Why is Rogoff Still ST CEO?

The previous post concluded the solution to Sound Transit’s problems was to hire a competent transit system CEO to replace Rogoff. That they’ve had a board of directors made up of elected officials who didn't understand what constituted effective public transit. The fact that Rogoff was also incompetent resulted in the Sound Transit Board spending billions on “Prop 1and Beyond” voter approved extensions that haven't the capacity to reduce multi-lane peak hour congestion and cost too much to operate during off-peak.  

However, those billions are only a down payment on a transportation system expansion whose costs have increased from the $54B voters approved in 2016 to $135B in their 2022 budget. Sound Transit used delusional light rail ridership claims to promote the 2016 ST3 “voter approved” system expansion. Light Their limited capacity means any riders the extensions attract will reduce current rider access, potentially ending it during peak commute.  They’ve also ignored the opportunity to implement BRT routes into Seattle with ten times light rail capacity at one tenth the cost, 10 years sooner.  (The buses could also charge on entry, minimizing the number not paying fares.)

 

Thus, Sound Transit’s real “Rogoff Problem” isn't that he should not have been fired, it’s that he should never have been hired. The board’s September 23rd meeting vote to replace Rogoff preceded the October 2nd Northgate Link debut, only the latest demonstration of why he should go. Sound Transit’s website had projected 41,000-49,000 riders for the link. The Seattle Times had heralded the debut as “Transit Transformed” with the three stations adding 42,000-49,000 riders. 

 

Sound Transit still refuses to release the “Service Delivery Performance Report-Q4 2021” detailing how many riders were added and how much each rider cost.The best estimate is, the lack of access from parking limited ridership to 8000 daily, a fraction of Sound Transit and Seattle Times projections. The 125 daily trips added $126,000 to cost; $16 for each rider using the 4.2-mile extension. The low ridership from lack of access and high operating costs portended similar problems for all the “voter approved” extensions. 

Rogoff’s firing resulted in the CEO Selection Committee hiring CPS-HR Consulting to help find a replacement. Concern over replacing a CEO who was to be gone in April resulted in the Sound Transit Board’s February 24th meeting agenda including the following: 

**Motion No. M2022-16: 1) Appointing Brooke Belman as the acting chief executive officer (CEO) starting when current CEO Peter M. Rogoff departs and ending when the new Board-appointed CEO begins duties and 2) establishing a temporary base salary increase for Ms. Belman effective February 28, 2022, and extending for the three months following the start date of a new CEO. 

The CEO Selection Committee’s April 8th meeting video included CPS-HR, recommending 8 of the most qualified candidates for the Selection Committee Interview Process. Their presentation concluded with plans for “Candidate Screening in executive session;” followed by “Selection committee Interviews (late April)”: and “Final Interviews (in April/May).”  

The April 8th executive session for "Candidate Screening", initially scheduled for 60 minutes, was followed by two 15-minute extensions. The 90-minute “Candidate Screening” session concluded with no discussion of the results. Plans for another meeting on April 21 were initially scheduled but later delayed until April 27th.  

The delay clearly jeopardized the CPS-HR recommending late April Selection Committee Interviews and April/May Final Interviews. (It wasn’t clear whether they were still involved) However, that meeting’s 60-minute executive session also concluded with no comments other than plans to hold a third meeting at a TBD date.

 

Thus, as of April 27th the CEO Selection Committee was still searching for a Rogoff replacement. Yet the video of Sound Transit Board’s April 28th meeting, one day later, showed Rogoff, who was supposed to be gone in April, was still here. That, he not only attended the meeting, the agenda had him listed as “Chief Executive Officer." Ms. Belman, who had previous been named as “Acting Chief Executive Officer” was also there though it’s unclear what her duties were. 

It raises the question why was Rogoff still listed as CEO? While it’s not clear why the Board decided to replace him, they surely had reasons for doing so. He didn't understand the limited capacity of 4-car light rail trains, the need for parking for access, or the benefits of BRT route capacity. A new CEO is clearly needed to mitigate the damage from the billions already spent. Divert future funding towards expediting West Seattle and Ballard light rail extensions and to implement BRT routes along limited access lanes to reduce I-5 and I-90 into Seattle. 

Again the "Rogoff Problem" isn't that he should not have been fired, it's he should never have been hired. (A 1/22/22 post had predicted "Problems Replacing ST CEO Rogoff") The sooner he's gone the better.  Unfortunately, it's not going to happen unless the Seattle Times Traffic Lab ends its decade of enabling Sound Transit incompetence.

 

A Solution to Sound Transit’s Real Problem

The video of April 7th Sound Transit Board meeting during which they adopted Resolution No. R2022-07 to supersede Resolution No. R2009-02 effectively ended any attempt to enforce riders pay fares on Link Light Rail trains. The new resolution makes it highly unlikely anyone will ever be fined or forced to pay. However Sound Transit’s real problem is not the loss in fare revenue, it’s that for more than a decade they’ve had a board of directors made up of elected officials with no understanding of what constitutes effective public transit. That they've compounded that problem by selecting an equally incompetent CEO.

