An Alternative to ST Bus Base North Boondoggle

The following April 11^th Sound Transit System Expansion Committee agenda item caught my attention:

For Recommendation to the Board

Motion Mo M2024-19: Authorizing the chief executive officer to enter into an interlocal government agreement with the City of Bothell for transfer of development rights from Bus Base North, and to execute and record a transfer of development rights covenant for the Bus Base North property.

 

The reason being previous posts had questioned the Sound Transit System Expansion Committee’s authority to approve a Bus Base North (BBN). 

The 2016 Prop 1 voters approved included a ST3 Map PDF specifically listing Bus Maintenance Facility as “Not Included.”  Sound Transit plans to replace bus routes with light rail trains would seem to allow existing facilities to maintain the 48 buses planned for their Stride bus routes. 

 

Yet the Sound Transit Board in the July 27^th .2023 meeting approved Resolution No. R2023-17 to spend $499,500.000 on a Bus Base North. 17 with the following:

Adopts the Bus Base North Stride Bus Rapid Transit project baseline schedule and budget by (a) increasing the authorized project allocation to-date by $216,463,500 from $283,036,500 to $499,500,000.

Sound Transit had earlier decreed East King County would provide $215,391,000 of the $283,036,000, so it’s likely they’ll fund most of the increase. Snohomish funds paid $9,340,000 of the earlier number and presumable a similar percentage of the increase. Again, without questioning the need for the facility to maintain the buses.

 

Sound Transit needs for light rail vehicle maintenance led to the Board in 2014 approving a maintenance facility in the Bel-Red area’s Spring District. In 2017 they approved a design-build contract for the Operation & Maintenance Facility (OMF) East in Bellevue. An August 2020 OFM East “Facts Sheet” detailed it included “yard storage for up to 96 light rail vehicles, vehicle maintenance, parts storage and cleaning shop”. The 365-day operating facility would include administrative offices for approximately 250 full-time employees in support of East Link, Lynnwood Link, Downtown Redmond, and Federal Way Link Extensions.

 

One of the OMF East benefits was it had always included plans for Transit Oriented Development (TOD).  A 2024 Sound Transit Spring District Station TOD  included a picture of the 6.8-acre TOD site for a "Program of 500 homes and 400,000 SF for office."  It included Sound Transit and the City of Bellevue each providing property at no cost (a collective $12 million value) to support the development of affordable housing on the site. Bridge Housing and Touchstone had been selected to develop the property with approximately 500 units of housing, over 400,000 square feet of office space, retail, resident amenities on the ground floor, and public park space.

 

As suggested by the April 11 agenda, Sound Transits approach to developing property not needed for BBN after construction was far different. The presentation described it as a 526,000 SF-site, with 130,000 SF needed for an Administration & Operations Building, surface parking lot for workers, underground parking for 120 buses, and Maintenance Building.  The presentation detailed 171,000 SF was reserved for future development though it included the CEO’s declaration “it was surplus and does not have a transit use.”  

The agenda item M2024-19 dealt with the remaining 225,000 SF.  Apparently, to appease City of Bothell zoning concerns, Sound Transit agreed to a Transfer Development Rights (TDR) allowing Bothell to reap any benefits.  That the agreement was approved by Bothell last year, well in advance of the April 11 request they recommend board approval.  

 

The bottom line is the TDR result is Sound Transit loses all benefits from TOD from the $499.5 million they’ll spend on BBN.   It continues the boondoggle of their funding a maintenance facility that was stipulated in 2016 ST3 PDF as “not included” and whose 48 Stride buses didn’t need the 120-bus capacity of BBN.  It's time Sound Transit look more at existing facilities to maintain those buses.

Lynnwood Link’s Debut

The previous post questioned whether the new Megaproject hire, Terri Mestas, would recognize Sound Transit’s biggest problem is the Board doesn’t recognize 4-car light rail trains don’t have the capacity to reduce multilane freeway peak hour congestion and cost too much to operate off peak. 

