2022 Another Year of Sound Transit Incompetence

 This blog ends 2022 like it began with a post declaring it was another year of Sound Transit’s failure to recognize the light rail spine won’t reduce I-5 and I-90 congestion into Seattle.  The year began with the need to find a someone to replace Peter Rogoff as CEO.  It ended with the new CEO Julie Timm’s December 8th blog post, “East Link opening time frame update". A response to the need to “remediate non-conforming direct fixation track plinths”.  Sound Transit verbiage for replacing faulty track attachments on the Link's extension.   

It was a year that began with a Jan 4th release of an Agency Progress Report claiming the East Gate “Substantial Completion Date” was 161 calendar dates later than the contractor milestone date of December 13, 2021, ended with a December 6th release with the completion date 444 calendar dates later than a May 13, 2022, contractor milestone date.  Still, without an update on time required to redo track attachment.  Timm’s December 8th post delayed the revenue service date from 30-June-23 to Spring 2025.  

 The year that began with a Jan 4th Agency Progress Report that the Federal Way progress schedule “is currently under review” was “still under review” in the Dec 6 release.  What changed was the “2017-2046 Sources and Uses of Funds” increased from $138.0B to $149.1B between the 2022 and 2023 Financial Plan and Proposed Budgets, nearly triple the $54B voters approved in 2016. And a year  that the  "Principle Balance on Tax-Based Deb" increased from $24B to $29B ignoring the fact that the ST3 taxes is based on ends in 2941.

 What didn’t change between the yearly budgets was the delusional claim Link ridership would increase from 20 million annually to 150 million in 2046.  They continued to ignore the fact that light rail spine extensions do nothing to increase light rail train capacity and the need to increase access to transit. They refused to release the quarterly Service Delivery Performance Reports that demonstrated that failure when Northgate Link’s three stations attracted only a fraction of the 42,000 to 49,000 predicted.    

The year included Sound Transit’s attempts to make up for the East Link delay with an East Link Starter Line alongside ST 550 to South Bellevue P&R.  They failed to consider most Bellevue commuters will “likely” choose ST550 because its route through downtown Bellevue has better access and there’s no need to transfer at P&R.  That even fewer returning commuters will choose to transfer to light rail at P&R for the trip into Bellevue. They could have used the delay the to allow East Link trains to terminate at Chinatown, but continued the plan to route to Mariner P&R  as Link 2 Line.

The bottom line is 2022 was a year where Sound Transit managed to hire a new transit CEO willing to continue implementing “voter approved” extensions for light rail trains that won’t reduce congestion. That it was also the year Sound Transit delayed the most blatant example of that failure, the East Link extension, from June 2023 to Spring 2025.   

 It ended with a Julie Timm Dec 8th post “An update on Link projects in construction” detailing the option of implementing the Starter Line first before Lynnwood Link and a TBD Federal Way start date.  That both options “face significant challenges and risks” but left it up to the board to decide in January.

Seattle Times Concedes “Voter Approved” Extensions Won’t Reduce Congestion

The previous post concluded Sound Transit CEO Timm will continue what she was hired to do, implement “Voter Approved” light rail extensions for as long as the Seattle Times enables them. This post responds to the paper’s request for a headline with one that could end their enabling: “Voter Approved Extensions Won’t Reduce I-5 and I-90 Congestion.”    

If they do publish the article, it’s been a long time in coming.  The paper’s ignored a decade of this blog urging they include a performance audit of Sound Transit’s light rail extension in their list of 10 priorities for legislators. Even a cursory audit would have concluded the “voter approved” extensions won’t reduce congestion into Seattle. 

  

They do nothing to increase parking for access to transit,  the number of trains per hour, the number of cars per train, or the number of riders in each car.  Thus, the extensions can’t change the fact that 4-car light rail trains lack the transit ridership capacity needed to reduce I-5 and I-90 peak hour congestion. 

 Sound Transit’s responds to the need for light rail riders by using the Link to replace bus routes into Seattle. Reducing bus routes reduces transit capacity into the city and nothing to reduce GP lane congestion. The former bus riders also reduce the access for current Link riders and exacerbate lack-of-capacity problem during peak hour commute. The longer the extensions, the more bus riders added, the greater their loss of access, and, the greater the costs of providing the service.  

There wouldn’t have been the “Voter Approved” extensions without Seattle’s 70% ST3 approval.  It was far less popular outside Seattle since King County approval was only 58%. Pierce and Snohomish counties combined, where much of the money will be spent, voted 53% to reject it.     

The bottom line is an article with the headline “Voter Approved Extensions Won’t Reduce Congestion” could inform readers light rail spine extensions won’t have the capacity to reduce I-5 and I-90 congestion into Seattle.  That the “voter approved” extensions will reduce access to transit for those in Seattle who voted to approve them.  That Sound Transit should divert light rail spine funding to Ballard and West Seattle extensions for those who made ST3 funding possible.. 

Those living in Sound Transit service area deserve the headline and article from Seattle Times.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

New Sound Transit CEO’s Report Card

 The previous post proposed Sound Transit could use the time needed to redo East Link track attachments to allow the Link’s train routes to terminate at Chinatown station.  This post offers a “Report Card” on the new Sound Transit CEO, Julie Timm’s, response to the need to redo the Link's attachments on her blog post and during the December 8th Sound Transit meetings.  

