spent a decade refusing to add significant parking.  Instead choosing to provide riders by terminating bus routes at light rail stations.  Without added parking for access, many of the trains will have few riders, exacerbating average costs for those who ride.  Thus, if the Board wanted to reduce operating costs the 2022 service plan change could terminate many routes at UW.  Instead they chose to reduce frequency for several ST Express routes. 

Their dilemma will be how and when they choose to expose that the additional $125,000 in operating costs for the extensions attracted only a fraction of the 42,000 to 49,000 predicted.  The problem being only a fraction of that number had access to parking near stations or chose to ride buses requiring they transfer to and from light rail for their commutes into and out of Seattle.  

The bottom line is over the short term Sound Transit should have continued with the routes needed to accommodate the vast majority of those riding the Link.  Replace early morning and late night routes and some of the off-peak routes with bus routes to reduce operating costs. (A round trip from 5th&University to Northgate would cost less than $200.) Instead they chose to reduce far less expensive ST Express routes doing little to reduce operating cost.  The meeting being "off-air" there's no way of knowing why the Board's decision.

Over the long term Sound Transit needs to recognize DSTT limits on Line 1 capacity prevent it from ever having the capacity needed to reduce I-5 congestion during peak commute.  That extension to Lynnwood does nothing to increase that capacity, it only increases operating costs.   It's only a question of when the Board acknowledges the Link debut's implications for all of the Prop 1 extensions.  The Seattle Times Traffic Lab has shown no interest in doing so.

ST's Apparent Northgate Link Debut Debacle

l looked forward to viewing the November 18th Sound Transit Board meeting in hopes of seeing initial Northgate Link debut results. Countless posts on this blog had opined Sound Transit should have never extended light rail routed through DSTT beyond UW station.  However, prior to the debut, the Seattle Times Traffic Lab had heralded it as "Transit Transformed", claiming it "will attract a combined 42,000 to 49,000 riders a day".  

The November meeting could have answered how many had ridden the Link daily since October 2nd debut. It might also have provided the Board's response to the October 29th release of the "2022 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget". 

The 2022 budget review had been included in the September and October  meeting agendas.  However the November meeting agenda neglected to include any Northgate Link ridership results and replaced the 2022 budget review with the following:

7. Business Items

A. Resolution No. R2021-19  Adopting the 2022 Service Plan, and authorizing the chief executive officer to implement recommended service changes in 2022.

The October 29th 2022 budget hadn't included any service plan.  The Board was presumably referring to a 2022 Service Plan in an August 12th Transit Development Plan.  It included a schedule requiring eighty-four 4-car-train round trips from UW to Northgate and back.  (A substantial reduction from earlier 117 Central Link scheduled trips, increasing delay times between trains for commuters)  An October 11th post on this blog had used Sound Transit 2021 budget light rail car operating costs to estimate the 8.4-mile round trips would add $84,152 to daily operating costs.

Again, the November meeting could have answered how many of the 42,000 to 49,000 riders did the Northgate Link add, what prompted the 2022 service changes, and what were the recommended changes.  Whatever the answers they remain "unavailable" as the meeting itself was "off-air".

The Northgate Link results should not have been a surprise.  The Board should have been aware a "Sound Transit Service Delivery Performance Report 2021 Q1" concluded Northgate Link ridership was 58.7%  lower than 2021 budget predictions, clearly portending ridership was a problem prior to Link debut. 

The latest financial results prior to the debut, the "Quarterly Financial Performance Report Q2 2021" confirmed the result was a large increase in costs per rider.  Actual 2021 June  YTD operating costs per rider were $25.82, 43% higher than $18.10  budget predictions.

The Board should have been concerned a 4-mile University Link trip into Seattle or 10-mile trip from Angel Lake would cost an average of $25.82 per rider.  It's not clear how many miles the "average" boarder rode the link or the cost per mile for the ride.

The bottom line is the 4.2-mile Northgate Link doubled the University Link operating cost, adding $85,152 to daily operating costs with the 2022 Service Plan.  The Sound Transit Board's decision to have the November meeting for discussing changes to service plan "off-air" indicates the Link failed to meet ridership predictions.

That the Seattle Times Traffic Lab was correct with its claim the debut would be a "Transit Transformation".  Not because it would attract riders to light rail but because it didn't.  A clear warning for future Prop 1 extensions results. 

Replacing ST CEO Peter Rogoff

The Sept 24th Seattle Times headline "Sound Transit Board ousting CEO" was a surprise to many.   The board apparently made the decision to replace CEO Rogoff during their monthly Sept 23rd meeting with Sound Transit .  It must have been a surprise to Rogoff since the  Board meeting agenda had included the following:

9. Business items (Continued) A. Motion No. M2121-47": Authorizing the first of three one-year employment agreement extensions to retain Peter M. Rogoff as Sound Transit's chief executive officer.

