Avoiding the East Link Debacle

 

Previous posts have detailed the June 9^th Sound Transit System Expansion Committee meeting had included a chart showing the Lynnwood Link debut “Target Date” had been delayed for at least two years.  That the Seattle Times Traffic Lab, who were asked to “dig into” why, had instead chosen to ignore it.  That, as a result, Sound Transit could delay another demonstration of the Northgate Link problems; the inability of 4-car light rail trains to reduce multi-lane freeway congestion during peak congestion and costing too much during off peak.  

Sound Transit still refuses to release their quarterly Service Delivered Performance Report 2021-Q4 and Quarterly Financial Performance Report 2022-Q1.  They would have provided how many of Sound Transit’s projected 41,000 to 49,000 riders actually used the 3 stations, how much did each boarding cost, and the farebox recovery of operating costs with the longer routes.

The best indication is the lack of parking with access to light rail stations or access to parking near bus routes to stations limited Link ridership to only 8000.  The Lynnwood Link exacerbates both problems by not adding capacity or parking for access during peak commute operation, and doubles operating costs, slashing fare box recovery,.  Again, delaying Lynnwood Link delays exposing Prop 1 light rail spine problems to Everett

However, the Lynnwood Link delay does nothing to delay the far bigger problems with the East Link debut in 2023. The July 7^th release of the May Agency Progress Report included a debut delayed from a June 30,2023 to Oct 20, 2023.  Whatever the date, the East Link debut will finally demonstrate that Sound Transit should have never been allowed to confiscate I-90 Bridge center roadway for light rail. That Sound Transit’s 2008 East Link DEIS claims for benefits were sheer fantasy.  

The Link’s confiscation of bridge center roadway precluded 2-way BRT routes with 10 times light rail capacity, 10 years sooner, at 1/10^th the cost.  Sound Transit violated Revised Code of Washington RCW 81.104.100 (2 )by failing to consider that far less expensive BRT option.

 

Sound Transit also essentially ignored Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation's environmental policy. It “Precluded approval of a transportation project that adversely affects waterfowl and wildlife refuges unless the impact is de minimis”.  Sound Transit spent millions shielding homes across Bellevue Way but nothing to protect the quiet solitude of the Mercer Slough Park. The route into Bellevue needlessly destroyed the city’s persona as “the city in the park”.

The East Link debut will confirm the debacle.  Rather than add transit capacity Sound Transit chose to use the $3.6B spent on East Link to replace all the I-90 Bridge bus routes.  They refuse to acknowledge the only way to reduce I-90 corridor congestion is to attract more commuters to public transit.  That attracting more riders requires providing commuters with local bus routes to transit stations with BRT routes into Seattle and Bellevue.

Instead, Sound Transit’s “bus intercept” agreement with Mercer Island terminates I-90 corridor bus routes on the island.  The agreement limits the number of corridor buses and requires those commuters to endure the hassle of being forced to transfer to light rail for the commute into Seattle.  The return trip will require they wait on the island for a bus back to their P&R.  Both a sure recipe for far fewer transit commuters when East Link debuts.  Avoiding that debacle requires most I-90 corridor buses bypass Mercer Island and route instead into Seattle.

Another East Link debut problem is Sound Transit plans to make the Link part of Line 2 and share tracks with Line 1 from Angel Lake through DSTT to Northgate and eventually to Mariner P&R near Everett.  Line 1 currently operates with 10-minute headways for 16 hours and 20-minute headways for 4 hours; 108 round trips daily.  Prior to East Link the 108, 8.4-mile round trips from UW to Northgate and back will add 3628.8 vehicle revenue miles for the 4-car trains. Sound Transit’s 2021 budget $30.17 cost per vehicle mile, so the link will add $109,481 daily.

  

When East Link debuts, maintaining the Line 1 schedule from Angel Lake and for Line 2 will double the number of routes through DSTT to Northgate, doubling the daily operating cost to $218,962.  When the Lynnwood Link does debut routing Line 2 the additional 8.5-mile extension will increase costs per trip from UW to Lynnwood and back to $3077 per trip, or $664,705 per day for the 216 trips. (It "may be" why Sound Transit has made the decision to delay if for two years)

  

The bottom line is Sound Transit's "bus intercept" plan will do nothing to increase the transit capacity needed to reduce I-90 corridor congestion.  That extending East Link though DSTT to Northgate and beyond will increase transit capacity and costs but nothing to increase access for riders.  Thus, costs for the extensions will dwarf any rational estimate for farebox revenue.  

The way to avoid the costs is to terminate Line 2 at the International District/Chinatown station.  Doing so allows Sound Transit to schedule Line 2 to meet transit capacity needs on the route through Bellevue to Redmond.  I-90 corridor BRT routes into Seattle could grow to meet the public transit demand needed to reduce congestion. If not, the East Link debut will force even the Seattle Times to concede the "likely"results of their decade long abetting Sound Transit's "voter approved" extensions.