Questions for New Sound Transit CEO

  

Sound Transit finally has a new CEO, Julie Timm, a year after a Sept 24th, 2021 Seattle Times headline, "Sound Transit board ousting CEO".  The paper described his ouster with a photo caption:

Sound Transit CEO Peter Rogoff will be replaced in 2022 following more than six years of accomplishments with the agency

It was never clear why they decided to replace him as Board Chair Keel praised Rogoff with, "all but one of Sound Transit's seven major construction projects are on time and below budget".  Board member Claudia Balducci praised Rogoff for his "efforts to manage multiple projects across the region".  Member Roger Millar, the state transportation secretary, claimed "Mr Rogoff is going to be going out on a high note".  Yet all three chose not to renew his contract. 

 

Whatever the reason, the board’s “Rogoff” problem is not with why he was fired, it’s that he should have never been hired in the first place.  He never demonstrated an understanding of what constituted effective public transit.  As a result, his “six years of accomplishments” have continued a decade of Sound Transit’s spending billions on Prop 1 extensions that will do nothing to reduce congestion on I-5 and I-90 corridors into Seattle. 

 

Several blog posts have suggested Sound Transit would have difficulty finding his replacement.  That most potential transit system CEOs would recognize the folly of continuing funding those extensions. The result of a transit system board of directors made up of elected officials with “limited” transit system experience.  Thus, it’s reasonable to ask why they hired her.   

 

For example, what was her response to Sound Transit’s recent Transit Development Plan 2022-2027?  The TDP included a list of Strategic Priorities, Agency Goals, and Measure of Success for the next 5 years.  The 5 on the list didn’t include any mention of a normal transit goal, the need to provide effective transit for those who can’t drive or choose not to drive into Seattle and to reduce congestion for those who choose to drive?  

The TDP included a Light Rail (Link) Capital Improvement Chart with plans to spend $12.7B over the next five years on light rail extensions. A 2004 PSRC study, funded by Sound Transit, concluded their 4-car light rail train capacity was limited to 8880 riders per hour.  Was she aware of that limit or recognize extensions beyond UW station, across I-90 Bridge or beyond SeaTac do nothing to increase that capacity.  

Sound Transit clearly didn’t since the TDP Operating Data, 2021—2027, chart predicted the extensions when completed will increase annual Passenger Trips from 13,400,000 in 2022 to 51,800,000 in 2025.  Meanwhile, TDP bus annual passenger trips dropped from 13,651,00000 in 2022 to 5,871,000 in 2027.

Did she concur with the TDP’s Activities chart lacking any significant funding for parking, instead forcing bus riders to transfer to light rail into and out of the city.   Reducing bus routes reduced transit capacity into the city and nothing to reduce congestion.  Extension riders only reduced the access for current link riders.    

The bottom line is Sound Transit’s Transit Development Plan 2022- 2027 typifies a decade of transit system failure to reduce congestion.  Julie Timm was presumably chosen because she agreed with the TDP as part of the Board Chair's goal to continue to  “Plan, build, and operate the largest transit expansion in the nation”.  It’s only a question of when not whether it will also be considered one of the biggest boondoggles in transit history.

Seattle Times Abets Incompetent ST Transit Development Plan

The previous post opined the Northgate Link debut demonstrated Sound Transit Prop 1 light rail spine extensions will fail any rational public transit cost/benefit test for the commute into Seattle.   That it failed to provide effective transit for those who didn’t have access to vehicles or choose not to drive on the freeways into Seattle as well as reduce the congestion for those that do.  

This post details the Sound Transit Board of Directors adopted a Transit Development Plan 2022-2027 that exemplifies that failure.  That Sound Transit’s version of an effective transit system was detailed in TDP charts entitled Strategic Priorities, Agency Goals, and Measure of Success for the next 5 years. 

Strategic Priority 1: Design and deliver a customer-focused, high-quality and safe service

Agency Goal 1.1: Establish a robust and proactive safety culture               Measures of Success.

Monthly Safety News Link.                                                                         Developed Foundations Plan for achieving ISO certification

Agency Goal 1.2: Provide a passenger-focused experience from design through daily service.                                                                                                  Measures of Success.  