On the plus side is her recognition Sound Transit problems with East Link and Tacoma Dome Link extensions have resulted in her requesting authorization to contract with HDR Engineering for construction management service.  The need to spend up to $118M and $93M respectively on the two extensions indicates she recognizes Sound Transit’s engineering oversight problems.  

On the minus side is her December 8th blog post, “East Link opening timeframe update” continues Sound Transit’s plan to implement “voter approved” extensions.   CEO Timm apparently doesn’t acknowledge extending light rail tracks do nothing to increase the number of transit vehicles per hour or the number of riders in each vehicle.  That the major result of the extensions is increased operating costs. 

The result of the track attachment redo is a two-year delay in East Link demonstrating Sound Transit’s biggest debacle.  They should have never been allowed to confiscate the I-90 Bridge center roadway for a transit system that limits East Side and South Seattle capacity to half the DSTT trains.  That using the trains to replace cross lake bus routes limits transit capacity and does nothing to reduce I-90 corridor congestion. 

Instead, the Lynnwood extension debut in either summer/fall or fall/winter 2024 will demonstrate the problem with “voter approved” extensions along I-5 corridor.   Most of the corridor commuters with access to transit have already been required to transfer from bus routes to the Northgate Link for the ride into and out of Seattle.  While some of them will use Lynnwood extension instead, the number of commuters added will be a fraction of Sound Transit’s 37,000 to 57,000 predicted.  Yet the 8.5-mile extension will add ~$2000 for the round trip from Northgate, doubling round trip cost from Westlake.     

 CEO Timm also gets a failing grade for her blog post proposal to implement Sound Transit System Expansion Committee Chair Claudia Balducci’s proposal for a East Link Starter Line alongside ST 550 bus route to South Bellevue P&R.   Bellevue commuters will “likely” choose ST 550 because it’s route though downtown Bellevue has better access and there’s no need to transfer at P&R.  Even fewer returning commuters will choose to transfer to light rail at South Bellevue for the trip into Bellevue.  

The bottom line is CEO Timm’s blog post reflects the fact she was hired because of her willingness to implement “voter approved” extensions.  The Seattle Times has abetted Sound Transit refusal to release the Northgate Link results demonstrating the "voter approved" extensions lacked the access and capacity needed to reduce multilane freeway peak congestion and cost too much to operate off-peak. 

The need to redo the East Link track attachments has resulted in CEO Timm's blog post delaying the next demonstration from June 2023 to at least summer 2024 Lynnwood Link debut.  Continuing what Sound Transit hired her to do for as long as the Seattle Times enables them.

Sound Transit Can Still Mitigate East Link Debacle.

The December 8th Sound Transit email “East Link Extension Project Update” continues the Link debacle with an “East Link opening timeframe update”.  It refers to a blog post by CEO Julie Timm detailing their current response to Sound Transit hiring a construction company that failed to properly install light rail tracks.  A failure Sound Transit first acknowledged with the following in the April Agency Progress Report:   

Contract E130-- Seattle to South Bellevue:  

Current Progress                                                                                                 West Segment:  Progress non-conforming tract direct fixation concrete plinth remediation                                                                                                       Center Segment:  Progress non-conforming tract direct fixation concrete plinth remediation.                                                                                                         East Segment: progress non-conforming track direct fixation concrete plinth remediation.  

Schedule Summary                                                                                           Within the E130 contract schedule, the critical path is driven by track remediation scope and cathodic protection on the floating bridge  

That Next Period’s Activities for all three segments included “direct fixation plinth remediation”.  

Similar concerns were included in subsequent monthly progress reports with no indications of progress.  The Current Progress activity in the December 6th release of the October report continues with “ongoing non-conforming track remediation”.   The schedule summary “The contractor needs to correct non-conforming scopes of work” with no estimate of completion.  

Typical of Sound Transit they call the contractor's need to replace faulty track attachments as “non-conforming track direct fixation remediation”.  The December 8th CEO blog post refers to the contractor's flawed attachments as a “project construction challenge”.   

 The email details the need to “ensure the work performed does not damage the bridge structure”.  That Sound Transit needs to “inspect all the work” and the staff needs “increased training to ensure they understand the required tolerances and scopes of work being installed”.  Apparently concerned their contractor still needed Sound Transit to oversee the “remediation”.  Not much of a contractor “endorsement”.  

One would have thought an April Agency Progress Report problem would, by December, have some “remediation” date and a recommendation as to how to proceed.  Instead, the blog post update “Possible project opening timeframes” delays East Link from July 2023 to Spring 2025.  It suggests an East Link Starter Line in 2024, problems with the two sequencing options, and “the intention to ask the Board for direction as soon as January”.    

The bottom line is the need to redo track attachments will delay demonstrating Sound Transit should have never been allowed to install light rail tracks on I-90 Bridge.  However,  the delay also allows them to mitigate that debacle by using the delay to implement terminating East Link trains at Chinatown station.  

The entire Sound Transit service area would benefit. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Another Year of ST Approving Financial Plan and Proposed Budget Folly

The agenda for the Dec 8th Sound Transit System Expansion Committee Meeting includes the following: 

6. Business Items

For committee final action:

B. Motion No. M2022-95: Recommending that the portions of the Proposed 2023 Budget and Transit improvement Plan reviewed by the System Expansion Committee be forwarded by the Finance and Audit Committee to the Board with a do-pass recommendation.