That the Board compounds the lack-of-capacity problem by using it to replace bus routes. The result is the money and time spent implementing their transit expansion will result in a product that doesn't reduce congestion, it only increases transit operating costs. Adding to what area residents will be required to pay off\ the bonds that funded that failure, far beyond 2046.

This post details why the Lynnwood debut detailed in the April 5^th Seattle Times front page article typifies Traffic Lab failure to recognize that failure.  For example, it reports “thousands who currently transfer to trains at Northgate will take the whole way from the four new stations to the University of Washington and beyond”. The Traffic Lab apparently doesn't recognize using light rail to replace buses at Northgate reduced transit capacity into Seattle and nothing to reduce I-5 GP congestion.

It included a Sound Transit spokesman’s forecast the Link will add 5,000 to 35,000 riders to the 1 line’s 72,000 daily trips in late 2023.  The 5000-rider prediction, a substantial “adjustment” to the Sound Transit website’s 25,300 to 34,200.  The spokesman explained Sound Transit was “hedging their bets” in response to changing conditions. 

Their “hedging” resulted in adding a special Route 515, continue routing ST510 into and out of Seattle. They also doubled Sounder routes from Everett, another example of their “field of dreams” approach that if they provide it riders will come.

Again, neither Sound Transit nor Traffic Lab apparently recognize the Sound Transit goal should be to reduce I-5 travel times into Seattle.  An April 9^th WSDOT Travel Time reported the average travel time on the 15.2-mile Lynnwood-to-Seattle route at 7:30 was 40 minutes. That those on the HOV lanes did so in 28 minutes. Clearly Travel times for those riding buses into Seattle wasn’t the problem.

Sound Transit could have reduced the average Lynnwood-to-Seattle travel time by providing increased access to additional bus routes with minimal increase on HOV lane travel time. Instead, Sound Transit will spend $3.3 billion to allow those riding buses on HOV lanes to ride light rail into Seattle. 

Any travel time benefits for former bus riders will “likely” be offset by the need to egress and access in DSTT rather than multiple designated stops in Seattle. That access in DSTT for the return trip along with those with shorter routes will be a particular problem.  That the cost of providing that service will dwarf any savings in bus operating cost. Especially during off-peak operation with fewer riders in either 4-car train or bus.

The bottom line is the Traffic Lab Lynnwood Link article typifies their failure to recognize the folly of Sound Transit using 4-car light rail trains to replace bus routes into Seattle.  They’re apparently unaware those riding buses on HOV lanes are already traveling 30% faster than GP lane riders. That Sound Transit has spent $3.3 billion extending light rail that will add $200,000 to daily operating costs for light rail trains of dubious benefit to riders and no help for GP lane commuters.

Will Megaproject Hire Fix ST's Biggest Problem?

The March 28^th post opined Sound Transit’s biggest problem was a Board of Directors made up of elected officials who don’t understand the basics of effective public transit. That their goal should be to provide transit for those who can’t or don’t choose to drive in sufficient numbers to reduce congestion for those who do. And to do so in a cost-effective way . Instead, Dow Constantine’s board consists of those who've approved implementing light rail on I-90 Bridge center roadway for light rail and are willing to approve a light rail “spine” that doesn’t attract the riders needed and cost too much to operate.

A March 29^th Seattle Times Traffic Lab announcement,” Megaproject leader hired by Sound Transit with $600k salary”. indicated the paper had similar Sound Transit Board concerns.  Calling the hiring the result of “the immediate need by 18 “nonspecialist” members” of the transit board capable of steering the nation’s biggest transit expansion that’s already running years late”.  That their finance plan had soared to $145 billion (from $54 billion voters approved in 2016 with ST3) and “projects “currently trending two to five years late”.

A major reason for increased spending is that since 2016 the board’s Sound Transit System Expansion Committee has approved every Sound Transit request for additional funding without seriously questioning the need.  The most egregious example being the $499 million request for a bus base north the ST3 had stipulated was not included. That all the expansion committee’s recommendations had been approved by full board, again with minimal discussion of costs or merit.

