Why ST Should Release Service Delivery Performance Report Q4 2021

The previous post opined the video of the March 10 Sound Transit System Expansion Committee demonstrated their intent to continue funding “voter approved” light rail extensions. That they did so despite the Northgate Link debut that “likely” demonstrated they don’t have the capacity to reduce multilane freeway congestion, reduce access for Central Link commuters, and have operating costs that dwarf farebox revenue.  This post details how videos of March 16th and 17th meetings show why Sound Transit should release the Service Delivery Performance Report Q4 2021. 

The March 16th Board Fares Workshop” meeting included a chart “Board-adopted farebox recovery targets” showing light rail farebox recovery had dropped from Sound Transit’s 40% “target” in 2017 to 10% in 2021, less than the 15.1% in their 2021 budget. The revenue part of the problem was reported in the March 17th video with chart showing, “Passenger fare revenues $(26) M or (48%) below budget”. They attributed the lower passenger fare revenue to reduced ridership from COVID and more fare avoidance. However, the COVID effect was presumably accounted for with Sound Transit’s 2021 budget, 48,600 average weekday ridership, far less than pre-COVID 79,617 in 2019.  

Thus, the question remained was whether the lower revenues were due to more riders unwilling to pay than predicted or was it because there were fewer riders than budgeted. If $26M was lost because more riders refused to pay fares, it’s not a big deal in a $3 billion budget. However, if it was because ridership was 48% below budget, that’s a huge deal.

 

Sound Transit’s 2021 budget had predicted 48,600 average Link weekday riders. Sound Transit’s Northgate Link website had claimed the extension would add 41,000 to 49,000 weekday riders. The Seattle Times had heralded the Link’s debut as “Transit Transformed” with the 3 stations adding 42,000 to 49,000 riders. Thus, year-end and especially 4th quarter ridership below 48,600 riders raises questions about light rail benefits. They need to release Service Performance Report Q4/2021 showing ridership for the 3 Northgate Link stations to assess light rail ridership benefits. 

The other issue with the low farebox recovery was higher than budgeted operating cost. The March 16th video included a warning, “Increased operating costs carry implications for overall program affordability.” However, the March 17th video included a chart showing 2021 Link operating costs were 7% below budget, no reason for year's lower farebox recovery. 

The March 16th concern over costs seemed to reflect a belated recognition of light rail’s high operating cost. The 2021 budgets those as $30.17 cost/per revenue vehicle mile. Every mile of extension adds 2 miles of $120.68 costs per mile for a 4-car round trip. The 4.2-mile Northgate Link extension added $1013.72 per trip, or $126,714 for their 125-trips a day schedule. Sound Transit’s 2021 budget operating costs presumably reflected that added 4th quarter cost.  

 

The Service Performance Report Q4/2021 provides costs per boarder for the entire route from Northgate to Angel Lake. The riders added by the 3 stations Northgate Link can be used to determine the costs for each of those riders. Do the benefits justify the cost? The costs per Northgate Link rider should raise concerns for all costs per rider for all the “voter approved” extensions.  

For example, a March 10th video showed Sound Transit’s System Expansion Committee increasing funding for the Lynnwood extension.  The 8.5-mile extension would add $256,445 daily for 125 trips of 4-car light trains from Northgate to Lynnwood and back.  An especially onerous charge since most transit riders previously rode Northgate Link, and typical of all the “voter approved” extensions. Especially for those replacing far less expensive bus routes.

The bottom line is the low Farebox Recovery necessitates Sound Transit release their quarterly Service Performance Report Q4 2021. Was it more fare avoidance or lower than predicted ridership. The latter is critical since Sound Transit has apparently “belatedly” recognized high light rail operating costs. A warning for all the "voter approved" extensions.

 

Sound Transit Ignores Northgate Link Debut “Likely” Debacle

 The video of Sound Transit’s System Expansion Committee March 10th meeting exemplifies a transit system that, for a decade, has had a board of directors made up of elected officials with no understanding of what constitutes effective public transit. The video showed a Sound Transit Board approving additional funding for Lynnwood extension typifying their intent to spend whatever was necessary to fund “voter approved” transit system extensions. The costs of which have increased from the $54 billion voters approved for ST3 in 2016 to the $138 billion in the 2022 budget.  

In doing so they chose to ignore the “likely” problems demonstrated by the Northgate Link debut in October. (It’s “likely” because Sound Transit refuses to release results.) That Sound Transit ridership claims for the Prop 1 and ST3 funded “voter approved” extensions in 2016 were delusional. A 2004 PSRC study, funded by Sound Transit, concluded that Central Link capacity was limited to one 4-car train every 4 minutes with 148 riders per car. The result, 8880 riders per hour in each direction, was a fraction of what's needed to reduce multilane freeway congestion.  

 
 The light rail extension from UW to Northgate did nothing to increase that capacity.   Thus, it's "likely" the transit riders added by the extension weren’t sufficient to reduce vehicular traffic and I-5 congestion, they only reduced capacity for University Link commuters. The Northgate Link ridership was also limited by Sound Transit’s decade long failure to add parking with access to Link stations or with bus routes to the stations. Instead using light rail to replace existing bus routes for riders, reducing transit capacity into Seattle. 

 
 The Link’s debut “likely” demonstrated the lack of capacity and access limited ridership to a fraction of Sound Transit’s website claims for 41,000 to 49,000 riders. That the Northgate Link was certainly not “Transit Transformed” as heralded by Seattle Times Traffic Labby with claims the three Northgate Link stations would add 42,000 to 49,000 riders. 

 
 The limited ridership from lack of capacity and access, especially off peak when lots were full “likely” resulted in farebox revenue being dwarfed by operating costs. Sound Transits 2021 budgets Light Rail Car Revenue Vehicle Mile costs as $30.17. Thus, every mile of extension adds two miles and $241 for a 4-car round trip. The Northgate Link’s 4.2-mile extension from UW Stadium adds $1012 per trip, $126,500 for their schedule of 125-weekday trips, a "likely" extremely high cost per boarder. 

  

It should have been self-evident 4-car light rail trains lacked the capacity to reduce multi-lane freeway congestion. That Sound Transit ridership claims for the Prop 1 and subsequent ST3 funded extensions were delusional. It was that recognition by potential transit CEOs that led to the failure of 2-month long effort by CPS HR Consulting to find a replacement for CEO Rogoff.  

 

Again, it’s “likely” the Northgate Link debut demonstrated that “voter approved” extensions didn’t reduce I-5 congestion. They only reduced access for University Link riders. That using the “voter approved” extensions to replace buses reduced transit capacity into Seattle. That their limited ridership and high operating costs resulted in farebox a small fraction of Sound Transit’s 40% target 

 
 The bottom line is it should not have taken the Northgate Link debut to demonstrate the problems with “voter approved” extensions. However, once it was done, the "likely" results should have “informed” Sound Transit’s funding decisions. The March 10th System Expansion Committee video decision to approve additional Lynnwood Link funding shows it didn’t.  

 
That the Northgate Link debut was a precursor to more billions spent on “voter approved” extensions that do nothing to reduce freeway congestion, further reduce access for Central Link riders, replace bus routes reducing transit capacity into Seattle, and add operating costs that dwarf any farebox recovery. And the Seattle Times Traffic Lab continues their decade of abetting them.