ST Should Terminate East Link at Chinatown Station

The previous post opined Sound Transit needs to do more to “justify’ transit projects.  Assure the result of a transit project was a “product” that reduced congestion. At this point it’s too late to point out the result of the East Link project, an 1-90 bridge center roadway confiscated by light rail, is a product that won’t reduce congestion.  

 

This post details Sound Transit exacerbates that failure by extending East Link light rail train routes as Link Line 2 through the DSTT and eventually to the Mariner P&R.   The result will be a “product” whose operation will share Line 1’s DSTT train capacity and incur problems merging with Central Link trains to UW and beyond.  

 

For example, Link Line 1 trains currently run northbound every 8 minutes from Angle Lake to Northgate from 5:30 to 8:46 am.  When East Link trains begin operation as part of Line 2 will Sound Transit replace half of the Line 1 trains, with both lines every 16 minutes, or double the frequency with both every 8 minutes?   A “product” with 4 minutes between trains and capacity that far exceeds the number of I-5 commuters with access to transit and operating costs that dwarf fare box revenue.   That will also be difficult to safely merge, with trains returning from different route lengths through DSTT with the 4-minute intervals.

 

Sound Transit could avoid both problems by terminating East Link at the International District Chinatown Station.  Those wishing to go further can transfer to a Line 1 train.  Central Link commuters won’t have to share whatever the DSTT train capacity when East Link debuts. 

 

Separating East Link also allows scheduling its operation with number of light rail cars in each train and their frequency adjusted to meet east side demands rather than what’s needed along Line 2 to Northgate and beyond.   Doing so has significant cost savings with light rail trains cars costing ~$30 per vehicle mile.  The 16-mile East Link and Redmond extensions cost nearly $1000 for each car-round-trip.  Limiting number of cars would enable more frequent trains, especially during off-peak operation.

 

Limiting operation to meet Bellevue transit requirements would also end Sound Transit need to use East Link to replace I-90 corridor buses for riders.  It would end the need for Sound Transit to insist on a “Bus Intercept” agreement with Mercer Island, despite nearly universal islander objections.   I-90 corridor transit riders would no longer be forced to endure the hassle of transferring to and from light rail for their commute into and out of Seattle.  Mercer Island would no longer be forced to share its access to light rail or have their station inundated with thousands of transferees. 

 

The bottom line is, terminating East Link at International District/Chinatown Station, ends a “project” that spends billions for a “product” that reduces transit capacity into Seattle and increases I-90 corridor congestion.  The following from an October 5^threlease of, “Agency Progress Report: Capital Progress, August 2022” facilitates doing so: 

The East Link critical path this month continues to run through track remediation on E130, which is holding up E750 access to complete OCS and signal installation. The time required to complete all repairs is still being determined, which may result in an even longer path to completion. Other East Link Civil Contracts continue to be closely monitored for potential impacts to the E750 schedule. 

Sound Transit should use the delay to implement terminating East Link at International District/Chinatown Station and mitigate the East Link debacle.

Sound Transit Needs to Justify Transit Projects

                   I emailed the Sound Transit System Expansion Committee the      10/07/22  post on this blog.  It included the following conclusion:

A competent transit CEO would recognize the Sound Transit TDP won’t reduce congestion.  The next System Expansion Committee meeting will indicate whether she does.  If not, the East Link debut will demonstrate the result of the eastside and south Seattle having to split the number of DSTT trains.  Central Link commuters will lose half their current capacity and east side bus commuters will lose all bus transit routes into Seattle.   

A competent Julie Timm could hasten that result and save billions.

The video of the October 13^th System Expansion Committee reported the committee reported they’d received the email as part of “public comment”.  It was released as the “written in" comment “What the New Sound Transit CEO Could Do”.

The lack of any response and subsequent agenda was a clear indication neither the committee nor the new CEO had any interest in the issues it raised. Instead, the meeting consisted of presentations about “process” not “product”.  About how to proceed with “voter approved extensions” rather than whether those extensions would relieve roadway congestion.