Improved passenger experience index.                                                       Baselined passenger complaint measures.                                                     Budget identified in 2022 to implement complaint resolution track system

The TDP charts also included the following priorities:

Strategic Priority 2: Deploy a performance-based, community-centric, and safe capital program

Strategic Priority 3: Cultivate an equitable, diverse, and inclusive workforce and culture that is high preforming, compassionate, empowering, and safe

Strategic Priority 4:  Transform and unify business practices and processes agency wide

Strategic Priority 5: Ensure financial stewardship exists in all decision-making to guarantee long-term affordability of the voter-approved plan

Notice Sound Transits TDP 2022 to 2027 priorities didn’t include providing effective public transit for commuters.  There was no priority or agency goal to provide access or transit capacity for commuters wishing to use it or to reduce freeway congestion for those choosing to drive.  

A Light Rail (Link) Capital Improvement Chart in the TDP for yearly link spending totaled $12.7B over the next five years with some of the 2027 funds on West Seattle-Ballard Link.  The Planned Activities chart in the TDP for the five years was more “optimistic” than recent Sound Transit schedules with East Link revenue service beginning in 2023 and Lynnwood, Federal Way and Downtown Redmond in 2024.  

The Planned Activities didn’t include adding any parking facilities near Link extensions.  Instead, Sound Transit recently confirmed plans to spend $270M on a 130th St Infill Station that won’t have parking.  Rather than add parking for access Sound Transit included the following in the TDP Activities charts

Revise service on ST Express between Bellevue and Seattle on I-90 and          allocate operating resources to East Link 

Revise service on ST Express between Lynnwood and Seattle on I-5 and allocate operating resources to Lynnwood Link extension 

Discontinue service on ST Express between Federal Way and Seattle on I-5 and allocate operating resources to Federal Way Link extension 

The revision being Sound Transit will use the Link to replace bus routes into and out of Seattle, reducing total transit capacity into Seattle.  The TPD ignores the results of using the Northgate Link to replace bus routes into Seattle.  That even with those transferring from buses the lack of access to the Northgate Link stations limited ridership to a fraction of Sound Transit’s 41,000 to 49,000 riders.  A “likely” precursor to similar results for all the TDP funded extensions given the similar lack of access.

The other TDP 2022-2027 problem is Sound Transit’s failure to recognize that the $12.7B spent on the extensions to Bellevue, Lynnwood, and Federal Way does nothing to increase the DSTT transit capacity into Seattle.  Yet the TDP Operating Data, 2021—2027, chart predicted the extensions when completed will increase annual Passenger Trips from 13,400,000 in 2022 to 51,800,000 in 2025.  Meanwhile bus passenger trips will decrease from 5,900,000 in 2022 to 5,100,000 in 2027.

The bottom line is Sound Transit’s TDP 2022-2027 will spend $12.7B on Prop 1 extensions that do nothing to increase transit capacity into Seattle.  That using the extensions to replace bus routes reduces public transit capacity and nothing to reduce congestion.   And it’s all abetted by an incompetent Seattle Times Traffic Lab.

 

ST Prop 1 Expansions Cost/Benefit Failure

 

The previous post detailed Sound Transit’s revenue problem wasn’t non-fare-paying riders but the excessive cost of providing the rides. That reducing  capital costs for light rail extensions and the costs for operating light rail trains on the extensions would dwarf any funding benefits from improving fare collection.  

 

This post details how the Sound Transit System Expansion Committee has failed to recognize the need for additional access to transit, the limited capacity of 4-car light rail trains, and the high costs of operating those trains.  The result being plans for funding Prop 1 extensions fail any rational cost/ridership benefit test.   

 

It began a decade ago when Sound Transit failed to recognize the costs of implementing light rail service on I-90 Bridge center roadway far exceeded any benefit for cross-lake commuters. Those living along the Bel-Red corridor had better access to bus service than what they’ll get with East Link.  The cost of implementing the service to Redmond, particularly during off peak commute, fails any rational cost/benefit assessment.