The motion personifies a decade of a Sound Transit Board made up of “well minded” elected officials with no understanding of what constitutes effective public transit.  That public transit should be used to provide transit for those who can’t drive or choose not to drive to destinations and to reduce congestion for those who do.  That doing so requires providing those seeking to use transit with access to transit capacity to desired destinations.   

Instead, the Sound Transit Board apparently perceives its job is to implement Prop 1 and ST3 “Voter approved extensions”.  They’ve chosen to ignore the fact both voter approvals were the result of delusional extension ridership projections.  That Sound Transit refuses to add parking to increase access to transit or acknowledge light rail spine extensions don’t increase transit capacity into the city.  Thus, ridership added by extensions will only reduce access for current commuters.  

The October 2021 Northgate Link debut exemplified those failures.  Sound Transit’s website had projected the Link would add 41,000 to 49,000 riders by 2022.  Prior to the debut, the Seattle Times Traffic had heralded the Link as “Transit Transformed” promising the Link’s three stations would add 42,000 to 49,000 riders.  

 

Yet Sound Transit has yet to release the ridership added, no longer providing any quarterly service delivery performance reports.  Ending reports for service provided, riders added at each light rail station, and riders added by each bus route. Also ending reports for costs per boarder and fare box recovery of those costs for each transit mode.    

Instead, the result was reflected in Sound Transit’s 2022 budget prediction only 43,000 “Average Weekday Boardings” for the entire Link, less than the 48,600 predicted for 2021 budget, prior to Northgate debut.   The budget predicted the Link extension added costs, with $14.92 cost per boarding, a 30% increase over $11.67, 2021 prediction.  Both, presumably the result of Sound Transit’s recognition of the Link’s failure to provide commuters with increased access and transit capacity into Seattle.  

Sound Transit’s October 2023 Budget doesn't include any comparable “Link Budget Highlights”, “Service Provided, Boardings, Costs per Boarding, or Farebox Recovery.  Thus, it’s unclear what their year-over-year predictions with Northgate Link operation.  Yet, the budget’s Long Range Financial Plan, Ridership by Mode 2017—2046” chart still shows Link ridership increasing from 18 million in 2022 to 62 million in 2026.  Presumably because of extensions to Lynnwood, Federal Way, and Redmond.   

However, none of those extensions significantly increase parking for access, the number of transit vehicles per hour, or the capacity of those vehicles.  Sound Transit plans to use light rail to replace bus routes into Seattle reduces transit capacity into the city.  Sound Transit waits until 2032 for the West Seattle and 2037 for Ballard extensions to add transit capacity into downtown.

The bottom line is the Sound Transit System Expansion Committee on Dec. 8th will recommend approving the 2023 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget.  A budget that reflects Sound Transit’s apparent goal to implement “voter approved” link extensions rather than reduce area’s congestion.  A budget that ignores the Northgate Link demonstration of the need for access and transit capacity.  Another year and billions spent on extensions that increase operating costs, do nothing to reduce congestion into the city, and reduce access for current riders. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Seattle Times Abets ST East Link Debacle

 A previous post opined the Seattle Times had abetted the Sound Transit Board of Directors adopting a “Transit Development Plan 2022-2027” exemplfying a decade of transit system incompetence.  However, the most egregious example of Seattle Times abetting Sound Transit incompetence is the paper’s Traffic Lab response to the East Link debacle.  

 The paper heralds it as follows:  

Traffic Lab is a project that digs into the region’s thorny transportation issues, spotlights promising approaches to easing gridlock, and helps readers find the best ways to get around.  

Clearly the “region’s thorny transportation issue” is the congestion on I-5 and I-90 into and out of Seattle.  A competent Traffic Lab would have recognized the folly of Sound Transit’s decision to confiscate the I-90 Bridge center roadway for East Link.  That two-way bus only routes on bridge center roadway would have 10 times light rail capacity, 10 years sooner, at 1/10th the cost.  

That Sound Transit compounded the capacity problem by choosing to route East Link beyond Chinatown station through DSTT to UW, Northgate, and eventually to Mariner P&R near Everett.  The result being rather than adding transit capacity into Seattle, Central Link lost half of the DSTT capacity.    

What’s absurd is rather than using East Link to add cross-lake transit capacity into Seattle, Sound Transit will use it to replace bus routes into the city.  Apparently not recognizing I-90 Bridge congestion is not due to too many buses.  Spending more than $3B on a transit system that halves Central Link capacity and is used primarily to replace bus routes surely qualifies as a debacle.

 Sound Transit could avoid Central Link losing half DSTT capacity by terminating East Link at Chinatown.  Doing so would allow Sound Transit to adjust the number of cars in each train and schedule frequency to meet the demand from commuters with access along route through Bellevue.  I-90 corridor buses could be routed into and out of Seattle rather than terminated on Mercer Island.  The Chinatown Station would also provide easy access for returning East Link riders.

The modification could be implemented during the delay due to the contractors need to redo the track attachments.   As of the November 17th meeting, the Board didn't know how long the delay.  A competent Traffic Lab would advocate using the delay to terminate East Link at Chinatown.

Instead, they'll likely abet Board's November 17th plan to implement a Starter 2 Line for East Link on east side of Lake Washington.  Typical of the Board, it's not clear why the need for the Starter Line.  Rapid Line 2 already provides far better access to transit into Bellevue than Starter Line 2.  Many transit commuters will also be dissuaded  by the need to transfer to and from buses at South Bellevue or Mercer Island P&R's to commute into and out of Seattle.  