The first was a “Comprehensive Review” by the Sound Transit Technical Advisory Group (TAG).   The “Key Takeaway” was the conclusion Sound Transit had “not got there as ready to proceed”.  That Sound Transit needed more “guidance” with a final report to be released early next year.   

One would have thought such a critical review of both Sound Transit Staff and Board would merit some response.  Instead, Board Chair, Kent Keel, called it “Refreshing and looking forward to hearing more details”.   

The next presenter concluded his review of all the Sound Transit’s reports led to a Cost Savings Plan to replace quarterly reporting requirement.  He was more pompous than probative as his plan to no longer release Quarterly Service Delivery and Financial Performance Reports ignores the need to update the public.

The next item detailed Sound Transit’s Chinatown International District Station engagement process. What was included in the CIP engagement tool kit.  Nothing that justified the decision the station was needed.

The last was a briefing about the “Delivery Methods” Sound Transit uses for transit projects.  That different delivery methods were chosen to assure the construction contract matched the needs of the project.  

Again, all about process for completing the project but nothing to justify the project.  For example, improving the process to construct the "product", the 130^th St Infill station, ignores the fact the $270B Station has no parking for access to trains.  Even more basic the Lynnwood extension it’s on does nothing to increase light rail capacity into Seattle.  

That nearly all those using available parking with access to extension are currently already riding buses to Northgate for the Link into Seattle.  Thus, the Lynnwood project will do little to reduce congestion no matter the benefit of the process improvements.  That none of the extensions will increase transit capacity into Seattle despite improving the process.

Sound Transit needs to do more to justify the projects.

 

Northgate Link Begins the Debacle

This post was prompted by the fact it’s over a year since the Oct 2, 2021, Northgate Link debut.  It was the first demonstration of Sound Transit’s ability to use Prop 1 funded light rail spine trains to reduce I-5 and I-90 congestion into Seattle.  ST’s website had predicted the 4.3-mile, $1.9B link would add 41,000 to 49,000 riders.  The Seattle Times Traffic Lab had heralded the debut as “Transit Transformed” claiming 42,000 to 49,000 commuters would be added by the Link’s three stations.  

 

Yet neither Sound Transit nor the Traffic Lab have provided any Link ridership results. (ST no longer releases the Quarterly Service Provided Performance Reports with ridership added by each station.)  Like all the extensions, the Northgate Link did nothing to increase the number of train cars per hour or the number of commuters who could ride in each car. Thus, like all the spine extensions, the Northgate Link did nothing to increase transit capacity into Seattle.

 

Sound Transit also did nothing to increase access to transit.  An Oct-Dec 2016, WSDOT “Park and Ride Inventory” reported all the parking with access to transit was essentially already “in use”.   Rather than add parking Sound Transit chose to require those using the existing parking to ride bus routes into Seattle to use the Northgate Link for the commute into and out of the city.  

 

King County Metro ended KCM 41 from Northgate.  Sound Transit’s ST511-513 from Everett was rerouted to Northgate and ST522 from Woodinville to Roosevelt Station. Ending the bus routes reduced total transit capacity into Seattle and nothing to reduce GP lane congestion.  Those former bus riders also reduced access for University Link riders.

 

Again, without Q4 2021 or later service provided reports it’s not clear have many commuters chose to ride Northgate Link.  However, the pre-pandemic ridership levels for the ST 510-513 and ST522 bus routes who rode the Link totaled less than 14,000 daily.  

 

Thus, with all the available parking essentially “In use”, the maximum possible terminated bus route commuters riding the Link would have been a fraction of Sound Transit and Traffic Lab predictions.  A precursor to a Lynnwood ridership access “problem” that only adds 500 stalls at the two Shoreline stations for Sound Transits claim for 37,000 to 55,000 riders. 

The other Northgate Link problem is the loss in farebox recovery from longer route operating costs. Sound Transits 2021 budgets Light Rail Car Revenue Vehicle Mile costs as $30.17. Thus, every mile of extension adds two miles and $241 for a 4-car round trip. The Northgate Link’s 4.2-mile extension from UW Stadium adds $1012 per trip, $126,500 for their schedule of 125-weekday trips.

