The Human Face of the East Link Debacle

The 7/27/14 post detailed the financial debacle of Sound Transit’s $285 Million operating deficit from East Link operation.  This post is an attempt to show why East Link will “change” forever the lives of eastside commuters.

It was prompted by my impressions during a recent bus ride into Seattle to see the Seattle Art Museum’s “Modernism in the Pacific Northwest” exhibition. (I thought it was great).  I caught the 9:13 AM Metro 212 bus at the Eastgate Freeway Station.   It was an articulated hybrid electric bus that was already “standing room only” before at least 10 of us got on.  (I must be getting old because someone offered me their seat—which I declined)  

My guess is there were around 90 riders, even though it was not considered a “peak commute” route.  The bus made several stops along the route but still took less than 20 minutes to reach my 4^th and Seneca destination.   What struck me was the lives of those riding that bus will change forever with East Link. 

The M212 bus didn’t even stop on Mercer Island, yet when East Link begins operation, the route will be terminated at either the South Bellevue or Mercer Island light rail stations.  What was a 20 minute commute into Seattle will instead be 90 riders forced to get out at one of the two stations and wait to get on a light rail train.   Those riding on routes that end on Mercer Island will have a particularly difficult time since light rail trains will likely be full well before they get there. 

What was an easy commute will be a transportation nightmare for many.  Some will be forced to endure the transfer since driving into Seattle and finding parking will be prohibitively expensive.   All this from a nearly $3 billion East Link light rail system ST promised voters would increase cross-lake capacity by 60%. 

I challenge the Sound Transit board members and all those either actively supporting if not quietly acquiescing to East Link ride M212 and see those whose lives will be devastated by these policies.  They're one of the reasons I chose to run.

East Link's $285 Million Operating Deficit

The previous post explained that East Link will require 8.888 hours to accommodate the 40,000 transit riders Sound Transit intends to switch to trains once East Link begins operating in 2023 and routing it to Lynnwood will add $116.9 Million in annual operating costs.  This post explains why East Link operating costs from Redmond into Seattle will be such a financial “black hole”.

East Link operation will eventually include the 26 miles from Redmond to the University as well as the 12.8-mile Lynnwood extension or 38.8 miles for a 77.6 mile round trip.   ST East Link current operating plans call for 484 cars per day during the workweek for 37,558 light rail car miles per day.  Using ST 2014 budget estimate of  $22.48 per car mile gives a daily operating cost of $844,313 (excluding depreciation),

ST has projected East Link ridership of 50,000 daily with 40,000 coming from terminated eastside bus routes.  The Lynnwood portion of the East Link route will attract some riders at the expense of fewer riding a Central Link extension with far more capacity than needed.  Thus, those riding East Link there don’t reflect “added” light rail customers.

Dividing the daily operating cost ($844,313) by ST projected ridership (50,000) gives a cost per rider of $16.88 nearly three times the $5.90 cost per Central Link boarder for the 1^st quarter of 2014.  Even this number is “optimistic” since many of the 40,000 east side transit riders will be forced by lack of light rail capacity (see 7/19/14 post) to find other ways to reach Seattle during peak commute. 

Assuming $2.50 light rail tolls, each East Link boarder requires a $14.38 subsidy from ST.  (Compared to $3.40 subsidy for Central Link operation).  The 50,000 daily riders will cost ST $719,000 each day to pay for operating costs (without depreciation).  Even this number understates the subsidy since 40,000 of the 50,000 riders are transfers from buses and presumably won't have to pay again.  

The resulting $100,000 loss in daily fares increases the required subsidy to $819,000.  Assuming weekend car miles and ridership are half those levels results in a $4.91 Million cost per week or $255 Million annual subsidy to cover East Link direct operating costs. 

Assuming the 77.6-mile round trip takes 2 hours, sixty light rail cars will be needed for the 4-car trains every 8 minutes.  If the cars cost $5 Million and last 10 years, the annual depreciation will add $30 Million to the operating costs, increasing the total subsidy to $285 Million.

