Constantine's Incompetent Sound Transit Board

The Seattle Times October 14th front page article, "Constantine, Nguyen snipe over competency, urgency" and their subsequent Constantine recommendation  prompted this post.  The article credits Constantine, "With helping make possible Sound Transit's continued expansion", clearly failing to recognize the agency's decade of incompetence under his leadership.  The incompetence was the reason I was one of the "non-serious" county executive candidates in 2017 and earlier this year.  Not to win, but to use the Voters' Pamphlet to inform residents about Constantine's failure to select competent directors to the Sound Transit Board.

For example, the Board referred to Prop 1 approval in 2008 as "a gift to our grand children."  They either failed to recognize the need for transit capacity or that extensions routed through the DSTT lacked the needed capacity.  A 2004 PSRC study, funded by Sound Transit, concluded the DSTT stations limited light rail trains to four cars and that safe operation required a minimum of 4 minutes between train.

The resultant 60 cars per hour and 148 riders per car provide 8880 rider-per-hour capacity in each direction, far less than what's needed to reduce congestion.  Routing half the trains across I-90 Bridge halves that capacity to Bellevue and SeaTac.  The billions and years spent extending light rail beyond UW,  SeaTac, and Bellevue will do nothing to increase that capacity.  Yet Constantine and his board continue to approve budgets projecting annual Link ridership will increase from 22 million in 2017 to 162 million in 2041.

Since Prop 1 passed Constantine and the Board have refused to add bus routes to increase transit capacity into Seattle.  A hundred high capacity buses an hour could've easily accommodated 10,000 passengers an hour; and more could be added. (900 buses an hour use a bus lane onto Manhattan Island.)

The bus routes could have been facilitated using a lane limited to buses or vehicles willing to pay tolls.  Limiting traffic to 2000 vehicles per hour (vph) assures 45 mph velocities.  The tolls could be raised to limit traffic to 2000 vph with whatever additional bus routes are needed.  The 10,000 transit riders would've reduced congestion on remaining I-5 lanes and eliminated 10,000 vehicles an hour on city streets.  And more routes could have been added.

Constantine and his board not only failed to understand the benefits of increased bus capacity, they failed to recognize commuters need access to any transit mode.  All of the P&R lots with access to bus routes or future light rail stations have been full for years.  Yet Constantine and his Board have spent a decade refusing to add parking with no plans for significant additions until at least 2041. 

Instead, Sound Transit is generating ridership by choosing to use the Link to replace bus routes into Seattle.  While using light rail to replace bus routes may provide those with access more reliable commute times, doing so will do nothing to reduce travel times for those without access.  The benefits of reducing bus routes into Seattle pale in comparison to the benefits of eliminating 10,000 vehicles an hour into the city with an additional 100 bus routes.  Again, and more buses could be added.

The bottom line is Dow Constantine's selection of Sound Transit Board members have failed to demonstrate a modicum if public transit competence.  The Seattle Times crediting him, "With helping make possible Sound Transit's continued expansion,"  demonstrates the paper's decade-long failure to recognize the incompetence. 

Sound Transit's Farebox Recovery Problem

The Sound Transit Board waited until Sept 23rd to release the "Farebox Recovery Report 2020".  it included the following regarding policy and pandemic affects on farebox recovery requirements:

Sound Transit policy establishes that farebox revenue must recover a specified percentage of operation costs.  The percentage of farebox revenue to operating costs is called the farebox recovery ratio.  Sound Transit calculates farebox recovery ratios by dividing fare revenues by direct and indirect service operating costs.  Sound Transit policy was most recently stated in ST Board Resolution No. R2014-27, which establishes minimum farebox recovery ratio thresholds as follows:

Link: 40%   ST Express: 20%  Sounder: 23%

The Link's higher recovery ratio threshold is an attempt to account for the fact that operating costs of light rail cars are more than twice those of express buses. The 2020 report continues with the following regarding farebox recovery results:

In 2020, all modes saw a drop in farebox recovery rates due to reduced ridership as a result of the pandemic and economic conditions.

ST Express bus farebox revenue was 10% of operating costs in 2020: lower than the 20% minimum policy threshold .

Sounder farebox revenue was 11% of operating costs in 2020; lower than the 23% minimum policy threshold.

Link farebox revenue was 8% of operating costs in 2020; lower than the 40% minimum threshold.

Clearly all three transit modes in 2020 failed to meet farebox recovery targets.  Sound Transit previously provided farebox recovery results with "Service Delivery Quarterly Performance Reports" detailing boardings and cost per boarding, and "Quarterly Financial Performance Reports" regarding farebox revenue and operating costs. However, the "Q1 2021 Service Delivery Quarterly Performance Report" is the last they've released and they have yet to release a "Quarterly Financial Performance Report" in 2021.

