Sound Transit Board’s Biggest Problem

A previous post opined the Sound Transit Board’s decision to ignore the failure of the Northgate Link to meet expectations for ridership was more of a problem than finding places to store and maintain light rail cars when Lynnwood Link begins operation.  

This post details Sound Transit’s biggest problem is a Board of Directors made up of elected officials who don’t understand the basics of effective public transit.  That their goal should be to provide transit for those who can’t or don’t choose to drive in sufficient numbers to reduce congestion for those who do. And do so in a cost-effective way.

A transit system board should consist of people with the competence needed to oversee the creation of a transit system aimed at meeting that goal.  Instead, Dow Constantine’s board consists of those who've approved implementing light rail on I-90 Bridge center roadway for light rail and willing to approve a light rail “spine” that won't.  

For example, a competent transit board would have never approved Sound Transit confiscating the I-90 Bridge center roadway for light rail.  That doing so precluded 2-way, BRT-only with 10 times light rail capacity, 10 years sooner, at 1/10^th the cost.  Sound Transit compounded that failure by choosing to route trains through DSTT, halving the number of trains for Central Link.  

They add to the problem by using light rail to replace cross-lake buses, reducing transit capacity into the city.  Forcing I-90 corridor commuters to endure the hassle of transferring to and from light rail trains for the commute into and out of Seattle.  As the last station on east side, they’ll be sharing light rail train's remaining limited capacity with Mercer Island commuters: a particular problem during peak commute.  

The board has used the delay needed to redo track attachments to approve spending $47 million to implement an East Link Starter Line (ELSL).  Routing 2-car light rail trains every 10 minutes for 16 hours a day from Redmond Technology Center to South Bellevue Station.  At least initially, sharing access to transit with Rapid Ride E to Bellevue and ST 550 to South Bellevue.  The lack of access along route and the need to transfer to and from ST 550 at South Bellevue will limit ridership to far less than the 7000 initially predicted and operating costs that will dwarf fare box revenue.

The Board’s plan for the Lynnwood Link Extension (LLE) debut this fall is the next demonstration of the Board’s most expensive blunder. Their failure to recognize the light rail “spine” won’t reduce I-5 congestion into or out of Seattle. That 4-car light rail trains don’t have the capacity needed to reduce multilane freeway peak hour congestion and cost too much to operate off peak.   

Instead, the Boards used the ST3 approval to spend $54 billion from 2017 to 2041 to currently plan to spend $160 billion from 2017-2046 primarily on extending the spine.   A competent transit board would have never extended light rail beyond the UW stadium station.  The Northgate extension's October 2021 debut demonstrated the lack of access limited ridership to a fraction of 41,000-49,000 riders they’d predicted.  Rather than add parking to increase ridership Sound Transit used the link to replace bus routes into and out of Seattle.

Still ridership was far less than predicted and since the link did nothing to increase capacity, riders added reduced access from UW station.  Using the Link to replace bus routes into Seattle reduced transit capacity into the city and nothing to reduce I-5 GP lane congestion.   

Sound Transit plan for the Lynnwood Link Extension increases all the Northgate Link problems, replacing more bus routes, reducing transit capacity, and further limiting UW access. It also exacerbates the Northgate Link's high costs of operating light rail trains.

Sound Transit budgets light rail car costs at ~$30 per mile, more than twice that of a bus.  It’s unclear how many trains will have 3 or 4 cars or what their peak hour and off peaks schedule will be. However, the operating costs for the 8.5-mile extension and a reasonable schedule would add $200,000 daily to the Northland Link operating cost.  Dwarfing the operating costs of the bus routes its replacing and any fare box revenue from added riders.  Especially during off-peak operation.

The bottom line is the Sound Transit Board's biggest problem is their continued  failure to recognize that light rail trains on I-90 Bridge or the light rail "spine" on I-5 won't reduce roadway congestion into or out of Seattle. That the Board's hiring the Transit Advisory Group and private consultant improve the "process" for implementing those extensions will do nothing to improve the "product". The East Link Starter Line and Lynnwood Link Extension debuts this year will "likely" demonstrate that failure. The question remains whether the Seattle Times Traffic Lab will "dig into" that failure.

 

Climate Commitment Act’s Value?

The March 11 Seattle Times Climate Lab front page article concerning lawmakers’ attempts to show Climate Commitment Act’s (CCA)value describes it as “requiring the state’s biggest polluters to reduce the amount of climate warming gases they release or purchase allowances to cover them”.  That by raising the fees “to cover them” it’s intended to cut the state’s CO2 emissions nearly by half by 2030 and “carbon free by 2050”.  

