ST Should Terminate East Link at Chinatown Station

The previous post opined Sound Transit needs to do more to “justify’ transit projects.  Assure the result of a transit project was a “product” that reduced congestion. At this point it’s too late to point out the result of the East Link project, an 1-90 bridge center roadway confiscated by light rail, is a product that won’t reduce congestion.  

 

This post details Sound Transit exacerbates that failure by extending East Link light rail train routes as Link Line 2 through the DSTT and eventually to the Mariner P&R.   The result will be a “product” whose operation will share Line 1’s DSTT train capacity and incur problems merging with Central Link trains to UW and beyond.  

 

For example, Link Line 1 trains currently run northbound every 8 minutes from Angle Lake to Northgate from 5:30 to 8:46 am.  When East Link trains begin operation as part of Line 2 will Sound Transit replace half of the Line 1 trains, with both lines every 16 minutes, or double the frequency with both every 8 minutes?   A “product” with 4 minutes between trains and capacity that far exceeds the number of I-5 commuters with access to transit and operating costs that dwarf fare box revenue.   That will also be difficult to safely merge, with trains returning from different route lengths through DSTT with the 4-minute intervals.

 

Sound Transit could avoid both problems by terminating East Link at the International District Chinatown Station.  Those wishing to go further can transfer to a Line 1 train.  Central Link commuters won’t have to share whatever the DSTT train capacity when East Link debuts. 

 

Separating East Link also allows scheduling its operation with number of light rail cars in each train and their frequency adjusted to meet east side demands rather than what’s needed along Line 2 to Northgate and beyond.   Doing so has significant cost savings with light rail trains cars costing ~$30 per vehicle mile.  The 16-mile East Link and Redmond extensions cost nearly $1000 for each car-round-trip.  Limiting number of cars would enable more frequent trains, especially during off-peak operation.

 

Limiting operation to meet Bellevue transit requirements would also end Sound Transit need to use East Link to replace I-90 corridor buses for riders.  It would end the need for Sound Transit to insist on a “Bus Intercept” agreement with Mercer Island, despite nearly universal islander objections.   I-90 corridor transit riders would no longer be forced to endure the hassle of transferring to and from light rail for their commute into and out of Seattle.  Mercer Island would no longer be forced to share its access to light rail or have their station inundated with thousands of transferees. 

 

The bottom line is, terminating East Link at International District/Chinatown Station, ends a “project” that spends billions for a “product” that reduces transit capacity into Seattle and increases I-90 corridor congestion.  The following from an October 5^threlease of, “Agency Progress Report: Capital Progress, August 2022” facilitates doing so: 

The East Link critical path this month continues to run through track remediation on E130, which is holding up E750 access to complete OCS and signal installation. The time required to complete all repairs is still being determined, which may result in an even longer path to completion. Other East Link Civil Contracts continue to be closely monitored for potential impacts to the E750 schedule. 

Sound Transit should use the delay to implement terminating East Link at International District/Chinatown Station and mitigate the East Link debacle.

Sound Transit Needs to Justify Transit Projects

                   I emailed the Sound Transit System Expansion Committee the      10/07/22  post on this blog.  It included the following conclusion:

A competent transit CEO would recognize the Sound Transit TDP won’t reduce congestion.  The next System Expansion Committee meeting will indicate whether she does.  If not, the East Link debut will demonstrate the result of the eastside and south Seattle having to split the number of DSTT trains.  Central Link commuters will lose half their current capacity and east side bus commuters will lose all bus transit routes into Seattle.   

A competent Julie Timm could hasten that result and save billions.

The video of the October 13^th System Expansion Committee reported the committee reported they’d received the email as part of “public comment”.  It was released as the “written in" comment “What the New Sound Transit CEO Could Do”.

The lack of any response and subsequent agenda was a clear indication neither the committee nor the new CEO had any interest in the issues it raised. Instead, the meeting consisted of presentations about “process” not “product”.  About how to proceed with “voter approved extensions” rather than whether those extensions would relieve roadway congestion.