Whatever those results the Northgate Link debut will surely add to the farebox  revenue recovery shortfall.  Sound Transit's March "2021 Financial Plan and Adopted Budget" reported Link light rail operating costs as $30.17 per Revenue Vehicle Mile or $253.43 per car for the 8.4 miles added by the round trip from UW to Northgate and back.

The August 12th Transit Development Plan included a scheduled frequency requiring 84 round trips costing $21,288 per day per car, or $85,152 for the 4-car trains.  Thus it's only a question of when Sound Transit releases the riders and farebox revenue added daily at the three stations to provide costs per rider and farebox revenue shortfall.

The Sound Transit Board should require the October 28th meeting agenda include the Northgate Link's initial ridership, cost per rider, and  farebox recovery ratio.  Not only as an early precursor of higher costs and increasing revenue shortfall with future light rail spine debuts, but to justify expediting a West Seattle-to-Ballard Link that avoids them.

Sound Transit Board Sould Also Be Replaced

The Sept 24th Seattle Times headline "Sound Transit board ousting CEO" is something a competent transit board would have done nearly three years ago.  A December 10th 2018 post responded to a Times request for, "Headlines readers would like to see in 2019" with,  "Sound Transit Board Fires CEO Peter Rogoff".  It concluded:

The bottom line is the Sound Transit Board should fire Rogoff.  He not only fails to recognize the DSTT limitations on light rail capacity, he refuses to implement the transit capacity available with added bus service.  He also refused to add the parking needed for access to either transit mode.  That riders added by the light rail extensions will reduce or potentially end access for current riders.

The lack of capacity conclusion was based on a 2004 PSRC report, funded by the Board, that the DSTT limited Central Link capacity to 8880 riders per hour in each direction. Yet Rogoff's 2019 long-term budget claimed 162 million in 2041,  approximately 500,000 weekday riders

The failure to add bus transit conclusion was reflected in Rogoff's 2021 budget continuing the Board's decade long refusal to increase bus transit capacity until at least 2041.  Neither Rogoff nor the Board recognized the need to provide added parking for riders with access to light rail or buses for the commutes into and out of Seattle.

Instead the Board approved Rogoff's 2019 budget expanding the funding voters approved in 2016 for ST3 taxes from 2017-2041 for a $54B transit system expansion to $96B with $17B in debt when ST3 funding ended.  They demonstrated Rogoff approval by extending his contract for another three years with a hefty raise.

The Seattle Times article described his ouster with a photo caption:

Sound Transit CEO Peter Rogoff will be replaced in 2022 following more than six years of accomplishments with the agency

Calling his tenure "six years of accomplishments" raises questions as to why the Board terminated him.  The article cites a "consultant report issued in August found management problems, including flaws in how the agency studied its soaring real estate costs and staff not knowing when to expose bad news"

Yet the Sound Transit Board's Sept 23rd agenda authorized him to implement several items and made no mention of his "future status".  All of his recommendations to the Board had been unanimously approved. The Times article reported the decision was "just nine days before the region celebrates new light rails stations at Northgate, Roosevelt, and U District, expected to attract 45,000 or more daily passengers".

Board Chair Keel praised Rogoff with, "all but one of Sound Transit's seven major construction projects are on time and below budget".  Board member Claudia Balducci praised Rogoff for his "efforts to manage multiple projects across the region".  Member Roger Millar, the state transportation secretary, claimed "Mr Rogoff is going to be going out on a high note".  Yet all three chose not to renew his contract.

The Times claims "the CEO still must grapple with the $6.5 billion Ballard to West Seattle."  Yet abides Sound Transit "Spending from 2017-46 is estimated at $131 billion for present and future programs". Apparently the Board's expansion of the $54 billion transit system voters approved in 2016 to $131 billion for present and future programs didn't include the Ballard-to-West Seattle project.

The statement also reflects the Board and Seattle Times failure to recognize the voters approved the taxes not the projects, and from 2017-2041, not 2046.  The Board and Times also both ignore the ST3 plan voters approved was to provide taxes from 2017 to 2041 to fund a $54 billion transit system expansion.

The bottom line is a competent Sound Transit Board would not have renewed Rogoff's contract three years ago.  His 2019 budget's long-range claims for ridership were delusional, didn't add access to transit, and failed to recognize BRT benefits.  The Board renewed it then because they'd spent the years since Prop 1 approval doing exactly the same.  They'd already made a major blunder by extending Central Link from UW rather than a second tunnel that would have served those going to South Lake Union.