  

Thus, even if the Link had attracted pre-pandemic ridership the cost per boarder would have been $9.00.  Whatever the costs per Northgate Link boarder, they’ll be dwarfed by those with Lynnwood extension.  The 8.5-mile Lynnwood extension will add $253,000 to the for 125-weekday trips, yet add only 1000 stalls for access. 

 

The bottom line is effective public transit requires providing the access needed to attract the number of commuters needed to reduce traffic for those driving.  The Northgate Link did nothing to increase light rail transit capacity or add access to public transit.  The debut demonstrated Sound Transit attempts to provide access by diverting bus riders to light rail reduced transit capacity into Seattle and still didn’t provide access needed for projected ridership claims.  

What remains to be demonstrated is that light rail train’s limited capacity means commuters added by extensions will end access for current riders without significantly reducing multilane freeway congestion.   What should have been obvious will apparently take billions and years for Sound Transit to "demonstrate".

 

What the New Sound Transit CEO Could Do

 

 

The previous post questioned why the Sound Transit Board had selected Julie Timm as their new CEO.  If it’s because she concurred with the Sound Transit “Transit Development Plan 2022-2077 they’ll continue to “Plan, build, and operate the largest transit expansion in the nation” she will continue perpetrating what will inevitably be considered as one of the biggest boondoggles in transit history.

This post details a competent public transit CEO could avoid that debacle.  Recognize public transit’s goal should be to provide transit for those who can’t drive or choose not to drive into Seattle and to reduce congestion for those who choose to drive. That reducing roadway congestion requires reducing vehicular traffic by attracting more commuters with access to routes and transit capacity into and out of Seattle.

A competent CEO would recognize the Sound Transit TDP for funding extending the Link does neither.  It doesn’t increase access with added parking or implement local routes from where commuters live to light rail stations.  Instead continuing a decade of Sound Transit refusal to add parking despite a WSDOT OCT-DEC 2016 “Park and Ride Inventory” reporting all of the parking with access to transit was essentially already “in use”. 

A competent transit system CEO would also recognize the TDP funded extensions do nothing to increase public transit capacity.  That transit capacity is determined by the number of vehicles per hour times the number of riders in each vehicle.  Extending light rail tracks do nothing to increase either.   Thus, a competent Julie Timm would recognize the folly of Sound Transit’s TD predicting the light rail spine will increase annual ridership will increase from 28,015,000 in 2022 to 73,756,000 in 2026.  

Sound Transit compounds the problem by using light rail trains on the track extensions to replace bus routes and transit capacity into Seattle. The TDP reflects the result with Express Bus “Revenue Vehicle Miles” reduced from 11,791,000 in 2023 to 8,755,000 in 2026 and Passenger Trips” dropping from 14,046,000 in 5,871,000.  

The bottom line is reducing congestion into Seattle requires increasing the number of public transit commuters.  Yet the TDP funded extensions do nothing to increase light rail capacity into the city.  That using the light rail extensions to replace bus routes into Seattle reduces total transit capacity into the city.  That the more bus replaced and the more riders added by extensions the greater the capacity lost by current riders.  

A competent transit CEO would recognize the Sound Transit TDP won’t reduce congestion.  The next System Expansion Committee meeting will indicate whether she does.  If not, the East Link debut will demonstrate the result of the east side and south Seattle having to split the number of DSTT trains.  Central Link commuters will lose half their current capacity and east side bus commuters will lose all bus transit routes into Seattle.   

A competent Julie Timm could hasten that result and save billions.

 

 

Questions for New Sound Transit CEO

  

Sound Transit finally has a new CEO, Julie Timm, a year after a Sept 24th, 2021 Seattle Times headline, "Sound Transit board ousting CEO".  The paper described his ouster with a photo caption:

Sound Transit CEO Peter Rogoff will be replaced in 2022 following more than six years of accomplishments with the agency

It was never clear why they decided to replace him as Board Chair Keel praised Rogoff with, "all but one of Sound Transit's seven major construction projects are on time and below budget".  Board member Claudia Balducci praised Rogoff for his "efforts to manage multiple projects across the region".  Member Roger Millar, the state transportation secretary, claimed "Mr Rogoff is going to be going out on a high note".  Yet all three chose not to renew his contract. 