 

Those living along I-90 corridor also lost with Sound Transit decision to confiscate bridge center roadway for light rail. Sound Transit could have implemented two-way bus only BRT with 10 times light rail capacity 10 years sooner at 1/10^th the cost. When operation begins Central Link commuters will lose half of their trains and I-90 corridor transit capacity will be limited by Sound Transit’s “bus intercept” agreement with Mercer Island.  

 

That agreement forces transit riders to transfer to East Link on the island to commute into and out of Seattle.  Island commuters who, not only lost their SOV access to bridge center roadway, will be forced to share access with the transferees and East Link’s limited capacity.  It’s “unlikely”  the result will  attract additional transits riders.  It’s only a question of when it debuts before the debacle begins.

 

The Northgate Link debut would have normally already exposed the lack of benefits from Sound Transit’s light rail spine.  Nearly a decade ago a March 29, 2013, post on this blog urged Sound Transit use the University Station as a terminus for 520 BRT rather than extend light rail to Northgate. Thousands of commuters from both sides of the lake could benefit by using the station to connect 520 BRT with University Link light rail. (A 2^nd Montlake Bridge had initially been included to facilitate the connection.)

 

Northgate commuters already had access to excellent transit service. Metro Route 41 buses departed Northgate every 4-5 minutes during peak morning commute, taking 18 minutes to reach University St Station.  The afternoon return commute routes provided similar frequencies and commute times. The benefits from that service were reflected in Sound Transit's north end bus routes (ST510, ST511, and ST512) not even stopping at Northgate.  

 

Both Metro and Sound Transit could have added transit capacity, reducing congestion on I-5 into and in downtown Seattle at a fraction of the Northgate Link's cost.  The only limit to ridership was the number of commuters living near or with access to parking near stations.  Both were already “fully in use”.  Yet Sound Transit made no effort to add parking to increase the access.  Choosing instead to provide riders when the Link debuted ending Metro Route 41 and terminating ST 511 and ST 512 at Northgate, reducing total transit capacity into Seattle. 

Apparently neither Sound Transit nor Seattle Times recognized the light rail spine lacked both access and capacity.   Prior to the Northgate Link debut, the Seattle Times September 26th Traffic Lab article described it as, "Light rail ready to open at Northgate, changing more than just commutes".  It included the following regarding Northgate Link benefits.

Sound Transit has estimated the new Northgate, Rosevelt, and U-District stations that open Saturday will attract a combined 42,000 to 49,000 riders per day.

They apparently didn’t recognize that if 80% of those riders did so during the 3-hour morning and afternoon commutes University Link riders would lose access up to 2/3 of the link’s limited capacity. That clearly wasn’t the problem. It’s been nearly a year since the Oct 2^nd, debut and Sound Transit has yet to provide any actual Northgate Link ridership.  They stopped publishing their quarterly service provide performance reports that would have provided ridership added by each of the three Northgate Link stations. 

 

The best indication of the Northgate Link ridership is a 2022 Link Statistic chart in Sound Transit’s 2022 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget. It presumably reflects Sound Transit’s ridership estimate with a full year of Northgate operation.  Yet the chart reports predicted total Link ridership, 43,000, was 5600 less than the 48,600 they budgeted for 2021. (Despite the fact it also replaced Metro 41 into and out of Seattle.) Clearly someone at Sound Transit recognized Northgate Link 42,000 to 49,000 projections dwarfed actual ridership.

 

The bottom line is public transit should have two objectives. To provide transit for those that don’t have or don’t wish to drive vehicles into downtown Seattle and to reduce congestion on the roadways into Seattle for those that do.  That both should attempt to do so at minimal cost. Central Link succeeded in Seattle because large numbers of commuters lived along the route into downtown. 

 

They purposedly avoided adding parking to encourage more to do so.  The routes were relatively short so even off-peak operation costs were limited.  Sound Transit could have done more of the same by expediting rail links to West Seattle and Ballard.  Instead, they proposed and managed to get approval of Prop 1 extensions along far longer routes with limited access, for 4-car light rail trains that lack the capacity to reduce multilane freeway peak hour and cost too much to operate during off peak commute.