That truly is absurd even for Sound Transit for a cross-lake light rail transportation system that will also gridlock I-90.

Two Numbers Should Stop East Link

I wrote the following post because of a luncheon meeting with Rep. Hunter.  He expressed concerns that Sound Transit issues were very complicated and he and his staff needed to “run their own numbers”.   His response when I emailed him a copy after initially posting it was:

I said it would take a while. I will get briefed on all of the Sound Transit projections and cost models. I would be astounded if I come to any conclusions before the end of August. It is very hard to set up meetings during the summer, and I’ve been out of town.

I’ll leave it to others whether they agree with his lack of concern on the issue.

Any competent East Link review would quickly conclude two numbers about the insanity of the project.  They are 8.888 hours and $116.90 million. 

The 8.888 hours is the time required for East Link to accommodate the east side bus riders Sound Transit plans to transfer to and from light rail trains for their daily commute into and out of Seattle.  It is based on ST’s latest East Link operating plan for one 4-car train every 8 minutes during the peak commute.  Each 74-seat light rail car can accommodate 150 riders.  Thus simple mathematics gives the following peak capacity:

7.5 trains per hour X 4 cars per train X 150 riders per 74-seat car
= 4500 riders per hour (RPH)

The 4500 RPH is barely a third of the 12,000 RPH Sound Transit promised voters in their 2008 DEIS with claims East Link was like adding 10 lanes of freeway across Lake Washington that would boost transit capacity by up to 60%.

The number of commuters is based on ST projections for 50,000 daily commuters with 40,000 from terminating all the existing cross-lake bus routes.   Since nearly all of the commuters on existing routes are eastside residents, 20,000 morning and afternoon commuters will be forced to transfer between buses and East Link trains at either the South Bellevue or Mercer Island light rail stations.  Thus the total time needed to accommodate the morning and afternoon commute is:

40,000 riders per day/4500rider per hour = 8.888 hours per day

It’s clear thousands of transit riders needing to go into Seattle during “normal” peak commute times will be forced onto the outer roadway.  Mercer Island commuters as well as those who take bus routes that terminate there will have little access to light rail since all the train cars will be full well before they arrive at the station. 

Those forced onto outer roadway will encounter another ST “exaggeration”: "Adding the fourth lane for HOV traffic will allow the outer roadway to accommodate all cross-lake vehicles".  A 2004 FHWA study ST participated in, showed the added lane wouldn’t have needed capacity if it allowed non-transit +2 and +3 cars to displace 60-70 passenger buses.  Thus closing the center roadway to install light rail will undoubtedly increase congestion on the outer roadway.  Obviously the thousands of cross-lake transit riders forced onto the outer roadway because of inadequate capacity on the center roadway when East Link begins operation will add to the gridlock.

The bottom line is ST has already spent close to a billion dollars over the last ten years on a light rail system that will gridlock the I-90 Bridge.  Instead of a cursory analysis that would have quickly shown this reality they’ve spent the money on countless promotions and lucrative contracts to consultants designing light rail stations that won’t be needed for ten years.  If allowed to continue they will close down the center roadway in 2017 to begin spending an additional $2 billion perpetuating this transportation debacle. (As well as devastating the route into Bellevue and violating environmental law with light rail’s noise impact on Mercer Slough Park)

What is almost beyond comprehension, ST manages to combine the East Link capacity debacle with a $116.84 million annual light rail financial debacle.   ST decision not to terminate Central Link at the University Station means all the East Link trains will be routed to Lynnwood.  ST’s planned East Link operation will result in 484 cars daily routed the 12.8 miles to Lynnwood adding 25.6 miles to the route or 12,390 car miles per day.  If weekend car miles are half that level, East Link will add 74,342 car miles per week or 3,865,805 car miles per year.  