 

Whatever the reason, the board’s “Rogoff” problem is not with why he was fired, it’s that he should have never been hired in the first place.  He never demonstrated an understanding of what constituted effective public transit.  As a result, his “six years of accomplishments” have continued a decade of Sound Transit’s spending billions on Prop 1 extensions that will do nothing to reduce congestion on I-5 and I-90 corridors into Seattle. 

 

Several blog posts have suggested Sound Transit would have difficulty finding his replacement.  That most potential transit system CEOs would recognize the folly of continuing funding those extensions. The result of a transit system board of directors made up of elected officials with “limited” transit system experience.  Thus, it’s reasonable to ask why they hired her.   

 

For example, what was her response to Sound Transit’s recent Transit Development Plan 2022-2027?  The TDP included a list of Strategic Priorities, Agency Goals, and Measure of Success for the next 5 years.  The 5 on the list didn’t include any mention of a normal transit goal, the need to provide effective transit for those who can’t drive or choose not to drive into Seattle and to reduce congestion for those who choose to drive?  

The TDP included a Light Rail (Link) Capital Improvement Chart with plans to spend $12.7B over the next five years on light rail extensions. A 2004 PSRC study, funded by Sound Transit, concluded their 4-car light rail train capacity was limited to 8880 riders per hour.  Was she aware of that limit or recognize extensions beyond UW station, across I-90 Bridge or beyond SeaTac do nothing to increase that capacity.  

Sound Transit clearly didn’t since the TDP Operating Data, 2021—2027, chart predicted the extensions when completed will increase annual Passenger Trips from 13,400,000 in 2022 to 51,800,000 in 2025.  Meanwhile, TDP bus annual passenger trips dropped from 13,651,00000 in 2022 to 5,871,000 in 2027.

Did she concur with the TDP’s Activities chart lacking any significant funding for parking, instead forcing bus riders to transfer to light rail into and out of the city.   Reducing bus routes reduced transit capacity into the city and nothing to reduce congestion.  Extension riders only reduced the access for current link riders.    

The bottom line is Sound Transit’s Transit Development Plan 2022- 2027 typifies a decade of transit system failure to reduce congestion.  Julie Timm was presumably chosen because she agreed with the TDP as part of the Board Chair's goal to continue to  “Plan, build, and operate the largest transit expansion in the nation”.  It’s only a question of when not whether it will also be considered one of the biggest boondoggles in transit history.

Seattle Times Abets Incompetent ST Transit Development Plan

The previous post opined the Northgate Link debut demonstrated Sound Transit Prop 1 light rail spine extensions will fail any rational public transit cost/benefit test for the commute into Seattle.   That it failed to provide effective transit for those who didn’t have access to vehicles or choose not to drive on the freeways into Seattle as well as reduce the congestion for those that do.  

This post details the Sound Transit Board of Directors adopted a Transit Development Plan 2022-2027 that exemplifies that failure.  That Sound Transit’s version of an effective transit system was detailed in TDP charts entitled Strategic Priorities, Agency Goals, and Measure of Success for the next 5 years. 

Strategic Priority 1: Design and deliver a customer-focused, high-quality and safe service

Agency Goal 1.1: Establish a robust and proactive safety culture               Measures of Success.

Monthly Safety News Link.                                                                         Developed Foundations Plan for achieving ISO certification

Agency Goal 1.2: Provide a passenger-focused experience from design through daily service.                                                                                                  Measures of Success.  

Improved passenger experience index.                                                       Baselined passenger complaint measures.                                                     Budget identified in 2022 to implement complaint resolution track system

The TDP charts also included the following priorities:

Strategic Priority 2: Deploy a performance-based, community-centric, and safe capital program

Strategic Priority 3: Cultivate an equitable, diverse, and inclusive workforce and culture that is high preforming, compassionate, empowering, and safe

Strategic Priority 4:  Transform and unify business practices and processes agency wide

Strategic Priority 5: Ensure financial stewardship exists in all decision-making to guarantee long-term affordability of the voter-approved plan

Notice Sound Transits TDP 2022 to 2027 priorities didn’t include providing effective public transit for commuters.  There was no priority or agency goal to provide access or transit capacity for commuters wishing to use it or to reduce freeway congestion for those choosing to drive.  