The bottom line is  the contractor's need to redo attaching tracks delays Sound Transit's demonstration they should have never confiscated the I-90 Bridge center roadway for light rail.  However, the delay gives them a chance to mitigate the damage by terminating East Link at Chinatown.  Instead, Sound Transit will likely  use the delay to spend additional billions on other similarly flawed "voter approved" extensions.

Again, another Sound Transit folly, abetted by Seattle Times Traffic Lab. 

New ST CEO Continues Rogoff Debacle

A previous post opined a public transit system CEO’s responsibility should be to oversee providing transit for those who can’t or don’t choose to drive and to reduce congestion for those who do.  A competent transit CEO would recognize that spending billions on “voter approved” light rail spine extensions won’t do either.  Instead, the new CEO’s leadership has resulted in a “2023 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget” that continues a decade of Sound Transit failure.

 

The 2023 budget’s “Long Range Financial Plan” continues expanding the funding requirements from the $54B voters approved in 2016 to $149.1B in 2046.  It ends with a “Tax Backed Debt” of $29B in 2046 with ST3 taxes that “Backed that Debt” ending in 2041.   

 

The long-range plan’s “Fare Revenue 2017—2046” chart claim Link Light Rail fares would increase from $20 million to $370 million in 2046 reflected delusional projections Link ridership would increase from 22 million to 150 million.  It also showed Sound Transit’s failure to recognize the benefits of added bus service with no anticipated fare revenue or ridership increase.  

 

The video of the November 10^th System Expansion Committee meeting only addressed the new CEO’s 2023 budget.  The 172-page budget was more about process than product, having extensive details on the process of how more than $3 billion will be spent on transit mode expansions and total operating costs but nothing on the product.  The product being what service will each transit mode provide, how many riders do they expect, how much it will cost for each rider, and what is each modes expected fare box recovery?   

 

A major portion of the 2023 budget is the ~$1,250 million spent funding “voter approved extensions” to Lynnwood, Redmond, and Federal Way. None of those extensions increase transit capacity with more light rail cars per minute or more riders per car.   Yet, the 2023 budget in the “Ridership by Mode 2017—2046” chart predicts Link light rail ridership will increase from 24 million in 2017 to 62 million in 2026 when the extensions are completed.

 

The new CEO’s 2023 budget also exemplifies Sound Transit decade of failing to recognize reducing freeway congestion requires attracting more commuters with added access to transit.  The access comes from stations within walking distance of transit stations, parking near light rail stations, or access to bus routes to stations.

 

None of the potential Link stations are within walking distance of the number of commuters needed to reduce congestion.  All the parking with access to Link stations or bus routes to the stations is already "fully in use".  The additional commuters needed to reduce congestion won’t have access without added parking, access to Link stations or bus routes to stations.

 

The Northgate Link debut exemplified Sound Transit's lack-of-access problem.  As with all of the light rail spine extensions, they attempt to make up for the failure to add parking for access by requiring bus riders using existing parking ride Link rather than bus routes into Seattle.  Replacing bus routes does nothing to increase transit ridership, reduce I-5 congestion, and reduces total transit capacity into Seattle.

 

The failure to provide access was presumably reflected in the Northgate Link’s failure to attract ridership.  Yet, Sound Transit refuses to release a quarterly Service Delivery Performance Report that would have shown only a fraction of the predicted 41,000 to 49,000 daily riders were added by the three Link stations.  Portending a lack-of-access problem with all the light rail spine extensions.  In response the 2023 budget spends $13 million on a System Access Policy attempting to “manage parking demand” by “maximizing efficient use of available parking resources".  A dubious process at best.

 

To be fair, much of the 2023 budget pre-ordained the new CEO’s arrival.  However, the November 10^th video of the 2023 budget presentation to the Board’s “System Expansion Committee indicates she’s willing to continue the debacle with this year's installment.  

ST System Expansion Committee Incompetence

 The November 10th System Expansion Committee agenda includes the following:

Review of the Proposed 2023 Budget for system expansion projects 

It’s a follow-up to the same agenda item in the November 3, 2022, Executive Committee Meeting.  Both deal with the 2023 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget proposed $3.1 billion expenditures with $2,369 million on “Projects” and $500 million on “Transit Operation.”  That $1,686 million of the project’s funding would be spent on Link system expansion in 2023.   

 

It's the 2023 version of Sound Transit’s plan to spend $149.1B from 2017 to 2046 on “voter approved extension” for the “largest transit system expansion in the country”.  That the result in the 2023 “Ridership by Mode 2017--2046” chart is an increase in Link ridership from 22 million to 150 million.  A “Capital Expenditures by Mode 2017—2046” chart showed about 90% will be spent on “Link Light Rail”.  

 

The 2023 budget showed Sound Transit intends to increase light rail expenditures from ~$1,700 million in 2023 to ~$3,200 million in 2024 and ~$3,100 million in 2025 completing extensions to Lynnwood, Redmond, and Federal Way.  Yet none of those track extensions will increase the number of light rail cars per hour or the number of riders in each car.  Thus, the extensions don’t increase a light rail train’s capacity into Seattle. Yet, the 2023 budget’s “Ridership by Mode 2017—2046” chart predicts the funds spent will increase ridership from 30 million in 2023 to 62 million in 2026.  