ST 2014 budget estimates light rail operation costs of $22.48 per car mile (excluding depreciation) for a yearly total of $86,903,291 in direct operating costs.  Assuming the sixty ~$5 million light rail cars East Link will require can last an average of 10 years, depreciation will add another $30 million to the annual costs.  Thus ST plans to route East Link to Lynnwood will add $116,903,291 to operating costs for light rail service that will be totally superfluous to commuter needs.  The nearly $117 million added operating cost is more than twice ST’s total annual fare box revenue.   Even that number is a fraction of the costs involved if ST proceeds on their 2040 plan to extend light rail to Everett.

The 8.888 hours and $116.9 million operating costs would stop any competent organization.  Unfortunately ST hasn't been "competent" in the past and those that could force it to do so have instead gone along with this debacle.   My candidacy is an attempt to stop it.  

East Link Will Bankrupt Central Link

The previous two posts detailed how Sound Transit’s failure to consider two-way bus only lanes on the I-90 roadway has led to an East Link light rail system that will be a transportation debacle for the entire east side.  This post explains why the East Link decision will also exacerbate their second major blunder; the financial debacle from their failure to terminate Central Link at the University Station.

ST is currently in the initial stages of boring the tunnel portion of their Central Link extension between the University Station and Northgate.  From there, the track extension will run at street level to Lynnwood, a total of 12.8 miles from the University adding 25.6 miles to both the Central Link and East Link routes.  Both extensions are part of the Prop 1 package voters approved in 2008.

Current Central Link schedules show 118 trains operate daily between SeaTac and downtown Seattle with nearly all of the trains having 2 cars or 236 car trips.  Presumably ST will adjust that schedule to match up with the 121 daily trains in their recent East Link operating plan.  The East Link plan assumes 4-car trains that will add 484 car trips daily to and from Lynnwood for a total of 720 cars daily.    

The Lynnwood extension nearly doubles the route lengths for both the East Link and Central Link trains.  Thus both routes will require commensurate increases in the number of trains and light rail cars to maintain desired frequencies.  The additional equipment costs for the East Link 4-car trains will be especially onerous since they will triple the number of cars required.  For example15 trains will be required to maintain 8 minute intervals if it takes 2 hours to complete the East Link route from Overlake to Lynnwood and back.  The 60 cars required will each cost in excess of $5 million for an additional $300 million in initial costs and $30 million yearly in depreciation (assuming 10-year life for cars).

The equipment cost East Link adds for the Lynnwood extension pales in comparison to its long-term effect on operating costs.  Routing 720 car trips over the 25.6 mile round trip results in 18,432 daily car miles for the two routes.  ST 2014 budgets show each car mile costs $22.48 (excluding depreciation).   Thus the Lynnwood extension will add more than $414,000 to ST daily operating costs.   Assuming the weekend car miles are half the weekday levels the Lynnwood extension would add nearly $2.5 million every week to ST light rail operating costs.

It’s way past time for ST to recognize East Link will be a major contributor to the Lynnwood cost problem.  Aborting it would save more than $80 million a year by eliminating the daily 484 car trips that are totally superfluous to commuter needs.  The fact it also eliminates the need for a large number of  expensive light rail cars makes it even more imperative.  Failure to do so will result in deficits that surely qualifiy as a financial debacle by anyone’s standard.

More on East Link Debacle

The 6/20/14 and 7/03/14 posts detail why East Link has been and will continue to be a debacle for cross-lake commuters.  This post explains why even if the combination of light rail on the center roadway and the added lanes on the outer roadway can accommodate all the cross-lake commuters East Link will still be a transportation debacle.   It does nothing to reduce the congestion on 405 and I-90 since its only access for those commuters will be the South Bellevue and Mercer Island light rail stations.

Reducing congestion on those corridors requires either adding highway lanes to accommodate more vehicles or attracting more commuters to mass transit to make better use of existing lanes.     Increasing capacity by adding highway lanes tends to be prohibitively expensive in our area, particularly in comparison to the costs of improving bus service.  During peak commute a single bus-only lane, with 3-5 seconds between buses, can accommodate up to 1200 buses an hour, more than enough to meet any foreseeable transit commuting requirements. 

