About this blog

My name is Bill Hirt and I'm a candidate to be a Representative from the 48th district in the Washington State legislature. My candidacy stems from concern the legislature is not properly overseeing the WSDOT and Sound Transit East Link light rail program. I believe East Link will be a disaster for the entire eastside. ST will spend 5-6 billion on a transportation project that will increase, not decrease cross-lake congestion, violates federal environmental laws, devastates a beautiful part of residential Bellevue, creates havoc in Bellevue's central business district, and does absolutely nothing to alleviate congestion on 1-90 and 405. The only winners with East Link are the Associated Builders and Contractors of Western Washington and their labor unions.

This blog is an attempt to get more public awareness of these concerns. Many of the articles are from 3 years of failed efforts to persuade the Bellevue City Council, King County Council, east side legislators, media, and other organizations to stop this debacle. I have no illusions about being elected. My hope is voters from throughout the east side will read of my candidacy and visit this Web site. If they don't find them persuasive I know at least I tried.

Sunday, February 27, 2022

Why No One Wants To Be ST CEO

An earlier post asked “What If No One Wants ST CEO Job?” The Sound Transit Board decided to replace CEO Rogoff last September. They waited until the January 26th CEO Selection Committee Meeting Agenda to announce their Recruitment Work Plan was to hire CPS HR Consulting to find suitable candidates. 

That process began with a December 23rd “Kickoff” and December 30th meet to “review draft work plan." January 3-21 was used to Conduct Stakeholder Sessions and Committee and Board member meetings. The January 26th meeting with CEO Selection Committee was to “finalize selection criteria." 

Active Recruitment” with “Advertising” began on February 7th with job openings posted in websites, publications, and various professional associations, and reaching out to potentially competitive candidates. The “Aggressive Recruiting/Application Process” began February 9th with “consultants following up with targeted/qualified candidates”, and conversations with client on “best avenue to proceed." The “consultants vetted candidate applications against minimum qualifications” and “provided weekly updates regarding recruitment activities.” The CPS HR Consulting contract presumably ends on March 16th when "Active Recruitment" will end.  


Apparently, CPS HR Consultant's search for candidates hasn’t gone very well since Sound Transit Board’s February 24th meeting agenda including the following: 


**Motion No. M2022-16: 1) Appointing Brooke Belman as the acting chief executive officer (CEO) starting when current CEO Peter M. Rogoff departs and ending when the new Board-appointed CEO begins duties and 2) establishing a temporary base salary increase for Ms. Belman effective February 28, 2022, and extending for the three months following the start date of a new CEO.  


The agenda motion raised all sorts of questions. Why was an “acting CEO” needed prior to Rogoff leaving in April and before the end of CPS search contract? Does the Board intend to extend CPS contract or look elsewhere for a “new Board appointed CEO”? If Ms. Belman is qualified to be CEO, why wasn’t she considered between September when CEO Rogoff was to be replaced and December when CPS was hired to find a replacement? Those questions remain unanswered since the motion was never discussed in the video of the meeting. 


The bottom line is the reason Sound Transit is having difficulty finding a replacement for CEO Rogoff is he should have never been hired in the first place. While he was able to oversee construction of light rail extensions, the transit system expansion budget increased from $54B in 2016 to $138B in 2022. Also, neither he nor the elected officials on Sound Transit Board demonstrated any understanding of what constituted effective public transit. Neither recognized light rail routed through the DSTT lacked the capacity needed to reduce peak congestion on I-5 and I-90. That during off peak commutes the I-5 and I-90 corridor light rail operating costs will dwarf farebox revenue exacerbating farebox recovery shortfall.  


A competent transit system CEO would've recognized both. That the billions spent on Prop 1 should have been spent increasing access to transit with additional capacity. Add parking and local bus routes to stations on I-5 and I-90 with BRT routes into Seattle able to adjust to both peak and off-peak demand. Thus, it's unlikely the Board will find someone other than current Sound Transit sycophants willing to spend billions more on future extensions.  