The first was a “Comprehensive Review” by the Sound Transit Technical Advisory Group (TAG).   The “Key Takeaway” was the conclusion Sound Transit had “not got there as ready to proceed”.  That Sound Transit needed more “guidance” with a final report to be released early next year.   

One would have thought such a critical review of both Sound Transit Staff and Board would merit some response.  Instead, Board Chair, Kent Keel, called it “Refreshing and looking forward to hearing more details”.   

The next presenter concluded his review of all the Sound Transit’s reports led to a Cost Savings Plan to replace quarterly reporting requirement.  He was more pompous than probative as his plan to no longer release Quarterly Service Delivery and Financial Performance Reports ignores the need to update the public.

The next item detailed Sound Transit’s Chinatown International District Station engagement process. What was included in the CIP engagement tool kit.  Nothing that justified the decision the station was needed.

The last was a briefing about the “Delivery Methods” Sound Transit uses for transit projects.  That different delivery methods were chosen to assure the construction contract matched the needs of the project.  

Again, all about process for completing the project but nothing to justify the project.  For example, improving the process to construct the "product", the 130^th St Infill station, ignores the fact the $270B Station has no parking for access to trains.  Even more basic the Lynnwood extension it’s on does nothing to increase light rail capacity into Seattle.  

That nearly all those using available parking with access to extension are currently already riding buses to Northgate for the Link into Seattle.  Thus, the Lynnwood project will do little to reduce congestion no matter the benefit of the process improvements.  That none of the extensions will increase transit capacity into Seattle despite improving the process.

Sound Transit needs to do more to justify the projects.

 

Northgate Link Begins the Debacle

This post was prompted by the fact it’s over a year since the Oct 2, 2021, Northgate Link debut.  It was the first demonstration of Sound Transit’s ability to use Prop 1 funded light rail spine trains to reduce I-5 and I-90 congestion into Seattle.  ST’s website had predicted the 4.3-mile, $1.9B link would add 41,000 to 49,000 riders.  The Seattle Times Traffic Lab had heralded the debut as “Transit Transformed” claiming 42,000 to 49,000 commuters would be added by the Link’s three stations.  

 

Yet neither Sound Transit nor the Traffic Lab have provided any Link ridership results. (ST no longer releases the Quarterly Service Provided Performance Reports with ridership added by each station.)  Like all the extensions, the Northgate Link did nothing to increase the number of train cars per hour or the number of commuters who could ride in each car. Thus, like all the spine extensions, the Northgate Link did nothing to increase transit capacity into Seattle.

 

Sound Transit also did nothing to increase access to transit.  An Oct-Dec 2016, WSDOT “Park and Ride Inventory” reported all the parking with access to transit was essentially already “in use”.   Rather than add parking Sound Transit chose to require those using the existing parking to ride bus routes into Seattle to use the Northgate Link for the commute into and out of the city.  

 

King County Metro ended KCM 41 from Northgate.  Sound Transit’s ST511-513 from Everett was rerouted to Northgate and ST522 from Woodinville to Roosevelt Station. Ending the bus routes reduced total transit capacity into Seattle and nothing to reduce GP lane congestion.  Those former bus riders also reduced access for University Link riders.

 

Again, without Q4 2021 or later service provided reports it’s not clear have many commuters chose to ride Northgate Link.  However, the pre-pandemic ridership levels for the ST 510-513 and ST522 bus routes who rode the Link totaled less than 14,000 daily.  

 

Thus, with all the available parking essentially “In use”, the maximum possible terminated bus route commuters riding the Link would have been a fraction of Sound Transit and Traffic Lab predictions.  A precursor to a Lynnwood ridership access “problem” that only adds 500 stalls at the two Shoreline stations for Sound Transits claim for 37,000 to 55,000 riders. 