 

The committee compounds their failure to recognize capacity limits with plans  to use light rail trains to replace bus routes into Seattle.  They initiated that approach using Northgate Link trains to replace ST Express Bus and KCM routes into the city.  It’s more than a year since the Link debuted.  Yet Sound Transit refuses to release their Quarterly Service Delivered Performance reports with how many of the predicted 41,000 to 49,000 riders the Link’s three stations added.  Instead, whatever riders were added reduced access for University Link riders.

 

Sound Transit could increase the number of light rail cars into Seattle by terminating East Link at Chinatown Station.  Instead, they intend to use the extension to replace all the I-90 bus routes into Seattle on light rail trains routed to Mariner P&R near Everett.

 

The bottom line is Sound Transit's Link ridership claims are delusional.  The board's System Expansion Committee is about to approve a 2023 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget with another year of $500 million spent on operations and ~$1,700 million on light rail extensions that do nothing to increase capacity.  That using light rail to replace buses will reduce the number of transit vehicles, transit capacity into the city, and access to transit for current riders.

The result of a transit board of well-meaning elected officials with no understanding of what constitutes effective public transit.

Sound Transit’s Delusional Ridership Projections

One of the more incongruous Sound Transit statements comes from their annual “Financial Plan and Proposed Budget” regarding long range transit ridership projection:

 

For long-range ridership forecasts, Sound Transit uses a travel demand forecasting model. In this model, transit ridership forecasts are based on observed origins and destinations of transit riders, observed transit line volumes, and a realistic simulation of observed transit service characteristics.

 

The latest example is the $142B, 2023 budgets total long-range prediction,  “Ridership by Mode” Boardings will increase from 24 million in 2022 to 170 million on 2046.  That “Link Light Rail Boardings” will increase from 19 million to 150 million.  It's not clear how Sound Transit uses a “travel demand forecasting model” to assess the various “mode boardings” or why the steps in “demand” from the Link extensions.

 

The steps in “demand” from extensions ignore the reality that extending light rail tracks extensions do nothing to increase the number of light-rail cars per hour or the number of riders in each car.  Thus, while the Link may increase the “demand”, it won’t increase the capacity so its “unclear” how they extensions will satisfy the demand.  

 

Sound Transit’s other ridership “demand” problem is commuters need access to the light rail train cars.  Yet, Sound Transit’s long-range plan neglects to add parking, despite the fact all the parking with access to transit has been full for years.  Instead, they intend to use the light rail link to replace bus routes into Seattle. Commuters who currently use the parking for access to bus routes are required to transfer to light rail, reducing bus routes and transit capacity into Seattle.

 

The bottom line is not only that light rail extensions do nothing to increase transit capacity, using them to replace bus routes reduces transit capacity into Seattle and access for current link riders.  The Northgate Link debut has already reduced bus transit capacity with future extensions adding to that loss.  The most egregious example is the East Link operation which will not only end I-90 bridge bus transit capacity into Seattle, it will also halve Link transit capacity to and from SeaTac.  Using that Link to replace bus routes from south of Seattle will add to the capacity loss.

 

Sound Transit needs to explain how they will meet transit ridership “demand” with their light rail spine.

ST Should Terminate East Link at Chinatown Station

The previous post opined Sound Transit needs to do more to “justify’ transit projects.  Assure the result of a transit project was a “product” that reduced congestion. At this point it’s too late to point out the result of the East Link project, an 1-90 bridge center roadway confiscated by light rail, is a product that won’t reduce congestion.  

 

This post details Sound Transit exacerbates that failure by extending East Link light rail train routes as Link Line 2 through the DSTT and eventually to the Mariner P&R.   The result will be a “product” whose operation will share Line 1’s DSTT train capacity and incur problems merging with Central Link trains to UW and beyond.  

 

For example, Link Line 1 trains currently run northbound every 8 minutes from Angle Lake to Northgate from 5:30 to 8:46 am.  When East Link trains begin operation as part of Line 2 will Sound Transit replace half of the Line 1 trains, with both lines every 16 minutes, or double the frequency with both every 8 minutes?   A “product” with 4 minutes between trains and capacity that far exceeds the number of I-5 commuters with access to transit and operating costs that dwarf fare box revenue.   That will also be difficult to safely merge, with trains returning from different route lengths through DSTT with the 4-minute intervals.

 

Sound Transit could avoid both problems by terminating East Link at the International District Chinatown Station.  Those wishing to go further can transfer to a Line 1 train.  Central Link commuters won’t have to share whatever the DSTT train capacity when East Link debuts. 

 

Separating East Link also allows scheduling its operation with number of light rail cars in each train and their frequency adjusted to meet east side demands rather than what’s needed along Line 2 to Northgate and beyond.   Doing so has significant cost savings with light rail trains cars costing ~$30 per vehicle mile.  The 16-mile East Link and Redmond extensions cost nearly $1000 for each car-round-trip.  Limiting number of cars would enable more frequent trains, especially during off-peak operation.

 

Limiting operation to meet Bellevue transit requirements would also end Sound Transit need to use East Link to replace I-90 corridor buses for riders.  It would end the need for Sound Transit to insist on a “Bus Intercept” agreement with Mercer Island, despite nearly universal islander objections.   I-90 corridor transit riders would no longer be forced to endure the hassle of transferring to and from light rail for their commute into and out of Seattle.  Mercer Island would no longer be forced to share its access to light rail or have their station inundated with thousands of transferees. 