Prior to the Sept 23rd meeting (and that meeting's agenda) the Board had given him authority to implement multiple actions and had unanimously approved those he had previously done.  Thus, it's not clear why they decided to replace him and include the following in their October 28th meeting agenda: (the meeting itself was "off-air")

F. Resolution No, R2021-18:  Establishing a CEO Selection Committee for the period of time necessary to develop a recommendation to the Board on a candidate to serve as the next Sound Transit CEO and appointing Board members to serve on the CEO Selection Committee in addition to their current committee appointments and leadership roles.

Sound Transit's problem is going to be finding someone competent who's willing to replace him.  It's not that he shouldn't have been fired, it's that he should have never been hired in the first place.  Rogoff's prior position with the FTA would normally have indicated extensive transportation system experience and competence.  However, it seems County Executive Constantine hired Rogoff because he agreed with his approach to light rail in a July 2015 post on this blog:

"What we can do is create light rail to take you where you want to go, when you want to go, on time, every time, for work, for play, for school"

Constantine clearly didn't understand the limitations of light rail in Seattle or the basics of transit system operation.  That a 2004 PSRC study, funded by Sound Transit, had concluded routing light rail through DSTT limited capacity to 8880 riders per hour in each direction.  Prior to the 2016 ST3 vote Rogoff  demonstrated similar problems with a Sound Transit 3 Map with ridership claims for "voter approved projects" that far exceeded DSTT capacity.

Those problems however preceded Rogoff's hiring.  Ridership claims for the 2008 approval for Prop 1  extensions beyond UW, across I-90 Bridge, and beyond SeaTac had also ignored the DSTT limit.  Sound Transit's decision to divert half the DSTT trains across I-90 Bridge to Bellevue was especially egregious.  It halved DSTT capacity to SeaTac and precluded two-way BRT on bridge with 10 times light rail capacity, 10 years sooner at 1/10th the cost.

Since Prop 1 passed Sound Transit had refused to increase bus transit capacity that could have reduced travel times into Seattle.  An additional 100 bus routes an hour on a restricted access lane could've accommodated more than 10,000 commuters, the equivalent of 5 lanes of freeway traffic traveling at 45 mph, reducing congestion on remaining lanes.   They'd also neglected to increase access to transit with added parking near stations, planning instead to provide riders by forcing current transit riders transfer to light rail for the commute into Seattle.  

The bottom line is the Seattle Times Traffic Lab heralded CEO Rogoff's "six years of accomplishments".  What he's done is exactly what Constantine hired him for,  spend those years continuing the fatally flawed Prop 1 extensions.  A fraction of the $10B he's spent on the extensions could have been spent increasing transit ridership with added parking with access to BRT routes into Seattle.

His position as CEO has resulted in the 25-year, $54B ST3 package voters approved in 2016  extended to 30 years with $113B in spending and taxes extending for decades beyond. When operational the extensions will replace bus routes, reducing transit capacity into Seattle, limit current rider access during peak commute, and incur operating costs that dwarf farebox revenue during off-peak operation.

Constantine's re-election with Seattle Times support for his policies, will likely result in Sound Transit continue implementing Rogoff's plans for  "the largest transit system expansion in the country".   Again, it's not clear why Sound Transit fired CEO Rogoff.  Their problem now is going to be finding someone who's competent that's willing to replace him.

What Sound Transit's 2022 Budget Didn't Tell Us

The previous post asked the question, "What is it Sound Transit's not telling us?",  They've refused to release any 2021 financial reports and their October 28th meeting was "off-air".  This post details one of the answers is the October 29th release of Sound Transit's "2022 Financial plan and Recommended Budget".

Sound Transit normally allows comments to the Board via emailallboardmembers@sound transit.com.  With this budget they limited public comments to between 9:30 and 10:00 a.m. on November 4th.  Doing so required going into Seattle to their "sign-up" window between 8:00 and 9:25 a.m. to comment on a first-come first-served basis.

Since the meeting was "virtual" those wishing to comment had to return home or someplace with access to website.  Sound Transit planned to record any comments and post on their website 24 to 48 hours after the meeting.  The likely result was very few chose to do so and I've been unable to find any video of those who did.

Yet the budget is surely worthy of critical comments.  The most blatant example is the fact the 199-page document includes a great detail on where they will get the money and how it will be spent.  However, it fails to provide any details as to the service each transit mode will provide, how many will chose to use the service, and how much  the service will cost.  Rather basic information for any transit system budget.