A Light Rail (Link) Capital Improvement Chart in the TDP for yearly link spending totaled $12.7B over the next five years with some of the 2027 funds on West Seattle-Ballard Link.  The Planned Activities chart in the TDP for the five years was more “optimistic” than recent Sound Transit schedules with East Link revenue service beginning in 2023 and Lynnwood, Federal Way and Downtown Redmond in 2024.  

The Planned Activities didn’t include adding any parking facilities near Link extensions.  Instead, Sound Transit recently confirmed plans to spend $270M on a 130th St Infill Station that won’t have parking.  Rather than add parking for access Sound Transit included the following in the TDP Activities charts

Revise service on ST Express between Bellevue and Seattle on I-90 and          allocate operating resources to East Link 

Revise service on ST Express between Lynnwood and Seattle on I-5 and allocate operating resources to Lynnwood Link extension 

Discontinue service on ST Express between Federal Way and Seattle on I-5 and allocate operating resources to Federal Way Link extension 

The revision being Sound Transit will use the Link to replace bus routes into and out of Seattle, reducing total transit capacity into Seattle.  The TPD ignores the results of using the Northgate Link to replace bus routes into Seattle.  That even with those transferring from buses the lack of access to the Northgate Link stations limited ridership to a fraction of Sound Transit’s 41,000 to 49,000 riders.  A “likely” precursor to similar results for all the TDP funded extensions given the similar lack of access.

The other TDP 2022-2027 problem is Sound Transit’s failure to recognize that the $12.7B spent on the extensions to Bellevue, Lynnwood, and Federal Way does nothing to increase the DSTT transit capacity into Seattle.  Yet the TDP Operating Data, 2021—2027, chart predicted the extensions when completed will increase annual Passenger Trips from 13,400,000 in 2022 to 51,800,000 in 2025.  Meanwhile bus passenger trips will decrease from 5,900,000 in 2022 to 5,100,000 in 2027.

The bottom line is Sound Transit’s TDP 2022-2027 will spend $12.7B on Prop 1 extensions that do nothing to increase transit capacity into Seattle.  That using the extensions to replace bus routes reduces public transit capacity and nothing to reduce congestion.   And it’s all abetted by an incompetent Seattle Times Traffic Lab.

 

ST Prop 1 Expansions Cost/Benefit Failure

 

The previous post detailed Sound Transit’s revenue problem wasn’t non-fare-paying riders but the excessive cost of providing the rides. That reducing  capital costs for light rail extensions and the costs for operating light rail trains on the extensions would dwarf any funding benefits from improving fare collection.  

 

This post details how the Sound Transit System Expansion Committee has failed to recognize the need for additional access to transit, the limited capacity of 4-car light rail trains, and the high costs of operating those trains.  The result being plans for funding Prop 1 extensions fail any rational cost/ridership benefit test.   

 

It began a decade ago when Sound Transit failed to recognize the costs of implementing light rail service on I-90 Bridge center roadway far exceeded any benefit for cross-lake commuters. Those living along the Bel-Red corridor had better access to bus service than what they’ll get with East Link.  The cost of implementing the service to Redmond, particularly during off peak commute, fails any rational cost/benefit assessment.

 

Those living along I-90 corridor also lost with Sound Transit decision to confiscate bridge center roadway for light rail. Sound Transit could have implemented two-way bus only BRT with 10 times light rail capacity 10 years sooner at 1/10^th the cost. When operation begins Central Link commuters will lose half of their trains and I-90 corridor transit capacity will be limited by Sound Transit’s “bus intercept” agreement with Mercer Island.  