 

The bottom line is, terminating East Link at International District/Chinatown Station, ends a “project” that spends billions for a “product” that reduces transit capacity into Seattle and increases I-90 corridor congestion.  The following from an October 5^threlease of, “Agency Progress Report: Capital Progress, August 2022” facilitates doing so: 

The East Link critical path this month continues to run through track remediation on E130, which is holding up E750 access to complete OCS and signal installation. The time required to complete all repairs is still being determined, which may result in an even longer path to completion. Other East Link Civil Contracts continue to be closely monitored for potential impacts to the E750 schedule. 

Sound Transit should use the delay to implement terminating East Link at International District/Chinatown Station and mitigate the East Link debacle.

Sound Transit Needs to Justify Transit Projects

                   I emailed the Sound Transit System Expansion Committee the      10/07/22  post on this blog.  It included the following conclusion:

A competent transit CEO would recognize the Sound Transit TDP won’t reduce congestion.  The next System Expansion Committee meeting will indicate whether she does.  If not, the East Link debut will demonstrate the result of the eastside and south Seattle having to split the number of DSTT trains.  Central Link commuters will lose half their current capacity and east side bus commuters will lose all bus transit routes into Seattle.   

A competent Julie Timm could hasten that result and save billions.

The video of the October 13^th System Expansion Committee reported the committee reported they’d received the email as part of “public comment”.  It was released as the “written in" comment “What the New Sound Transit CEO Could Do”.

The lack of any response and subsequent agenda was a clear indication neither the committee nor the new CEO had any interest in the issues it raised. Instead, the meeting consisted of presentations about “process” not “product”.  About how to proceed with “voter approved extensions” rather than whether those extensions would relieve roadway congestion.

The first was a “Comprehensive Review” by the Sound Transit Technical Advisory Group (TAG).   The “Key Takeaway” was the conclusion Sound Transit had “not got there as ready to proceed”.  That Sound Transit needed more “guidance” with a final report to be released early next year.   

One would have thought such a critical review of both Sound Transit Staff and Board would merit some response.  Instead, Board Chair, Kent Keel, called it “Refreshing and looking forward to hearing more details”.   

The next presenter concluded his review of all the Sound Transit’s reports led to a Cost Savings Plan to replace quarterly reporting requirement.  He was more pompous than probative as his plan to no longer release Quarterly Service Delivery and Financial Performance Reports ignores the need to update the public.

The next item detailed Sound Transit’s Chinatown International District Station engagement process. What was included in the CIP engagement tool kit.  Nothing that justified the decision the station was needed.

The last was a briefing about the “Delivery Methods” Sound Transit uses for transit projects.  That different delivery methods were chosen to assure the construction contract matched the needs of the project.  

Again, all about process for completing the project but nothing to justify the project.  For example, improving the process to construct the "product", the 130^th St Infill station, ignores the fact the $270B Station has no parking for access to trains.  Even more basic the Lynnwood extension it’s on does nothing to increase light rail capacity into Seattle.  

That nearly all those using available parking with access to extension are currently already riding buses to Northgate for the Link into Seattle.  Thus, the Lynnwood project will do little to reduce congestion no matter the benefit of the process improvements.  That none of the extensions will increase transit capacity into Seattle despite improving the process.

Sound Transit needs to do more to justify the projects.

 

Northgate Link Begins the Debacle

This post was prompted by the fact it’s over a year since the Oct 2, 2021, Northgate Link debut.  It was the first demonstration of Sound Transit’s ability to use Prop 1 funded light rail spine trains to reduce I-5 and I-90 congestion into Seattle.  ST’s website had predicted the 4.3-mile, $1.9B link would add 41,000 to 49,000 riders.  The Seattle Times Traffic Lab had heralded the debut as “Transit Transformed” claiming 42,000 to 49,000 commuters would be added by the Link’s three stations.  

 

Yet neither Sound Transit nor the Traffic Lab have provided any Link ridership results. (ST no longer releases the Quarterly Service Provided Performance Reports with ridership added by each station.)  Like all the extensions, the Northgate Link did nothing to increase the number of train cars per hour or the number of commuters who could ride in each car. Thus, like all the spine extensions, the Northgate Link did nothing to increase transit capacity into Seattle.

 

Sound Transit also did nothing to increase access to transit.  An Oct-Dec 2016, WSDOT “Park and Ride Inventory” reported all the parking with access to transit was essentially already “in use”.   Rather than add parking Sound Transit chose to require those using the existing parking to ride bus routes into Seattle to use the Northgate Link for the commute into and out of the city.  

 

King County Metro ended KCM 41 from Northgate.  Sound Transit’s ST511-513 from Everett was rerouted to Northgate and ST522 from Woodinville to Roosevelt Station. Ending the bus routes reduced total transit capacity into Seattle and nothing to reduce GP lane congestion.  Those former bus riders also reduced access for University Link riders.

 

Again, without Q4 2021 or later service provided reports it’s not clear have many commuters chose to ride Northgate Link.  However, the pre-pandemic ridership levels for the ST 510-513 and ST522 bus routes who rode the Link totaled less than 14,000 daily.  

 

Thus, with all the available parking essentially “In use”, the maximum possible terminated bus route commuters riding the Link would have been a fraction of Sound Transit and Traffic Lab predictions.  A precursor to a Lynnwood ridership access “problem” that only adds 500 stalls at the two Shoreline stations for Sound Transits claim for 37,000 to 55,000 riders. 

The other Northgate Link problem is the loss in farebox recovery from longer route operating costs. Sound Transits 2021 budgets Light Rail Car Revenue Vehicle Mile costs as $30.17. Thus, every mile of extension adds two miles and $241 for a 4-car round trip. The Northgate Link’s 4.2-mile extension from UW Stadium adds $1012 per trip, $126,500 for their schedule of 125-weekday trips.