The other Northgate Link problem is the loss in farebox recovery from longer route operating costs. Sound Transits 2021 budgets Light Rail Car Revenue Vehicle Mile costs as $30.17. Thus, every mile of extension adds two miles and $241 for a 4-car round trip. The Northgate Link’s 4.2-mile extension from UW Stadium adds $1012 per trip, $126,500 for their schedule of 125-weekday trips.

  

Thus, even if the Link had attracted pre-pandemic ridership the cost per boarder would have been $9.00.  Whatever the costs per Northgate Link boarder, they’ll be dwarfed by those with Lynnwood extension.  The 8.5-mile Lynnwood extension will add $253,000 to the for 125-weekday trips, yet add only 1000 stalls for access. 

 

The bottom line is effective public transit requires providing the access needed to attract the number of commuters needed to reduce traffic for those driving.  The Northgate Link did nothing to increase light rail transit capacity or add access to public transit.  The debut demonstrated Sound Transit attempts to provide access by diverting bus riders to light rail reduced transit capacity into Seattle and still didn’t provide access needed for projected ridership claims.  

What remains to be demonstrated is that light rail train’s limited capacity means commuters added by extensions will end access for current riders without significantly reducing multilane freeway congestion.   What should have been obvious will apparently take billions and years for Sound Transit to "demonstrate".

 

What the New Sound Transit CEO Could Do

 

 

The previous post questioned why the Sound Transit Board had selected Julie Timm as their new CEO.  If it’s because she concurred with the Sound Transit “Transit Development Plan 2022-2077 they’ll continue to “Plan, build, and operate the largest transit expansion in the nation” she will continue perpetrating what will inevitably be considered as one of the biggest boondoggles in transit history.

This post details a competent public transit CEO could avoid that debacle.  Recognize public transit’s goal should be to provide transit for those who can’t drive or choose not to drive into Seattle and to reduce congestion for those who choose to drive. That reducing roadway congestion requires reducing vehicular traffic by attracting more commuters with access to routes and transit capacity into and out of Seattle.

A competent CEO would recognize the Sound Transit TDP for funding extending the Link does neither.  It doesn’t increase access with added parking or implement local routes from where commuters live to light rail stations.  Instead continuing a decade of Sound Transit refusal to add parking despite a WSDOT OCT-DEC 2016 “Park and Ride Inventory” reporting all of the parking with access to transit was essentially already “in use”. 

A competent transit system CEO would also recognize the TDP funded extensions do nothing to increase public transit capacity.  That transit capacity is determined by the number of vehicles per hour times the number of riders in each vehicle.  Extending light rail tracks do nothing to increase either.   Thus, a competent Julie Timm would recognize the folly of Sound Transit’s TD predicting the light rail spine will increase annual ridership will increase from 28,015,000 in 2022 to 73,756,000 in 2026.  

Sound Transit compounds the problem by using light rail trains on the track extensions to replace bus routes and transit capacity into Seattle. The TDP reflects the result with Express Bus “Revenue Vehicle Miles” reduced from 11,791,000 in 2023 to 8,755,000 in 2026 and Passenger Trips” dropping from 14,046,000 in 5,871,000.  

The bottom line is reducing congestion into Seattle requires increasing the number of public transit commuters.  Yet the TDP funded extensions do nothing to increase light rail capacity into the city.  That using the light rail extensions to replace bus routes into Seattle reduces total transit capacity into the city.  That the more bus replaced and the more riders added by extensions the greater the capacity lost by current riders.  

A competent transit CEO would recognize the Sound Transit TDP won’t reduce congestion.  The next System Expansion Committee meeting will indicate whether she does.  If not, the East Link debut will demonstrate the result of the east side and south Seattle having to split the number of DSTT trains.  Central Link commuters will lose half their current capacity and east side bus commuters will lose all bus transit routes into Seattle.   

A competent Julie Timm could hasten that result and save billions.