However, a subsequent Climate Lab March 14^th article reported that “maturing the program” had resulted in halving the cost to “cover them”.  That the article included the contention the CCA’s main goal is to cut carbon pollution and “that’s what it’s doing”.  Yet there’s no estimate as to how much the CCAs already cut carbon pollution or effect on global warming.

Both articles typify the recent Seattle Times Climate Lab, an initiative that “explores the effects of climate change in the Pacific Northwest and beyond”.  While the articles detail the funds raised and how they will be spent, they failed to detail the potential benefits of the carbon taxes on climate.

For example, how much does the CCA reduce CO2 emissions.  A July 2023 U.S Energy Information, Energy-Related CO2 Emission Table 3 “State energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by sector” for 2021 reported Washington emitted 73.8 million metric tons (mmt) of the countries 4,911.2 mmt or only 1.56% of the country’s total. An October 2024 release of Table 3 will update the data and the result of the CCA’s $2 billion fees on CO2 emissions.

The limited emissions to date are the result of the state having access to hydroelectric and nuclear power generation.  A February 2024 “Choose Energy” website included data showing they generated 70% of the state’s electrical power.  That reducing CO2 emissions from electrical power to 9.8 mmt, 13.3% of total emission, compared to up to 50% of emissions for other states.  

The CCA’s effect on global warming is presumably due to how much it reduces global CO2 emissions. An ENGAR GHG “Emissions of all World Countries report for 2023 reported the United States made up 11.19% of the worlds.  Thus, in 2021, prior to CCA, Washington’s 1.56% of country’s 11.19% CO2 made up 0.17456% of the global CO2 emissions. That the CCA’s goal to reduce Washington's CO2 emissions by 50% by 2030 or “Carbon Free” by 2050 will have little effect on global emissions.  Especially since China that in the 2023 ENGAR GHG report made up 29.16% in 2023 is expected to increase emissions by 25% by 2030.

The bottom line is the CCA is more about the funds it generates than any attempt to reduce global CO2 emissions. That any “value” that results comes from where the funds are spent not from why they were accrued. The recent CCA’s halving the costs is clearly the result of the initiative.  That if the initiative fails there’s little to prevent future funding “needs” from increasing the CCA fees to “cover the emissions”.  That the two Climate Lab articles typify Seattle Times journalists willing to write what they’ve been told without attempting to validate the facts themselves.

Car Storage Not Sound Transit’s Real Problem

The March 9^th Seattle Times Traffic Lab article concerning storing light rail cars raises all sorts of questions.  The most obvious being, “Why did Sound Transit choose to use a Bellevue facility to maintain the Lynnwood extension trains?”  Using a facility along the route would’ve saved the need to route the trains across I-90, disrupting those along the route through Bellevue to reach the facility after midnight and return in the early hours of the morning.  

The other article prediction, the storing was needed to avoid the following:

 “packed trains this fall, when the new Lynnwood light rail extension brings thousands of new passengers”

The “thousands of new passengers” is presumably based on Sound Transit latest projection the Lynnwood Link Extension (LLE) would add 25,300 to 34,200 riders. (They had earlier predicted 37,000 to 57,000) An earlier Traffic Lab projection had parroted Sound Transit claims the Northgate Link Extension (NLE) was “Transit Transformed” with 42,000 to 49,000 added by 3 stations.  While Sound Transit stopped providing their quarterly service provided reports that would’ve provided the data, the best indication available is NLE ridership was less than a third of that level.  

The problem with NLE was it did nothing to increase Line 1 train capacity. Access was limited by the number of commuters living within walking distance of stations or having access to parking near stations, dropped off at stations, or to bus routes to stations.  Rather than add access with more parking, Sound Transit used the NLE to replace bus routes for those using existing parking for commute into and out of Seattle. Forcing bus riders to transfer to and from light rail for the commutes likely “dissuaded” commuters from using transit. 

The result being Sound Transit decision to NLE to replace bus routes into reduced both transit capacity and likely transit ridership into Seattle. It did nothing to reduce I-5 GP congestion and reduced access for those riding Light Rail 1 from UW station, all for very few commuters who were “new passengers”.

The 8.5-mile LLE exacerbates the NLE problems.  It does nothing to increase light rail capacity.  Sound Transit added access with parking was limited to 500 stalls at Lynnwood T/C and at North and South Shoreline Stations. Their concern over “packed trains at Lynnwood” prompted a new bus route, ST515, from Lynnwood and a stop for current ST510 route at Lynnwood for commutes into and out of Seattle during peak commute.  ST 512 will be terminated at Lynnwood rather than Northgate and all those riding Snohomish Community Transit SCT 400 buses will be required to transfer to LLE or NLE for the commutes. 