 

My candidacy for Senate will use the Voters' Pamphlet this summer to tell residents about the irony of it taking the Board’s decision to replace CEO Rogoff to demonstrate the folly of hiring him.  

 

Thursday, February 24, 2022

A 2nd Tunnel Alternative and More

The previous post detailed how terminating East Link at International District/Chinatown station would allow West Seattle to use DSTT.   I-90 corridor transit commuters would use BRT routes, bypassing Mercer Island, into Seattle rather than light rail.   

This post opines the Ballard Link could be a tunnel that would terminate at the Westlake Station. I-5 commuters would also use BRT routes into Seattle rather than light rail. Terminating East Link and Ballard Link at International District/Chinatown and Westlake would end the need for a second tunnel under downtown Seattle.  

 

Both I-5 and I-90 BRT routes would have access to a Seattle T/C. 4th Ave could be converted into an elongated bus-only T/C with multiple stops on both sides from Pine Steet to Yesler. During peak hours, I-5 and I-90 commuters at each P&R would have access to a BRT route directly to two or three designated stops along T/C for egress and access.  


Bus routes to and from each P&R could be scheduled to meet local demand providing commuters access to each P&R during peak commute. Off peak bus routes would include stops at all P&Rs on way into and on-demand stops on return. Those commuters could pay to reserve stalls to assure access to station and means to return home. 

 

The BRT routes could use 60 ft buses with 110 passenger capacity along a limited access lane. During peak hours they would use HOV lane requiring +3 carpools and HOT fees raised to limit traffic to 2000 vehicles per hour to assure 45 mph. 


The bottom line is the Northgate Link debut results, when released, will demonstrate the folly of attempting to use light rail extensions routed through the DSTT to reduce I-5 and I-90 congestion. They don’t have the capacity during peak commute and cost too much to operate during off-peak.  The DSTT capacity should be used by commuters with access to light rail stations in South Seattle, UW, Bellevue and Bel-Red, West Seattle, and Ballard. 


Funds planned for the light rail spine extensions and second tunnel should be diverted toward expediting West Seattle and Ballard light rail extensions. Add local bus routes to existing P&R lots with access to BRT routes on limited access I-5 and I-90 HOV lanes to a bus-only 4th Ave T/C. It’s only a question of when Sound Transit and the Seattle Times recognize that reality. 

 

Tuesday, February 15, 2022

Mitigating the East Link Debacle

 Sooner or later Sound Transit will release Northgate Link ridership levels that were a fraction of their Link website predictions. This post is an attempt to avoid even more serious problems next year when East Link begins operation 

Countless posts on this blog have detailed reasons Sound Transit’s East Link 2008 DEIS ridership claims were sheer fantasy. They should have never been allowed to confiscate the I-90 Bridge center roadway for half the 15 train-per-hour limit needed to maintain 4 minutes between trains for safe operation in DSTT. The result, both East Link and Central Link south of International District/Chinatown Station lack capacity needed to reduce congestion into Seattle. 

The obvious solution, terminate East Link at the International District Station prior to entering DSTT. Use the station as a transfer point allowing East Link riders transfer to Central Link to continue into tunnel for routes to University Station and beyond. Others could choose to use station to end commute into Seattle 

Doing so ends potential problems with merging return trains with different route lengths. It also avoids the stupidity of sending twice as many trains to Northgate as to Bellevue and south end commuters losing half their trains when East Link debuts. The existing DSTT capacity could suffice for route to West Seattle, delaying any need for a second tunnel. 

  

East Link operation could match the needs of east side commuters with access to stations and provide access for Seattleites with access to Bellevue and Overlake. Those on I-90 corridor should have direct bus routes into Seattle rather than forced to transfer to and from East Link on Mercer Island as currently planned.  