The costs involved in limiting HOV lanes on I-90 and 405 to “buses only” during peak commute are trivial.  Safety considerations would necessitate permanent two-way bus only use on the I-90 bridge center roadway.  Again those costs would be minimal.   The only significant costs are for providing the additional parking needed for commuters.  However, the costs for parking lots near where people live would presumably be far less than the cost for adding parking required with the added lanes near where they “work”.

The bus-only lanes and the additional parking would attract more commuters with express bus routes connecting individual P&R lots with one or two dedicated drop off points along 4^th Ave for the morning commute and with return routes from one or two dedicated pick up points along 2^nd Ave in the afternoon.  Each P&R would have its own bus service with frequency matched to meet the routes demand.  (Some of the P&R lots would add similar connections to and from the Bellevue T/C.)   it’s likely thousands of commuters would relish the opportunity to leave their car at a local P&R and have a fast, reliable commute into and out of Seattle.

East Link would end that option.  Instead of a quick ride to a drop off point in Seattle, commuters will be forced to exit the bus at either the South Bellevue or Mercer Island light rail station and wait for a light rail train for the trip into Seattle.  Instead of a non-stop ride from a pick-up point in Seattle to their local P&R they’ll be forced to exit at one of the two light rail stations and wait for their local bus to continue the commute home. 

Even if East Link had the needed capacity, many commuters will likely chose to drive rather than put up with this hassle.  It reinforces the reality ST made a monumental blunder when they refused consider the bus-lanes on the I-90 Bridge 20 years ago.  Cross-lake commuters, who could have enjoyed many years of fast, reliable bus connections from P&R lots throughout the area, have instead endured years of increased congestion.

What's practically obscene is ST proceeding with their plan to spend nearly $3 billion completing a light rail system that will reduce capacity on the I-90 center roadway and dramatically increase congestion on the bridge outer roadways.  (As well as devastate parts of Bellevue along the route.)  That surely meets anyone’s definition of a “debacle”.   

The East Link Debacle

The 6/20/14 post detailed how Sound Transit’s delays in adding the 4^th lane to the I-90 bridge outer roadways had already forced thousands of cross-lake commuters from both sides of the lake to needlessly endure years of increased congestion.  Whatever the reason, their current plans to extend the delay until 2017 will allow ST to never “consider” two-way, bus-only lanes on the center roadway or to “demonstrate” the added lane will provide needed capacity until it is too late to do anything about it.  (A 2004 FHWA study concluded center roadway closure will increase congestion on the outer bridge roadways even with the added lane.)

Sound Transit may have believed the increased capacity from light rail will attract enough additional riders to reduce outer roadway vehicle congestion.  They were undoubtedly aware of the very successful Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system between San Francisco and the Oakland area.  It currently averages nearly 400,000 riders every weekday.  However it does so with up to sixteen 10-car trains an hour.  The Seattle tunnel will limit East Link to 4-car trains every 8 minutes or 7 1/2 per hour (4500 riders per hour (RPH) assuming 150 riders in each of the 74-seat cars).

Furthermore, BART provides easy access to a huge population base with five separate lines serving a wide area on the Oakland side.  East Link will be a single line with the South Bellevue and Mercer Island light rail stations the only access for the vast majority of cross-lake commuters.  Thus, East Link will do absolutely nothing to alleviate I-90 or 405 congestion, even if it had the needed capacity.   To put it mildly “East Link is no BART”!

Yet Sound Transit’s 2008 DEIS claimed East Link would “meet growing transit and mobility demands by increasing person-moving capacity across Lake Washington on I-90 by up to 60 percent.”   They supported this assessment with claims light rail could accommodate “up to 24,000 riders per hour” (RPH) and was “the equivalent of 10 lanes of freeway”.  