However, the Megaproject hiring was probably not the result of Constantine finally conceding his board appointments had been nonspecialists. It was more likely the result of the Constantine board following the advice from a $2 million Transit Advisor Group (TAG) study. The hiring was one of six TAG recommendations to improve how Sound Transit process for implementing their planned transit expansion.

However, the TAG never advised Sound Transit their problem was not the process it was the product, the light rail spine.  Four-car light rail rains don’t have the capacity needed to reduce multilane freeway peak hour congestion and cost too much to operate off peak”.   That the light rail “spine” won’t reduce I-5 congestion into or out of Seattle. That using light rail trains to replace bus routes into the city reduces transit capacity, nothing to reduce GP lane congestion, and reduces access for current riders into Seattle.  The increased operating costs for the extensions will dwarf any fare box funds, especially during off-peak.

The Traffic Lab raised concerned with “the toughest route ahead, the $11.2 billion Ballard-to-Sodo connector.  It included a second tunnel under Seattle that won’t be available until 2039.  Apparently, like the board and TAG, not recognizing there would be no need for a second tunnel if the Ballard link were terminated at existing Westlake station. That the East Link and West Seattle Links could be terminated at the existing CID station. That those going beyond could use the existing DSTT. 

That doing so would expedite Ballard link operation and end the Line 1 link losing half the DSTT tunnel capacity to East Link and sharing its remaining capacity with West Seattle commuters until 1939 when second tunnel begins operation. That operating schedules for all three links could be matched to meet local demand.

The bottom line is the Sound Transit Board biggest problem is not the cost increases or the years of delay.  Its that the money and time spent implementing their transit expansion will result in a product that doesn't reduce congestion. That funding the bonds required and operating the extensions will be a financial strain for far beyond 2046.  Thus what they needed was someone who would recognize the folly of extending the light rail spine and using the extensions to replace buses. That Seattle didn’t need the years of disruption and the cost involved with a second tunnel.

The question remains whether Terri Mestas, “someone outside transportation” is the one to do it.

 

Sound Transit Board’s Biggest Problem

A previous post opined the Sound Transit Board’s decision to ignore the failure of the Northgate Link to meet expectations for ridership was more of a problem than finding places to store and maintain light rail cars when Lynnwood Link begins operation.  

This post details Sound Transit’s biggest problem is a Board of Directors made up of elected officials who don’t understand the basics of effective public transit.  That their goal should be to provide transit for those who can’t or don’t choose to drive in sufficient numbers to reduce congestion for those who do. And do so in a cost-effective way.

A transit system board should consist of people with the competence needed to oversee the creation of a transit system aimed at meeting that goal.  Instead, Dow Constantine’s board consists of those who've approved implementing light rail on I-90 Bridge center roadway for light rail and willing to approve a light rail “spine” that won't.  

For example, a competent transit board would have never approved Sound Transit confiscating the I-90 Bridge center roadway for light rail.  That doing so precluded 2-way, BRT-only with 10 times light rail capacity, 10 years sooner, at 1/10^th the cost.  Sound Transit compounded that failure by choosing to route trains through DSTT, halving the number of trains for Central Link.  

They add to the problem by using light rail to replace cross-lake buses, reducing transit capacity into the city.  Forcing I-90 corridor commuters to endure the hassle of transferring to and from light rail trains for the commute into and out of Seattle.  As the last station on east side, they’ll be sharing light rail train's remaining limited capacity with Mercer Island commuters: a particular problem during peak commute.  

The board has used the delay needed to redo track attachments to approve spending $47 million to implement an East Link Starter Line (ELSL).  Routing 2-car light rail trains every 10 minutes for 16 hours a day from Redmond Technology Center to South Bellevue Station.  At least initially, sharing access to transit with Rapid Ride E to Bellevue and ST 550 to South Bellevue.  The lack of access along route and the need to transfer to and from ST 550 at South Bellevue will limit ridership to far less than the 7000 initially predicted and operating costs that will dwarf fare box revenue.