 

The Northgate Link debut was the first demonstration that the costs of implementing Prop 1 extensions dwarfs any potential benefit.  They do nothing to increase transit capacity into Seattle they only increase the costs, and nothing to reduce freeway congestion. Whatever riders they add also reduces access for current riders.  Sound Transit should not be allowed to avoid exposing that failure in order to perpetrate further Prop 1 extensions that add to the cost/benefit shortfall.

 

Seattle Times Ignores ST"s Real Revenue Problem

The September 2^nd Seattle Times Traffic Lab front page article “Sound Transit goes all in on gentler fare enforcement” typifies a failure to understand Sound Transit’s real “revenue problem” isn’t from those not paying for riding light rail it’s the high cost of providing those light rail routes. Sound Transit’s 2022 long term budget projects spending $58.8B on light rail extensions between 2017 and 2046.  Operating and Maintenance (O&M) of light rail will cost $18.9B and most of the System of Good Repairs (SOGR) cost, $9.4B, will be spent on light rail. 

Yet total fare revenue in the budget from all the transit modes was limited to $8.3B.  And that was based on  Sound Transit's dubious (delusional?) projections for ridership added by light rail extensions.  The Seattle Times should urge Sound Transit to pay more attention to the costs of providing the routes rather than attempting to make up for the lost fares by spending $672 million on “gentler fare enforcement”.

For example, spending $58.8B completing the 116-mile light rail extensions averages $0.5B per mile to construct.  The $18.9B O&M and $9.4 SOGR for the 116-mile adds $0.24B per mile, costing Sound Transit $0.74B for each mile of extension for from 2017 to 2046.   By reducing the 116-mile extension by 11 miles, the money saved would offset the complete loss of toll revenue for the entire period.

 Sound Transit could also reduce costs by avoiding unneeded operating costs. An example would be terminating East Link at the International District/Chinatown Station.  Ending the costs of routing 4-car trains to UW and beyond to Northgate.  Sound Transit budgets light rail car operating costs at ~$30 per vehicle revenue mile. 

With 4-car light rail trains, the ~20-mile round trip to Northgate and back adds $2,400 to the trip cost, or ~$260,000 for 110 routes a day, costing ~$82 million for a “310-weekday” year.   Terminating East Link would avoid spending nearly 4 times the $21M Sound Transit budgeted for 2022 Link Fare revenue and more than 2 times the $36M fare revenue from all the transit modes.  

The money saved by terminating East Link at International District would do more than end Sound Transits need for any fare revenue. It would also avoid halving the DSTT’s limited number of light rail trains to SeaTac.   The question is who would be harmed?  East side commuters wanting to go beyond International District could transfer to Link Line 1 for the commute to Westlake Station and beyond.  Extending the route adds unneeded capacity to UW, to Northgate, and beyond.

Again, the Seattle Times needs to recognize Sound Transit’s revenue problem is not they can’t collect fares for the service, it’s because they spend far too much providing the service.  A recent example is Sound Transit's  decision to spend $600M on 2 transit stations, at 85th St on I-405 and on 130th St on I-5.  That’s more than 15 times the total fares Sound Transit expects for the year. Yet the service the two stations provide is limited by the fact neither has parking for access.

That extending the light rail spine along I-5 does nothing to increase capacity, it only adds cost for light rail construction and operation of light rail trains. Using the light rail extensions to replace bus routes reduces transit capacity into Seattle and reduces access for current riders. BRT provides far more transit capacity along both I-5 and I-90 corridors at a fraction of light rail cost. What’s needed are local bus routes to provide access for commuters.  

The Times should urge Sound Transit divert the light rail spine funding to the far shorter West Seattle and Ballard Link. The service provided would benefit far more since 70 to 80% of the two links projected 80,000-95,000 riders would live within walking distance of stations.  The costs could be slashed by terminating the Ballard Link at Westlake Station. Ending the ultimate example of excessive cost for service provided by no longer spending $5 billion and years of disruption to provide Ballard commuters a tunnel under Seattle.