ST projected East Link would have 50,000 daily riders by 2030.  More recently they explained 40,000 of the riders would be the result of terminating all existing cross-lake bus routes at South Bellevue and Mercer Island light rail stations.  Transferring transit riders from buses to light rail cars does very little to increase cross-lake capacity. Thus it’s “unclear” how East Link could increase I-90 transit capacity by 60%.

Even this limited number of riders is beyond East Link capacity, at least during normal commute hours. The 40,000 total rides are presumably split between 20,000 morning and afternoon commuters into and out of Seattle.  With a maximum capacity of 4500 RPH, it will take nearly 4 ½ hours for East Link to accommodate the 20,000 inbound and outbound commuters each weekday.  As a result rather than attracting the thousands of additional transit riders needed for their 60% growth projections, East Link will reduce transit capacity.   During the peak commute thousands of former bus riders will be forced onto the I-90 outer roadways adding to the congestion there.

By the time East Link begins operation (2023?), I-90 commuters will have had to endure 6-7 years of increased congestion due to ST confiscation of the center roadway.  Imagine their outrage when they experience the additional congestion from thousands of former transit riders forced onto outer roadway when East Link begins operation by terminating cross-lake bus routes. 

A debacle by anyone’s standards!

Bel Red's Real East Link Problem

(The following was prompted by the Seattle Times.   I emailed it to their editorial board as a “Special to the Times” submission and decided to post it since they will likely decline to print it.)

Bel Red Real East Link Problem

The June 30 front page article in the Seattle Times suggests relocating the 25 acre East Link rail yard outside of Bel Red would make the 900 acre development a magnet for developers.  First of all Sound Transit’s current preferred location should be no surprise to anyone since it was included in the 2008 Draft Environmental Impact Statement.  

Even if the Bellevue City Council does manage to relocate the rail yard, it's unlikely East Link will enhance Bel Red development.   The problem is light rail noise.  East Link noise will far exceed Bellevue City codes for maximum permissible sound levels.  Sound Transit has been forced to spend millions “sound proofing” homes more than 300 feet away Central Link.  Noise from East Link 4-car trains operating on elevated tracks will surely exceed those from Central Link, street-level, 2-car trains.

These noise concerns are what prompted the BCC to force ST to provide detailed plans to mitigate the noise for properties along the route into Bellevue.  Yet ST plans for Bel Red appear devoid of any attempts to mitigate the noise there.   Properties along a huge swath, well beyond 300 feet on both sides of the tracks, will likely need to be “sound proofed” to be “livable” with light rail trains trundling through every 4-8 minutes for 20 hours a day. 

The Bellevue City Council is surely aware (or should be aware) East Link noise levels will far exceed their allowable noise limits.  The fact they are still apparently willing to approve permits ST needs for Bel Red would presumably free ST from any legal responsibility for any adverse noise impact.  Thus, any subsequent mitigation will likely require BCC funding, potentially millions.

The council could have avoided the Bel-Red noise and maintenance yard problem by opting for a far less expensive and more esthetically appealing “South Lake Union” type streetcar system.  It could either loop through or run on parallel tracks through the area west of 140^th or 148^th with connections to the Bellevue T/C.  (BRT routes across 520 to a University light rail station T/C would be far better for meeting "Microsoft" transit needs.) Frequency would be set by local demand rather than by some futile attempt to meet cross-lake transit demands. 

Street level tracks could be used in Bel Red since the reduced frequency along with the lower speed would not be nearly as hazardous to north-south vehicle traffic as high-speed, four 74-ton, light-rail-car trains every 4 minutes.  

(Street-level cars work fine on South Lake Union route.)  The tracks would be less intrusive and provide greater accessibility from more stops than East Link’s two elevated light rail stations.   

In conclusion, Bel Red streetcars would end the debacle of East Link 4-car light rail trains trundling through for 20 hours a day.   The BCC, in combination with potential Bel Red developers, needs to consider this option.