The Board’s plan for the Lynnwood Link Extension (LLE) debut this fall is the next demonstration of the Board’s most expensive blunder. Their failure to recognize the light rail “spine” won’t reduce I-5 congestion into or out of Seattle. That 4-car light rail trains don’t have the capacity needed to reduce multilane freeway peak hour congestion and cost too much to operate off peak.   

Instead, the Boards used the ST3 approval to spend $54 billion from 2017 to 2041 to currently plan to spend $160 billion from 2017-2046 primarily on extending the spine.   A competent transit board would have never extended light rail beyond the UW stadium station.  The Northgate extension's October 2021 debut demonstrated the lack of access limited ridership to a fraction of 41,000-49,000 riders they’d predicted.  Rather than add parking to increase ridership Sound Transit used the link to replace bus routes into and out of Seattle.

Still ridership was far less than predicted and since the link did nothing to increase capacity, riders added reduced access from UW station.  Using the Link to replace bus routes into Seattle reduced transit capacity into the city and nothing to reduce I-5 GP lane congestion.   

Sound Transit plan for the Lynnwood Link Extension increases all the Northgate Link problems, replacing more bus routes, reducing transit capacity, and further limiting UW access. It also exacerbates the Northgate Link's high costs of operating light rail trains.

Sound Transit budgets light rail car costs at ~$30 per mile, more than twice that of a bus.  It’s unclear how many trains will have 3 or 4 cars or what their peak hour and off peaks schedule will be. However, the operating costs for the 8.5-mile extension and a reasonable schedule would add $200,000 daily to the Northland Link operating cost.  Dwarfing the operating costs of the bus routes its replacing and any fare box revenue from added riders.  Especially during off-peak operation.

The bottom line is the Sound Transit Board's biggest problem is their continued  failure to recognize that light rail trains on I-90 Bridge or the light rail "spine" on I-5 won't reduce roadway congestion into or out of Seattle. That the Board's hiring the Transit Advisory Group and private consultant improve the "process" for implementing those extensions will do nothing to improve the "product". The East Link Starter Line and Lynnwood Link Extension debuts this year will "likely" demonstrate that failure. The question remains whether the Seattle Times Traffic Lab will "dig into" that failure.

 

Climate Commitment Act’s Value?

The March 11 Seattle Times Climate Lab front page article concerning lawmakers’ attempts to show Climate Commitment Act’s (CCA)value describes it as “requiring the state’s biggest polluters to reduce the amount of climate warming gases they release or purchase allowances to cover them”.  That by raising the fees “to cover them” it’s intended to cut the state’s CO2 emissions nearly by half by 2030 and “carbon free by 2050”.  

However, a subsequent Climate Lab March 14^th article reported that “maturing the program” had resulted in halving the cost to “cover them”.  That the article included the contention the CCA’s main goal is to cut carbon pollution and “that’s what it’s doing”.  Yet there’s no estimate as to how much the CCAs already cut carbon pollution or effect on global warming.

Both articles typify the recent Seattle Times Climate Lab, an initiative that “explores the effects of climate change in the Pacific Northwest and beyond”.  While the articles detail the funds raised and how they will be spent, they failed to detail the potential benefits of the carbon taxes on climate.

For example, how much does the CCA reduce CO2 emissions.  A July 2023 U.S Energy Information, Energy-Related CO2 Emission Table 3 “State energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by sector” for 2021 reported Washington emitted 73.8 million metric tons (mmt) of the countries 4,911.2 mmt or only 1.56% of the country’s total. An October 2024 release of Table 3 will update the data and the result of the CCA’s $2 billion fees on CO2 emissions.

The limited emissions to date are the result of the state having access to hydroelectric and nuclear power generation.  A February 2024 “Choose Energy” website included data showing they generated 70% of the state’s electrical power.  That reducing CO2 emissions from electrical power to 9.8 mmt, 13.3% of total emission, compared to up to 50% of emissions for other states.  