 

That agreement forces transit riders to transfer to East Link on the island to commute into and out of Seattle.  Island commuters who, not only lost their SOV access to bridge center roadway, will be forced to share access with the transferees and East Link’s limited capacity.  It’s “unlikely”  the result will  attract additional transits riders.  It’s only a question of when it debuts before the debacle begins.

 

The Northgate Link debut would have normally already exposed the lack of benefits from Sound Transit’s light rail spine.  Nearly a decade ago a March 29, 2013, post on this blog urged Sound Transit use the University Station as a terminus for 520 BRT rather than extend light rail to Northgate. Thousands of commuters from both sides of the lake could benefit by using the station to connect 520 BRT with University Link light rail. (A 2^nd Montlake Bridge had initially been included to facilitate the connection.)

 

Northgate commuters already had access to excellent transit service. Metro Route 41 buses departed Northgate every 4-5 minutes during peak morning commute, taking 18 minutes to reach University St Station.  The afternoon return commute routes provided similar frequencies and commute times. The benefits from that service were reflected in Sound Transit's north end bus routes (ST510, ST511, and ST512) not even stopping at Northgate.  

 

Both Metro and Sound Transit could have added transit capacity, reducing congestion on I-5 into and in downtown Seattle at a fraction of the Northgate Link's cost.  The only limit to ridership was the number of commuters living near or with access to parking near stations.  Both were already “fully in use”.  Yet Sound Transit made no effort to add parking to increase the access.  Choosing instead to provide riders when the Link debuted ending Metro Route 41 and terminating ST 511 and ST 512 at Northgate, reducing total transit capacity into Seattle. 

Apparently neither Sound Transit nor Seattle Times recognized the light rail spine lacked both access and capacity.   Prior to the Northgate Link debut, the Seattle Times September 26th Traffic Lab article described it as, "Light rail ready to open at Northgate, changing more than just commutes".  It included the following regarding Northgate Link benefits.

Sound Transit has estimated the new Northgate, Rosevelt, and U-District stations that open Saturday will attract a combined 42,000 to 49,000 riders per day.

They apparently didn’t recognize that if 80% of those riders did so during the 3-hour morning and afternoon commutes University Link riders would lose access up to 2/3 of the link’s limited capacity. That clearly wasn’t the problem. It’s been nearly a year since the Oct 2^nd, debut and Sound Transit has yet to provide any actual Northgate Link ridership.  They stopped publishing their quarterly service provide performance reports that would have provided ridership added by each of the three Northgate Link stations. 

 

The best indication of the Northgate Link ridership is a 2022 Link Statistic chart in Sound Transit’s 2022 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget. It presumably reflects Sound Transit’s ridership estimate with a full year of Northgate operation.  Yet the chart reports predicted total Link ridership, 43,000, was 5600 less than the 48,600 they budgeted for 2021. (Despite the fact it also replaced Metro 41 into and out of Seattle.) Clearly someone at Sound Transit recognized Northgate Link 42,000 to 49,000 projections dwarfed actual ridership.

 

The bottom line is public transit should have two objectives. To provide transit for those that don’t have or don’t wish to drive vehicles into downtown Seattle and to reduce congestion on the roadways into Seattle for those that do.  That both should attempt to do so at minimal cost. Central Link succeeded in Seattle because large numbers of commuters lived along the route into downtown. 

 

They purposedly avoided adding parking to encourage more to do so.  The routes were relatively short so even off-peak operation costs were limited.  Sound Transit could have done more of the same by expediting rail links to West Seattle and Ballard.  Instead, they proposed and managed to get approval of Prop 1 extensions along far longer routes with limited access, for 4-car light rail trains that lack the capacity to reduce multilane freeway peak hour and cost too much to operate during off peak commute.

 

The Northgate Link debut was the first demonstration that the costs of implementing Prop 1 extensions dwarfs any potential benefit.  They do nothing to increase transit capacity into Seattle they only increase the costs, and nothing to reduce freeway congestion. Whatever riders they add also reduces access for current riders.  Sound Transit should not be allowed to avoid exposing that failure in order to perpetrate further Prop 1 extensions that add to the cost/benefit shortfall.