Again, like the NLE, LLE will reduce transit capacity into Seattle, do nothing to reduce I-5 GP congestion, reduce access for current Line 1 Link riders: all for very few commuters who were “new passengers”.  That any “packed trains” will be those from UW station, forced to share access with former I-5 bus riders, especially during peak commutes.  During off-peak operation three-or-four-car LLE train costs will dwarf those of the bus routes it replaces, slashing fare box recovery.

The bottom line is the light rail car storage issue pales in comparison to the problem from Sound Transit ignoring the NLE results. That like the NLE, the LLE lacks access for “new passengers”. That using light rail to replace bus routes reduces transit capacity into and out of Seattle and nothing to reduce I-5 GP congestion. That it adds to the NLE riders displacing Line 1 Link riders at a cost per rider that dwarfs fare box revenue, especially off peak.

3 Days of WSDOT I-405 $15 HOT Fee Results

An earlier post concluded “the March 1^st $5.00 increase just adds to the debacle of WSDOT imposing HOT on two HOV lanes”.  The debacle being the WSDOT apparently doesn’t understand the rationale for imposing HOT fees on HOV lanes.   That HOT can be used to reduce multilane freeway congestion by imposing fees on an HOV lane to achieve 2000 vehicles per hour.  More vehicles slow traffic below the 45mph optimum for maximum capacity and fewer vehicles waste capacity that could be used to reduce GP lane congestion.   The HOT fees can be adjusted throughout the day, raised to limit traffic during peak commute and reduced during off peak to attract the 2000 per hour that minimizes GP lane congestion.

 

The WSDOT approach to HOT on I-405 between Bothell and Bellevue was to limit the fees but to impose them on two lanes, increasing congestion on the remaining three GP lanes.  The WSDOT  2023 Express Toll reported the Bothell-to-Bellevue section achieved average speeds of 50 mph or greater: the Lynnwood to Bothell 46 mph, both during the peak period”. Thus prior to the decision to increase HOT fees the higher-than-45 mph speeds were already wasting capacity and doing so on two lanes between Bothell and Bellevue. The effect on the $5.00 increase on travel times is reflected on the WSDOT website wsdot.com Travel Time for routes between Bothell and Bellevue, and Lynnwood and Bellevue.  Subtracting the former from later can be used for Lynnwood to Bothell.

 

The average travel times for March 5^th,6^th, and 7^th at 7:45 am were assumed to reflect $15 tolls for the morning commute and 4:45 pm for the return commute.  The GP travel times between Bothell and Bellevue were 16.3 min and 44 min from Lynnwood to Bellevue. Comparable HOT travel times to Bellevue were 9 min from Bothell and 25 min from Lynnwood.  Subtracting the 9.4-mile Bothell to Bellevue section from 15.2-mile Lynnwood to Bellevue give 5.8 miles for Lynnwood to Bothell.  Subtracting the time for the Bothell to Bellevue from the time from Lynnwood gives travel times from Lynnwood to Bothell as 27.7 min on GP lanes and 16 min on HOT lanes.  

 

The 9 min HOV travel time for the 9.4-mile route between Bothell and Bellevue gives a 62.7 mph with the $15 fee, an indication the resulting reduced traffic did not result in commuters driving significantly faster than reported by WSDOT with $10 fee.  However, the additional traffic on GP lane increased travel time to 16.3 min and 34.6 mph, increasing the penalty for not paying the fee from the 9 min reported by WSDOT for $10 fee to 28 min for $15.  The 27.7 GP and 16 min HOV travel times for 5.8-mile Lynnwood-to-Bothell gives 12.6 mph on GP lane and 21.7 mph on HOT lanes, less than half the 46 mph the Washington Transit Commission quoted.  A clear indication the $5.00 increase did not reduce travel times.

 

A similar analysis for the 4:50 pm return times gives travel times and speed as 30 min and 18.8 mph on GP lane and 13 min and 44.8 mph on HOT lane from Bellevue to Bothell, increasing the 23 mph HOV advantage with $10 fee to 26 mph.  However, the 12 min on GP lane and 7 min on HOT lane on the 7.1-mile return trip from Bothell to Lynnwood gives 35.5 mph GP and 60.8 mph HOT lane velocity, three times the inbound velocity.  The reason being WSDOT added a GP lane of traffic along the route.

 

The bottom line is the three days of travel time data show reducing congestion on HOV lanes doesn’t assure increased velocity or reduced travel time. However, increasing congestion with additional traffic from those deterred by increased fees, significantly reduce velocity and increased travel times.  That on the Bothell-to-Lynnwood segment adding a GP lane dramatically increased both GP and HOV lane velocity.  A strong indication converting one of the two HOV lanes to a GP lane would reduce travel times between Bothell and Bellevue.  And reaffirming the recommendation the added lanes along the rest of the route  also be used for GP traffic not HOT.