The CCA’s effect on global warming is presumably due to how much it reduces global CO2 emissions. An ENGAR GHG “Emissions of all World Countries report for 2023 reported the United States made up 11.19% of the worlds.  Thus, in 2021, prior to CCA, Washington’s 1.56% of country’s 11.19% CO2 made up 0.17456% of the global CO2 emissions. That the CCA’s goal to reduce Washington's CO2 emissions by 50% by 2030 or “Carbon Free” by 2050 will have little effect on global emissions.  Especially since China that in the 2023 ENGAR GHG report made up 29.16% in 2023 is expected to increase emissions by 25% by 2030.

The bottom line is the CCA is more about the funds it generates than any attempt to reduce global CO2 emissions. That any “value” that results comes from where the funds are spent not from why they were accrued. The recent CCA’s halving the costs is clearly the result of the initiative.  That if the initiative fails there’s little to prevent future funding “needs” from increasing the CCA fees to “cover the emissions”.  That the two Climate Lab articles typify Seattle Times journalists willing to write what they’ve been told without attempting to validate the facts themselves.

Car Storage Not Sound Transit’s Real Problem

The March 9^th Seattle Times Traffic Lab article concerning storing light rail cars raises all sorts of questions.  The most obvious being, “Why did Sound Transit choose to use a Bellevue facility to maintain the Lynnwood extension trains?”  Using a facility along the route would’ve saved the need to route the trains across I-90, disrupting those along the route through Bellevue to reach the facility after midnight and return in the early hours of the morning.  

The other article prediction, the storing was needed to avoid the following:

 “packed trains this fall, when the new Lynnwood light rail extension brings thousands of new passengers”

The “thousands of new passengers” is presumably based on Sound Transit latest projection the Lynnwood Link Extension (LLE) would add 25,300 to 34,200 riders. (They had earlier predicted 37,000 to 57,000) An earlier Traffic Lab projection had parroted Sound Transit claims the Northgate Link Extension (NLE) was “Transit Transformed” with 42,000 to 49,000 added by 3 stations.  While Sound Transit stopped providing their quarterly service provided reports that would’ve provided the data, the best indication available is NLE ridership was less than a third of that level.  

The problem with NLE was it did nothing to increase Line 1 train capacity. Access was limited by the number of commuters living within walking distance of stations or having access to parking near stations, dropped off at stations, or to bus routes to stations.  Rather than add access with more parking, Sound Transit used the NLE to replace bus routes for those using existing parking for commute into and out of Seattle. Forcing bus riders to transfer to and from light rail for the commutes likely “dissuaded” commuters from using transit. 

The result being Sound Transit decision to NLE to replace bus routes into reduced both transit capacity and likely transit ridership into Seattle. It did nothing to reduce I-5 GP congestion and reduced access for those riding Light Rail 1 from UW station, all for very few commuters who were “new passengers”.

The 8.5-mile LLE exacerbates the NLE problems.  It does nothing to increase light rail capacity.  Sound Transit added access with parking was limited to 500 stalls at Lynnwood T/C and at North and South Shoreline Stations. Their concern over “packed trains at Lynnwood” prompted a new bus route, ST515, from Lynnwood and a stop for current ST510 route at Lynnwood for commutes into and out of Seattle during peak commute.  ST 512 will be terminated at Lynnwood rather than Northgate and all those riding Snohomish Community Transit SCT 400 buses will be required to transfer to LLE or NLE for the commutes. 

Again, like the NLE, LLE will reduce transit capacity into Seattle, do nothing to reduce I-5 GP congestion, reduce access for current Line 1 Link riders: all for very few commuters who were “new passengers”.  That any “packed trains” will be those from UW station, forced to share access with former I-5 bus riders, especially during peak commutes.  During off-peak operation three-or-four-car LLE train costs will dwarf those of the bus routes it replaces, slashing fare box recovery.

The bottom line is the light rail car storage issue pales in comparison to the problem from Sound Transit ignoring the NLE results. That like the NLE, the LLE lacks access for “new passengers”. That using light rail to replace bus routes reduces transit capacity into and out of Seattle and nothing to reduce I-5 GP congestion. That it adds to the NLE riders displacing Line 1 Link riders at a cost per rider that dwarfs fare box revenue, especially off peak.