  

I-90 corridor commuters would have far faster commutes and Mercer Island could avoid having their station inundated with I-90 transit commuters. Bypassing the island would also avoid islanders having to share access with I-90 commuters to whatever capacity remained at East Link's last stop; especially during peak commute. 

  

The bottom line is Sound Transit should never have been allowed to confiscate I-90 Bridge center roadway for light rail. However the East Link operating debacle can be mitigated by terminating it at International District station and continuing I-90 corridor bus routes into Seattle.  

 

Thursday, February 10, 2022

Seattle Times Still Doesn’t Get It

The February 8th Seattle Times editorial “Strong Transit needs Fare Enforcement” epitomizes the paper’s slavish support for CEO Rogoff's Sound Transit problems: 

The agency set a goal of paying 40% of Link light rail operating costs through fares. When the numbers are finally counted, it expects to only hit 5% last year. 


The loss in fare revenue isn’t a new concern. Sound Transit Agency Progress reports of Risk Management issues included the following need for Fare Paid Zones:  

 

August 2020 

  • Fare Paid Zone (FPZ) - Scope change to add FPZ modifications to stations could cost more or take longer than anticipated. 

January 2021 

  • ST imposed changes to Fare Paid Zones could require substantial demolition/remodel at station entrances. 


Apparently, the cost of modifying stations for FPZ exceeded the benefit as later Progress Reports no longer included the issue. Still their 2021 budget assumed Link farebox recovery would be 15.1%. The Seattle Times response to the 5% recovery typifies their identifying the problem but “vague” as to solution. 


Elected officials must make finding comprehensive solutions to fare box evasion quickly a high priority. 


The Seattle Times still doesn’t “get it.” The likely major reason 2021 farebox recovery was a third of predictions was, not because riders weren’t paying, but because there were far fewer riders than predicted. Sound Transit’s Northgate Link website had predicted it would add 41,000 to 49,000 daily riders by 2022. The Times had called the Northgate Link debut, “Transit Transformed” predicting its three stations would add 42,000 to 49,000 riders.  


Thus, any attempt to find solution to fare box evasion should also consider revenue lost from fewer riders. It’s been four months since the Northgate Link debut yet Sound Transit refuses to release Link ridership. (They haven’t released their normal Quarterly Service Performance reports with “boardings per trip,” “cost per boarding” and boardings at individual stations since Q1 2021.)  Again, the likely result, funds lost by fare evasion were dwarfed by the funds lost because Northgate Link ridership was a fraction of predictions. (The result of a lack of parking at light rail stations or stations with bus routes to those stations.) Yet the Seattle Times continues abetting Sound Transit ridership opacity. 


Whatever the ridership, the lower farebox recovery also reflects increased operating costs with the Northgate Link extension’s longer routes. Sound Transit's March "2021 Financial Plan and Adopted Budget" reported Link light rail operating costs as $30.17 per Revenue Vehicle Mile. The 8.4 miles added by the round trip from UW to Northgate and back adds $253.43 per car or $1,013.72 per 4-car trip. The Link’s schedule for 125 daily trips adds $126,715 to operating costs. Rather than attempting to increase farebox recovery by reducing fare evasion, Sound Transit could reduce operating costs with fewer routes, or fewer cars per train, yet assiduously refuses to do.

 

The bottom line is Seattle Times asking legislature to help Sound Transit collect fare revenue exemplifies a decade of abetting Sound Transit. The paper has ignored countless blog posts urging they ask legislature require a performance audit of their plans for Prop 1 expansions. Even a cursory review of Sound Transit plans to confiscate the I-90 Bridge center roadway would have concluded light rail routed through DSTT didn’t have needed capacity. That light rail routed through DSTT should have never been extended beyond UW to Northgate or beyond SeaTac. Funds spent on those projects dwarf any farebox revenue lost from evasion.  Funds spent on further extensions do nothing to increase capacity, they only exacerbate the problem.


It's something the Seattle Times still doesn’t get.  (And a major reason I'm a candidate for Senate to expose.)