The bottom line is the Seattle Times and Sound Transit need to recognize the solution for light rail's revenue problem is to reduce the cost of providing the service rather than spending $672M attempting to increase fare revenue.

Expediting Bellevue-to-Redmond Light Rail Starter Line

                    

The August 30th Seattle Times Opinion page, "Don't delay opening of the Bellevue to Redmond light rail starter line” raises several questions.  The author, Claudia Balducci, is the chair of Sound Transit’s System Expansion Committee that presumably makes the decisions regarding when to open the “starter line”.  What prompted her to write an opinion page expressing concerns that someone wanted to delay the opening?  

More important is what are the benefits of running light rail from Redmond to South Bellevue or Mercer Island P&R.  Typical of Sound Transit, Balducci, apparently doesn’t recognize commuters don’t like being forced to transfer between transit modes.  Extending the “starter line” beyond Bellevue T/C to South Bellevue or Mercer Island would require Seattle residents transfer to and from bus routes for their commute into and out of downtown Bellevue.  Downtown Bellevue residents would be forced to transfer from Link to and from buses for their commutes into and out of Seattle. 

Terminating the "starter line" at Bellevue T/C, shortening the route by 2.5 miles, would also reduce operating costs.  Sound Transit budgets light rail car operating costs at ~$30 per vehicle revenue mile so the 5-mile round trip would add $150 per car or $600 for 4-car trains.  The bus routes they'd replace cost $13 per mile, or $65 per trip.

Thus, even Sound Transit would hopefully recognize any “Starter Line” should be limited to providing commuters access to transit along Bel-Red corridor from Redmond to downtown Bellevue. The link would have 6 intermediary stations between downtown Redmond and Bellevue T/C. Access from parking would be limited to 1400 stalls at West Marymoor Station and 300 stalls at both Redmond Technology and Bel-Red 130^th Station. Balducci suggests additional access via “additional transit-oriented development, including affordable housing at most light rail stations along the East Link Corridor”. 

However East Link Corridor residents currently have access to transit to Bellevue via the RapidRide B Line.  The route from Redmond Transit Center to Bellevue Transit Center provides access at 11 stations and 16 stops, primarily along 148^th Ave and 8^th Ave into Bellevue.  Access to parking includes 440 stalls at Redmond Transit Center and 300 stalls at both Redmond Technology and Overlake P&R.  RapidRide B Line clearly has far greater access, though it results in 40-minute peak commute times, likely twice those for the Link.

The question remains as to service provided and cost for that service.  The RapidRide B weekday schedule include 90 routes that begins at 4:22 am from the Redmond T/C and ends at 12:30 am from the Bellevue T/C. During peak 4-hour morning and afternoon commutes it runs every 10 minutes increasing to 15 minutes during off peak.  Sound Transit budgets bus operating costs at ~$13.00 per revenue mile so the 17-mile trip from Redmond T/C will cost $221 or ~$20,000 for the 90 round trips.

The Link extension from Bellevue T/C to downtown Redmond essentially doubles East Link operating costs. Sound Transit proposes Link routes every 8 minutes during peak commute though it’s not clear what the remaining schedule will be.  Sound Transit budgets light rail cars as ~$30.00 per revenue mile.  The Link’s somewhat shorter 15-mile trip will cost $450 per car.  Assuming 4-car trains the cost per route is $1800, nine times that of RapidRide B route, presumably limiting the service provided.

The bottom line is the decision to expedite the “Starter Line” exemplifies a Sound Transit Board made up of well-meaning people who don’t understand the basics of effective public transit.  They’ve been allowed to hide the fact that the Northgate Link debut demonstrated they should have never extended light rail beyond the UW Station.  That 4-car light rail trains don’t have the capacity needed to reduce peak hour multilane freeway congestion and cost too much to operate during off-peak commute.  

The East Link delay will delay demonstration Sound Transit should have never confiscated the I-90 Bridge center roadway for light rail.  The “Starter Line” debut will demonstrate the light rail train route along Bel-Red corridor to Redmond won’t’ have the access needed to justify cost of construction and that 4-car light rail trains on the route cost too much to operate for the service needed.  Expediting the route only hastens the discovery.