For example, Sound Transit's 2021 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget included "ST 2021 Budget Highlights" for each transit mode for 2019 actual, 2020 budget, 2020 actual, and 2021 budget predictions, (The 2020 actual results were, "preliminary and unaudited")  The budget highlights for each mode included "Transit Mode Service Provided". "Service Consumed", "Service Performance Measures" and "Financial Performance Measures".

Each of these was broken down with "Service Provided" detailing "Revenue Vehicle Hours Operated", "Revenue Vehicle Miles Operated", and "Trips Operated".  The "Service Consumed" included "Total Boardings" and "Average Weekday Boardings".  The "Service Performance Measures" included "Total Boardings/Revenue Vehicle Hour", "Total Boardings/Trip" and "On-time Performance". 

"Financial Performance Measures" included "Fare Revenue", "Operating Costs", and "Farebox Recovery". Again, the 2021 budget provided a detailed explanation of Sound Transit services, ridership, and cost for past, current, and predictions for the next year's operation.

By contrast, Sound Transit's 2022 Financial Plan and Recommended  Budget" neglects to include any transit system information regarding 2020 actual, 2021 budget, 2021 actual, and 2022 budget predictions concerning what service each transit mode will provide, how many will use it, and what will it cost.  

The likely reason is the same reason they've refused to release any "Quarterly Financial Reports" in 2021 and the Sound Transit Board's decision for an "off-air" response to the 10/21/21 "CFO Report" to the Board's Finance and Audit Committee.  It reported ridership YTD through August was 39% below budget and fare revenue 50% less than budget.  YTD farebox recovery for the Link, 6%, Sounder, 4%, and STX, 6%, were fractions of the 15%, 13%, and 15%,  in 2021 budget predictions and 40%, 23%, and 20% Sound Transit policy targets.

Clearly Sound Transit failed to provide the Board accurate budget estimates for ridership, fares, and farebox recover in their 2021  Financial Plan and Recommended Budget.  Again the CFO report is YTD through August.  Any 2022 budget should reflect Sound Transit's predictions for Northgate Link operation. not only in terms of 2021"actual" transit results, but 2022 budget predictions.

The bottom line is on October 29th Sound Transit released a 199-page 2022 Financial Pan and Recommended Budget that neglected to predict how many commuters will ride the Link and how much each ride will cost.  They did so because the Northgate Link debut finally demonstrated the failure of light rail routed through DSTT to accommodate riders needed to reduce congestion into Seattle.  Sound Transit compounded that problem by refusing to add parking for access, choosing instead to use the Link to replace buses. (A clear precursor to East Link debut with half DSTT capacity, again without adding parking.) That Sound Transit made a monumental blunder extending Central Link beyond UW, across I-90 Bridge, and beyond SeaTac Airport.

Their October budget is their attempt to continue doing so.  And the Seattle Times Traffic Lab continues to abet them.

What Sound Transit Is Not Telling Us

 The Sound Transit Board waited until August 11th to release the  "2020 Sound Transit Annual Report" and September 23rd to release the "2020 Fare Revenue Report".  They've yet to include any "Quarterly Financial Performance Reports" for 2021 on their list of "Financial Documents".  They've clearly been reticent in providing residents with up-to-date financial status.

Thus it's unclear what or when their response will be to Sound Transit's 10-21-21 presentation of a 13-page Q3 Financial report entitled "CFO Report" to the Board's Finance and Audit Committee.  It included YTD comparisons through August of tax revenue, ridership, fare revenue, and operating expense with budget predictions.

Tax revenue exceeded budget by 28% and operating costs were 6% less than budget.  However, ridership was 39% below budget and fare revenue, 50% less than budget.  Clearly Sound Transit failed to provide the Board with accurate budget estimates for ridership and farebox revenue.

The revenue shortfall is reflected in lower farebox recovery for all the transit modes.  The CFO cites Sound Transit  recovery policy targets as 40% for Link, 23% for Sounder, and 20% for STX.  Sound Transit's "2021 Financial Plan and Adopted Budget" predicted 15%, 13%, and 15% for the three modes.

Their 2021 budget predictions, far less than Sound Transit policy targets, still provided only 2% of 2021 budget's revenues.  The CFO's 2021 August YTD farebox recovery for the Link, 6%, Sounder, 4%, and STX, 6%, were fractions not only of Sound Transit targets, but 2021 budget predictions.  

The bottom line is the Sound Transit Board has been reticent in releasing financial reports.  The CFO Report shows the August YTD farebox recovery for the transit modes not only failed to meet target levels, they failed to meet Sound Transit predictions for pandemic's affect on 2021 budget.  

The CFO report was presumably a subject in the October 28th Sound Transit Board meeting.  It's unclear their response as the Board has gone from not providing a video of the meetings to having them "off-air".  It raises the question "What is it that Sound Transit is not telling us?".  It's something a competent Seattle Times Traffic Lab would "dig into" but hasn't.