3 Days of WSDOT I-405 $15 HOT Fee Results

An earlier post concluded “the March 1^st $5.00 increase just adds to the debacle of WSDOT imposing HOT on two HOV lanes”.  The debacle being the WSDOT apparently doesn’t understand the rationale for imposing HOT fees on HOV lanes.   That HOT can be used to reduce multilane freeway congestion by imposing fees on an HOV lane to achieve 2000 vehicles per hour.  More vehicles slow traffic below the 45mph optimum for maximum capacity and fewer vehicles waste capacity that could be used to reduce GP lane congestion.   The HOT fees can be adjusted throughout the day, raised to limit traffic during peak commute and reduced during off peak to attract the 2000 per hour that minimizes GP lane congestion.

 

The WSDOT approach to HOT on I-405 between Bothell and Bellevue was to limit the fees but to impose them on two lanes, increasing congestion on the remaining three GP lanes.  The WSDOT  2023 Express Toll reported the Bothell-to-Bellevue section achieved average speeds of 50 mph or greater: the Lynnwood to Bothell 46 mph, both during the peak period”. Thus prior to the decision to increase HOT fees the higher-than-45 mph speeds were already wasting capacity and doing so on two lanes between Bothell and Bellevue. The effect on the $5.00 increase on travel times is reflected on the WSDOT website wsdot.com Travel Time for routes between Bothell and Bellevue, and Lynnwood and Bellevue.  Subtracting the former from later can be used for Lynnwood to Bothell.

 

The average travel times for March 5^th,6^th, and 7^th at 7:45 am were assumed to reflect $15 tolls for the morning commute and 4:45 pm for the return commute.  The GP travel times between Bothell and Bellevue were 16.3 min and 44 min from Lynnwood to Bellevue. Comparable HOT travel times to Bellevue were 9 min from Bothell and 25 min from Lynnwood.  Subtracting the 9.4-mile Bothell to Bellevue section from 15.2-mile Lynnwood to Bellevue give 5.8 miles for Lynnwood to Bothell.  Subtracting the time for the Bothell to Bellevue from the time from Lynnwood gives travel times from Lynnwood to Bothell as 27.7 min on GP lanes and 16 min on HOT lanes.  

 

The 9 min HOV travel time for the 9.4-mile route between Bothell and Bellevue gives a 62.7 mph with the $15 fee, an indication the resulting reduced traffic did not result in commuters driving significantly faster than reported by WSDOT with $10 fee.  However, the additional traffic on GP lane increased travel time to 16.3 min and 34.6 mph, increasing the penalty for not paying the fee from the 9 min reported by WSDOT for $10 fee to 28 min for $15.  The 27.7 GP and 16 min HOV travel times for 5.8-mile Lynnwood-to-Bothell gives 12.6 mph on GP lane and 21.7 mph on HOT lanes, less than half the 46 mph the Washington Transit Commission quoted.  A clear indication the $5.00 increase did not reduce travel times.

 

A similar analysis for the 4:50 pm return times gives travel times and speed as 30 min and 18.8 mph on GP lane and 13 min and 44.8 mph on HOT lane from Bellevue to Bothell, increasing the 23 mph HOV advantage with $10 fee to 26 mph.  However, the 12 min on GP lane and 7 min on HOT lane on the 7.1-mile return trip from Bothell to Lynnwood gives 35.5 mph GP and 60.8 mph HOT lane velocity, three times the inbound velocity.  The reason being WSDOT added a GP lane of traffic along the route.

 

The bottom line is the three days of travel time data show reducing congestion on HOV lanes doesn’t assure increased velocity or reduced travel time. However, increasing congestion with additional traffic from those deterred by increased fees, significantly reduce velocity and increased travel times.  That on the Bothell-to-Lynnwood segment adding a GP lane dramatically increased both GP and HOV lane velocity.  A strong indication converting one of the two HOV lanes to a GP lane would reduce travel times between Bothell and Bellevue.  And reaffirming the recommendation the added lanes along the rest of the route  also be used for GP traffic not HOT.