Since his renewal the Board has done nothing to add parking or bus transit.  Instead approved spending $6B competing the Northgate Link, extending light rail to Lynnwood and beyond, across I-90 to Overlake and beyond, and to Federal Way and beyond

The Northgate Link debut will be the first to demonstrate the results of Rogoff's "six years of accomplishments".  That the $1.9B extensions doesn't reduce I-5 congestion into Seattle.  That the number of those who chose to use light rail for their commutes into and out of Seattle is far short of the 45,000 daily projected.  That the "cost per boarding" is far higher and "fare box recovery" far lower than the $11.67 and 15.1% predicted in Sound Transit's 2021 Financial Plan and Projected Budget". A precursor for results from current extension plans.

A more competent Board would have recognized the likelihood of those results three years ago. They need to be replaced.  

Northgate Link's Transit Transformation?

This week's Seattle Times Traffic Lab articles heralding the benefits of Northgate Link debut this Saturday typify the paper's more than decade long cheerleading Prop 1 extensions.  The September 26th article, "Transit Transformation" describes it as "Light rail ready to open at Northgate, changing more than just commutes".  It includes the following regarding Northgate Link benefits.

Sound Transit has estimated the new Northgate, Rosevelt, and U-District stations that open Saturday will attract a combined 42,000 to 49,000 riders per day.

The article reports "neighborhoods are growing" with additional housing units near stations at Northgate, Roosevelt, and UW.  A Northgate station photo shows 4-car trains on tracks alongside 4 GP and 2 express lanes on I-5 into Seattle.  The claim that four-car trains will "transform" the commute on the six lanes would seem to ignore reality.  Especially since Sound Transit intends to use the link to replace bus routes on express lanes not vehicles on GP lanes.

Even Sound Transit agrees, with the article limiting light rail benefits:

Sound Transit no longer promises to make driving faster, but to offer alternatives to traffic jams, including the 177,000 daily vehicles that clog I-5 at Northgate

However, those able to use light rail as an "alternative to traffic jams" will be limited by the lack of access to sufficient light rail capacity and its failure to serve South Lake Union area.  Sound Transit has  refused to add parking for access, choosing instead to transfer those riding buses to light rail for ridership.  The only ones with access at Northgate will be early arrivals at parking near light rail stations or connecting bus routes.  Even those with access may reject the hassle of accessing light rail in DSTT and need to transfer back to buses for their return.

Time will tell whether the Traffic Lab Sept 28th and Sept 29th articles claiming Roosevelt and U-District benefits from Northgate Link access are valid.  Neither has the parking needed for large numbers to  access the link.  What will quickly be apparent, reducing bus routes from Northgate does little to reduce the 177,000 vehicles and congestion on I-5.

Those who access at Northgate, Roosevelt, and U District will reduce access for University Link commuters.  The Seattle Times companion  article in the 26th edition, "Fast facts about Northgate light rail before it opens Saturday" details the problem:

Sound Transit will operate four rail cars per train, for ideal capacity of 600 people, or 4,500 riders per hour per direction, at peak eight -minute frequency.

During peak commute reducing 10 or 20 buses an hour on I-5 express lane will do little to reduce I-5 congestion.  However the 1000 or 2000 transferees will severely limit access at University link stations during peak commute.  During off-peak operation, the lack of access with parking near Northgate link will result in largely empty four-car trains.  The result being a large revenue/operating cost shortfall from link.

The bottom line is the $1.9B Northgate Link debut will demonstrate whether it is the "Transit Transformation" the Traffic Lab maintains, or as Sound Transit concedes, "won't make driving faster", or "offers an alternative to traffic jams". 

The only "driving faster" indication, WSDOT report for Lynnwood- and Everett-to-Seattle travel times, is unlikely to be conclusive.  The "alternative to traffic jams" can be judged by the number of riders added and how it compares with Sound Transit claim,"Northgate, Roosevelt, and U-District stations that open Saturday will attract a combined 42,000 to 49,000 riders per day".

The riders added at each station along with Sound Transit light rail cost per vehicle mile will provide costs per rider and fare box revenue shortfall.  It's the first demonstration of Prop 1 extensions' ability to reduce congestion and what that reduction will cost.  Sound Transit will be monitoring the ridership daily.  They need to expedite the release of that ridership and its cost as a precursor to future Prop 1 operation results.  