  

Thus, even if the Link had attracted pre-pandemic ridership the cost per boarder would have been $9.00.  Whatever the costs per Northgate Link boarder, they’ll be dwarfed by those with Lynnwood extension.  The 8.5-mile Lynnwood extension will add $253,000 to the for 125-weekday trips, yet add only 1000 stalls for access. 

 

The bottom line is effective public transit requires providing the access needed to attract the number of commuters needed to reduce traffic for those driving.  The Northgate Link did nothing to increase light rail transit capacity or add access to public transit.  The debut demonstrated Sound Transit attempts to provide access by diverting bus riders to light rail reduced transit capacity into Seattle and still didn’t provide access needed for projected ridership claims.  

What remains to be demonstrated is that light rail train’s limited capacity means commuters added by extensions will end access for current riders without significantly reducing multilane freeway congestion.   What should have been obvious will apparently take billions and years for Sound Transit to "demonstrate".

 

What the New Sound Transit CEO Could Do

 

 

The previous post questioned why the Sound Transit Board had selected Julie Timm as their new CEO.  If it’s because she concurred with the Sound Transit “Transit Development Plan 2022-2077 they’ll continue to “Plan, build, and operate the largest transit expansion in the nation” she will continue perpetrating what will inevitably be considered as one of the biggest boondoggles in transit history.

This post details a competent public transit CEO could avoid that debacle.  Recognize public transit’s goal should be to provide transit for those who can’t drive or choose not to drive into Seattle and to reduce congestion for those who choose to drive. That reducing roadway congestion requires reducing vehicular traffic by attracting more commuters with access to routes and transit capacity into and out of Seattle.

A competent CEO would recognize the Sound Transit TDP for funding extending the Link does neither.  It doesn’t increase access with added parking or implement local routes from where commuters live to light rail stations.  Instead continuing a decade of Sound Transit refusal to add parking despite a WSDOT OCT-DEC 2016 “Park and Ride Inventory” reporting all of the parking with access to transit was essentially already “in use”. 

A competent transit system CEO would also recognize the TDP funded extensions do nothing to increase public transit capacity.  That transit capacity is determined by the number of vehicles per hour times the number of riders in each vehicle.  Extending light rail tracks do nothing to increase either.   Thus, a competent Julie Timm would recognize the folly of Sound Transit’s TD predicting the light rail spine will increase annual ridership will increase from 28,015,000 in 2022 to 73,756,000 in 2026.  

Sound Transit compounds the problem by using light rail trains on the track extensions to replace bus routes and transit capacity into Seattle. The TDP reflects the result with Express Bus “Revenue Vehicle Miles” reduced from 11,791,000 in 2023 to 8,755,000 in 2026 and Passenger Trips” dropping from 14,046,000 in 5,871,000.  

The bottom line is reducing congestion into Seattle requires increasing the number of public transit commuters.  Yet the TDP funded extensions do nothing to increase light rail capacity into the city.  That using the light rail extensions to replace bus routes into Seattle reduces total transit capacity into the city.  That the more bus replaced and the more riders added by extensions the greater the capacity lost by current riders.  

A competent transit CEO would recognize the Sound Transit TDP won’t reduce congestion.  The next System Expansion Committee meeting will indicate whether she does.  If not, the East Link debut will demonstrate the result of the east side and south Seattle having to split the number of DSTT trains.  Central Link commuters will lose half their current capacity and east side bus commuters will lose all bus transit routes into Seattle.   

A competent Julie Timm could hasten that result and save billions.

 

 

Questions for New Sound Transit CEO

  

Sound Transit finally has a new CEO, Julie Timm, a year after a Sept 24th, 2021 Seattle Times headline, "Sound Transit board ousting CEO".  The paper described his ouster with a photo caption:

Sound Transit CEO Peter Rogoff will be replaced in 2022 following more than six years of accomplishments with the agency

It was never clear why they decided to replace him as Board Chair Keel praised Rogoff with, "all but one of Sound Transit's seven major construction projects are on time and below budget".  Board member Claudia Balducci praised Rogoff for his "efforts to manage multiple projects across the region".  Member Roger Millar, the state transportation secretary, claimed "Mr Rogoff is going to be going out on a high note".  Yet all three chose not to renew his contract. 

 

Whatever the reason, the board’s “Rogoff” problem is not with why he was fired, it’s that he should have never been hired in the first place.  He never demonstrated an understanding of what constituted effective public transit.  As a result, his “six years of accomplishments” have continued a decade of Sound Transit’s spending billions on Prop 1 extensions that will do nothing to reduce congestion on I-5 and I-90 corridors into Seattle. 

 

Several blog posts have suggested Sound Transit would have difficulty finding his replacement.  That most potential transit system CEOs would recognize the folly of continuing funding those extensions. The result of a transit system board of directors made up of elected officials with “limited” transit system experience.  Thus, it’s reasonable to ask why they hired her.   

 

For example, what was her response to Sound Transit’s recent Transit Development Plan 2022-2027?  The TDP included a list of Strategic Priorities, Agency Goals, and Measure of Success for the next 5 years.  The 5 on the list didn’t include any mention of a normal transit goal, the need to provide effective transit for those who can’t drive or choose not to drive into Seattle and to reduce congestion for those who choose to drive?  