 

They’ve failed to recognize 4-car light rail trains don’t have the capacity needed for the ridership required to reduce peak multilane freeway congestion. Instead making delusional projections to attract voter support for 2008 Prop 1 extensions. They exacerbated the lack-of-capacity problem in 2016 with more delusional ridership projections for “voter approved” ST3 extensions. The long-term projections in their budgets for Link ridership for years have predicted increases through 2041 and now through 2046 that completely ignore rational ridership estimates. 

They've also failed for a decade to recognize commuters need access to transit either by living near stations, have parking near stations, or near bus stops with routes to light rail station. However, the Link's limited capacity means whatever riders the extensions do attract will reduce access for current riders. 

The Board and CEO have both ignored the Northgate Link debut demonstration that the lack of access limited daily ridership to 8000, a fraction of Sound Transit’s website projected 41,000 to 49,000. That their decision to use the Link to replace bus routes into Seattle did little to reduce I-5 traffic volume. That without added access the Lynnwood and beyond extensions will do nothing to increase ridership or reduce I-5 traffic. That all the Prop 1 and ST3 “voter approved” extensions face similar problems. 

However, even with added access, the “voter approved” extensions 4-car trains lack the capacity for the riders required to reduce I-5 and I-90 congestion. That during peak commute, the limited capacity means adding parking to increase ridership access to extensions will end access for current Central Link riders before ever reducing congestion.  

Sound Transit should also recognize the loss in revenue from those not paying fares will be dwarfed by the revenue lost from lack of access and capacity. The revenue-lost problem will be exacerbated by the costs of operating Link Prop 1 extensions. Sound Transit has yet to release a “Service Performance Report-Q4 2021” that would have reflected the cost added by Northgate Link operation.  Instead, Sound Transit’s 2021 budget for light rail costs, $30.17 per vehicle revenue mile was used for the quarter.  

Each mile of extension adds 8 revenue vehicle miles for a 4-car train, adding $241.36 for a 4-car round trip.  The 4.2-mile Northgate Link added $1,013.71 for each trip from UW Station to Northgate and back; $126,714 for Sound Transit’s 125 weekday Link schedule. If the added ridership had been the 45,000 projected, the costs per rider would be $2.82, easily covered by those paying fares. However, it costs $16 per rider to enable the 8000 Northgate Link commuters, minimizing the farebox recovery from those who paid. 

The 8.5-mile Lynnwood Link will exacerbate both the operating cost and cost per rider. It adds $2051.56 to the trip, $256,445 daily and $383,159 total for Sound Transit’s 125-trip schedule. Without added access, the Link will add very few riders since most with existing access previously rode Northgate Link into Seattle. Thus. the Lynnwood extension will increase the cost of enabling the 8000 riders to $47.90 per rider. dwarfing any concern over whether they paid any fare. Again, however, adding parking for access to Lynnwood extension reduces cost per rider but exacerbates loss-of-access problem for University Link riders.

The solution to both the lack of capacity, high operating cost, and even failure to pay fares, is to use BRT routes rather than light rail to reduce I-5 and I-90 corridor congestion.  A 70-ft articulated bus can accommodate 116 passengers. A hundred of these buses an hour can accommodate 10,000 commuters an hour, more than 4-car light rail trains; and more could be added. 

 

Sound Transit 2021 budgeted bus operating cost as $12.95 per mile. If bus routes had been used, the 14-mile round trip from 5th & University to Northgate and back would’ve cost $181.30. Assuming 80% of the 8000 riders did so during the three-hour morning and afternoon peak commutes, a bus every 5 minutes, 72 total, could easily accommodate the 6400 riders at a daily cost of $13,053, $2.03 per rider. The remaining 1600 riders could have access to 40 off-peak routes costing $7252 daily, costing $4.53 per rider. The total daily cost would have been $20,305, a 6th of Northgate Link costs.  

Also, with buses the $3.25 fares, paid on entry, would provide $26,000 daily fare revenue exceeding operating costs. Clearly, adding BRT routes rather than using the Link to replace existing buses could have provided needed capacity at a fraction of Northgate Link cost; not to mention the nearly $2 billion spent on the extension.

Even greater savings could be achieved if BRT replaced the Lynnwood extension.  Routing the buses the additional 17 miles from Northgate to Lynnwood and back would add $220.15 for a total of $401.45 per round trip from Seattle to Lynnwood and back. The 72 peak hour trips would cost $28,904 making costs per peak commute rider $4.52 and 40 off-peak costs $16,058 or $10.04 per rider. However, the $26,000 fare from 8000 riders would cover more than half the $45,000 daily cost,  

 

The bottom line is Sound Transit’s problem isn’t from those not paying fares, it’s from 4-car light rail trains not having the capacity needed to reduce multilane freeway congestion and the high costs of enabling those riders. That BRT routes have the capacity to reduce freeway congestion and cost far less to operate. That money saved by not extending light rail tracks with their high operating costs could be used to implement local bus routes to stations providing commuters with access to those BRT routes into and out of Seattle. 

 

Sound Transit's real problem is that neither the Sound Transit Board nor their current CEO recognize that reality.  Since the Board can't be replaced the solution is they find a CEO that does.