ST Northgate Link Debut Data Release

The previous post opined the Northgate Link debut will demonstrate  using Prop 1 light rail extensions routed through the DSTT to replace bus routes into Seattle doesn't reduce congestion; instead their riders displace current riders.  That the operating costs with longer routes and lack of parking for access will limit ridership, dramatically increasing costs per rider. 

Sound Transit monitors ridership and fares from each of the link stations so it can easily provide daily ridership and fare revenue.  The operating costs are based on number of trips, vehicle miles added by extension, and vehicle cost per mile. Sound Transit's October schedule provides 84 round trips of 4-car trains,  (It's not clear what operational changes CEO Rogoff agreed to with UW to appease concerns that light rail operation exceeded agreed-upon vibration and EMF levels under the campus.)

The 4.2-mile extension adds 8.4 miles to the University Link round trip for an additional 2822.4 daily vehicle miles.  Sound Transit's 2021 budgets $30.17 for vehicle revenue operating costs per mile. Thus, Northgate Link operation will add $85,152 to daily light rail costs.  Sound Transit can use the ridership, fare revenue, and operating cost to provide cost per rider and shortfall between fare box revenue and operating costs.  It's only a question of when they will release the data.

Every month Sound Transit releases Agency Progress Reports detailing how they will spend funds expanding their transportation system.  The latest example is the Aug 27, July version.  It provided progress reports for Link Light Rail, Sounder, and Regional Express and Stride "Active Projects" for the month.  (Realigned extensions are not included.)

Each transit mode report includes overall program schedules and detail on each project.  The monthly reports provide Project Schedules, Program Budgets, Key Project Activities, Closely Monitored Issues, Risk Management, Contingency Management, and details on Major Construction Contract Packages.

The program budgets also included Authorized Project Allocation, Committed and Incurred to Date, and Estimated Final Cost for the projects through 2024.  Thus on August 27th Sound Transit published a detail report on July funding status for implementing the transit mode "Active Projects".

Yet Sound Transit continues to delay releasing current transit mode ridership and operating costs.  They waited until August to release the 2020 Sound Transit Annual Report, 2020 Financial Statements, and the Independent Auditor's Report detailing ridership and costs.  Their Documents and Reports web page lists "Quarterly Service Delivery Reports" and "Quarterly Financial Performance Reports" for the transit modes.

The service deliver report provides vehicle hours, miles, and trips operated.  Total boardings for the quarter, cost per boarding, and weekday boardings at each station are provided.  It also compares those with previous quarter and with budget predictions.  (e.g.Sound Transit predictions for 41,000 to 49,000 daily riders by 2022.) Again, the data should be readily available yet the "Service Deliver Performance Report Q1 2021" is the latest released by Sound Transit.

The financial report provides Annual and YTD Budget Revenues, Operating Costs, and Project Budgets.  Quarterly boardings and fare revenue for the transit modes are compared with budget predictions and previous quarter.  Again the data should be readily available yet Sound Transit hasn't release a quarterly financial report this year.

The bottom line is Sound Transit delays in releasing quarterly service and financial reports delays exposing their failure to predict the loss in ridership and costs per rider in 2021 budget.   Their delay in releasing the Northgate Link results will delay exposing that Prop 1 extensions should have never been routed through the DSTT. 

Billions and years have already been spent extending light rail beyond UW and SeaTac on I-5. and across I-90 bridge to Overlake that won't reduce congestion.  Delaying the Northgate Link results allows them to add another year and spend hundreds of millions on extensions that add to the problem. Sound Transit should not be allowed to delay releasing that data. 

Northgate Link Debuts Prop 1 Failure

 The Northgate Link debut will be the first demonstration of the failure of Sound Transit's Prop 1 light rail extensions to reduce area roadway congestion.  Reducing congestion requires reducing the number of vehicles on roadway lanes.   For example, studies have shown limiting access to 2000 vehicles per hour assures 45 mph and maximizes lane vehicle capacity.  

A limited access lane can reduce traffic and congestion on an entire roadway by providing drivers with access to public transit. Adding a hundred high-capacity buses an hour can accommodate 10,000 riders, the equivalent of adding 5 lanes of freeway.  The only limit is the need to provide access to the added capacity.

Instead Sound Transit has spent a decade of refusing to increase bus transit ridership by failing to increase bus routes or parking.  Their long range plans in recent budgets show they intend to continue to do so with projected 2041 ridership, 15 million, less than the 20 million in 2017.