The TDP included a Light Rail (Link) Capital Improvement Chart with plans to spend $12.7B over the next five years on light rail extensions. A 2004 PSRC study, funded by Sound Transit, concluded their 4-car light rail train capacity was limited to 8880 riders per hour.  Was she aware of that limit or recognize extensions beyond UW station, across I-90 Bridge or beyond SeaTac do nothing to increase that capacity.  

Sound Transit clearly didn’t since the TDP Operating Data, 2021—2027, chart predicted the extensions when completed will increase annual Passenger Trips from 13,400,000 in 2022 to 51,800,000 in 2025.  Meanwhile, TDP bus annual passenger trips dropped from 13,651,00000 in 2022 to 5,871,000 in 2027.

Did she concur with the TDP’s Activities chart lacking any significant funding for parking, instead forcing bus riders to transfer to light rail into and out of the city.   Reducing bus routes reduced transit capacity into the city and nothing to reduce congestion.  Extension riders only reduced the access for current link riders.    

The bottom line is Sound Transit’s Transit Development Plan 2022- 2027 typifies a decade of transit system failure to reduce congestion.  Julie Timm was presumably chosen because she agreed with the TDP as part of the Board Chair's goal to continue to  “Plan, build, and operate the largest transit expansion in the nation”.  It’s only a question of when not whether it will also be considered one of the biggest boondoggles in transit history.

Seattle Times Abets Incompetent ST Transit Development Plan

The previous post opined the Northgate Link debut demonstrated Sound Transit Prop 1 light rail spine extensions will fail any rational public transit cost/benefit test for the commute into Seattle.   That it failed to provide effective transit for those who didn’t have access to vehicles or choose not to drive on the freeways into Seattle as well as reduce the congestion for those that do.  

This post details the Sound Transit Board of Directors adopted a Transit Development Plan 2022-2027 that exemplifies that failure.  That Sound Transit’s version of an effective transit system was detailed in TDP charts entitled Strategic Priorities, Agency Goals, and Measure of Success for the next 5 years. 

Strategic Priority 1: Design and deliver a customer-focused, high-quality and safe service

Agency Goal 1.1: Establish a robust and proactive safety culture               Measures of Success.

Monthly Safety News Link.                                                                         Developed Foundations Plan for achieving ISO certification

Agency Goal 1.2: Provide a passenger-focused experience from design through daily service.                                                                                                  Measures of Success.  

Improved passenger experience index.                                                       Baselined passenger complaint measures.                                                     Budget identified in 2022 to implement complaint resolution track system

The TDP charts also included the following priorities:

Strategic Priority 2: Deploy a performance-based, community-centric, and safe capital program

Strategic Priority 3: Cultivate an equitable, diverse, and inclusive workforce and culture that is high preforming, compassionate, empowering, and safe

Strategic Priority 4:  Transform and unify business practices and processes agency wide

Strategic Priority 5: Ensure financial stewardship exists in all decision-making to guarantee long-term affordability of the voter-approved plan

Notice Sound Transits TDP 2022 to 2027 priorities didn’t include providing effective public transit for commuters.  There was no priority or agency goal to provide access or transit capacity for commuters wishing to use it or to reduce freeway congestion for those choosing to drive.  

A Light Rail (Link) Capital Improvement Chart in the TDP for yearly link spending totaled $12.7B over the next five years with some of the 2027 funds on West Seattle-Ballard Link.  The Planned Activities chart in the TDP for the five years was more “optimistic” than recent Sound Transit schedules with East Link revenue service beginning in 2023 and Lynnwood, Federal Way and Downtown Redmond in 2024.  

The Planned Activities didn’t include adding any parking facilities near Link extensions.  Instead, Sound Transit recently confirmed plans to spend $270M on a 130th St Infill Station that won’t have parking.  Rather than add parking for access Sound Transit included the following in the TDP Activities charts

Revise service on ST Express between Bellevue and Seattle on I-90 and          allocate operating resources to East Link 

Revise service on ST Express between Lynnwood and Seattle on I-5 and allocate operating resources to Lynnwood Link extension 

Discontinue service on ST Express between Federal Way and Seattle on I-5 and allocate operating resources to Federal Way Link extension 

The revision being Sound Transit will use the Link to replace bus routes into and out of Seattle, reducing total transit capacity into Seattle.  The TPD ignores the results of using the Northgate Link to replace bus routes into Seattle.  That even with those transferring from buses the lack of access to the Northgate Link stations limited ridership to a fraction of Sound Transit’s 41,000 to 49,000 riders.  A “likely” precursor to similar results for all the TDP funded extensions given the similar lack of access.

The other TDP 2022-2027 problem is Sound Transit’s failure to recognize that the $12.7B spent on the extensions to Bellevue, Lynnwood, and Federal Way does nothing to increase the DSTT transit capacity into Seattle.  Yet the TDP Operating Data, 2021—2027, chart predicted the extensions when completed will increase annual Passenger Trips from 13,400,000 in 2022 to 51,800,000 in 2025.  Meanwhile bus passenger trips will decrease from 5,900,000 in 2022 to 5,100,000 in 2027.

The bottom line is Sound Transit’s TDP 2022-2027 will spend $12.7B on Prop 1 extensions that do nothing to increase transit capacity into Seattle.  That using the extensions to replace bus routes reduces public transit capacity and nothing to reduce congestion.   And it’s all abetted by an incompetent Seattle Times Traffic Lab.