The Northgate Link debut will demonstrate the folly of Sound Transit's Prop 1 approach of extending light rail trains routed through Downtown Seattle Transit Tunnel. (DSTT).  Sound Transit claims their 74-seat light rail car can accommodate 148 riders.  A 2004 PSRC study, funded by Sound Transit, concluded the DSTT stations limited light rail trains to four cars and safe operation required a minimum of 4 minutes between trains.  The resultant 60 cars per hour and 148 capacity per car equates to 8880 rider per hour capacity in each direction. 

Extending light rail beyond UW station does nothing to increase that capacity into Seattle.  Yet Sound Transit's long range plans project the extensions will increase annual light rail ridership from ~32 million in 2021 to ~162 million in 2041.  The combination of the failure to increase bus transit ridership and delusional light rail capacity expectations portend a long term transportation debacle for the area.

Over the short term the Northgate Link debut will be the first to demonstrate Prop 1 failure.  Sound Transit could have used the  capacity to increase I-5 transit ridership, reducing congestion into Seattle.  However, they neglected to add the parking needed to access the capacity. Instead choosing to use the Link to replace bus routes.   ST 511, 512, and 513 and KCM41, reducing transit capacity into Seattle.  Reducing the number of buses on I-5 does nothing to reduce congestion.  Former bus riders added by the Link will limit access for current University Link riders.

The bottom line is Sound Transit has spent a decade of refusing to increase public transit ridership into Seattle with buses.  The Northgate Link debut will demonstrate the $1.9B they spent on the extension reduces transit capacity into Seattle, does nothing to reduce I-5 congestion into the city, and reduces access for current Central Link riders.   A precursor to similar results from the other Prop 1 extensions to Lynnwood and Federal Way on I-5 and from East Link across I-90. 

 

Sound Transit Lacks Transparency

The Sound Transit Board's recent efforts to use "Realignment" to make their transportation system "affordable" has been matched by their decision to limit "transparency".  For years Sound Transit has provided  access to videos of  Board meetings.  That ended with their 2021 February Meeting video.

Sound Transit has been particularly "opaque" regarding financing.  The Board was clearly alarmed with Sound Transit's April 22, "Financial Plan Update, April 2021" presentation.  It showed costs had increased to where "Tax Based Debt" needed to fund transit system expansion exceeded  the money they could borrow, "Agency Debt Capacity," by $7.9B.

The concern over increased costs resulted in Sound Transit Board Chair Kent Keel's April 30th letter to Sound Transit Board and to CEO Rogoff.  It detailed the need to delay projects, "Realignment". until the could borrow the funds needed.  Board members Constantine, Durkan, and Balducci urged delaying the realignment for a year.

Keel's April 30th three-page letter to Sound Transit Board and CEO Rogoff detailing the reasons for proceeding with the realignment was dropped from their website. The "Financial Plan Update, April 2021" that triggered the concern is not included on Sound Transit's list of Financial Documents.  And the April 22 presentation to the Board detailing how Sound Transit planned to implement the realignment was also dropped.

An August 5th (updated August 12th) "Realignment Capital Program" detailed the "Original ST3 Schedule","Affordability Schedule", and "Initial Target Schedule" for completing all of the projects.  Yet Sound Transit  neglected to provide any information as to what the realigned schedule would cost.

Sound Transit's opacity continues with their refusal to provide any "Quarterly Financial Performance Reports" for 2021 in their list of "Financial Documents".  They waited until August 11th to publish a "2020 Sound Transit Annual Report." It included data showing fare revenue had dropped from $97.1million in 2019 to $30.8 million in 2020.   The Q4 2020 Service Delivery Performance Report reported the average Link fare collected, $1.43, was a tiny fraction of the $26.12 cost per rider.

The other issue lacking transparency is a result of the Board's July 8th following response to Northgate Link trains exceeding agreed-upon UW vibration and EMF thresholds under campus.

Authorizing the chief executive officer to (1) execute an amendment to the Light Rail Transit System Operations and Maintenance Agreement for Vibration and Magnetic Fields on University  of Washington Transportation Easement During revenue Service with the University of Washington and (2)  execute any necessary amendments to other agreements with the University of Washington to be consistent with the new terms of the Operations and Maintenance Agreement for the Northgate Link Extension.

Sound Transit paid $20M to tunnel under the campus.  It's two months later, three weeks from Link debut, but no "transparency" as to CEO Rogoff's "amendments"to run  trains through it.

The bottom line is Sound Transit's need for "realignment" has been matched by failure to provide transparency with access to current Sound Transit Board videos, Financial documents, and Service Planning and Ridership Documents.  Doing so only delays exposing their problem and adds to the eventual cost, abided by the Seattle Times Traffic Lab lack of concern.