Northgate Link Debut Should "Inform" Sound Transit's Realignment

 The previous post opined Sound Transit Board's "unbridled" realignment ignored the end of ST3 taxes in 2041.  That it failed to provide the "project scope discipline" needed to limit funding to what voters approved with ST3 passage in 2016.  This post proposes delaying realignment until Northgate Link operation demonstrates their "Baseline" extensions' benefits.  That any realignment should also be paid for by 2041 when ST3 taxes end.

Any realignment should recognize the limits from routing the "Baseline" extensions through the Downtown Seattle Transit Tunnel (DSTT).  A 2004 PSRC Technical Workbook, "High Capacity Transit Corridor Assessment", funded by Sound Transit, concluded the DSTT stations limited trains to 4 cars.  That safe operation required a minimum of 4 minutes between trains.

They assumed each car could accommodate 148 riders, limiting capacity to 8880 riders per hour in each direction.  While Sound Transit ridership projects presume more "optimistic" capacity, none of the "Baseline" extensions will increase DSTT capacity.  Thus riders added will reduce access for current Central Link riders.

The Northgate Link debut this fall will demonstrate DSTT limit on "Baseline" extension ridership into Seattle.  Whether Sound Transit's  website was justified with claims for 41,000 to 49,000 daily riders by 2022.  Will routing "Baseline" extension through DSTT limit current Central Link riders during peak commute?

None of the "Baseline" extensions include the added parking needed to increase access to light rail at their stations.  Instead Sound Transit is choosing to use the extensions to replace bus routes into Seattle.  Thus, "Baseline" operation will reduce total transit capacity into the city.  The Northgate Link debut will demonstrate whether replacing bus routes into Seattle reduces congestion into the city.

The debut will also demonstrate the high cost of operating "Baseline" extension trains.  In their 2021 budget, Sound Transit assesses light-rail operating costs as $30.17 per mile per car.  Extending the route the 4.3 miles from UW station to Northgate and back adds $260 to the operating cost for a light rail car.  Sound Transit current operates 3-car trains, so extending the route to Northgate will add $780 to a round trip.

Sound Transit earlier scheduled Northgate operation to include 6 hours of peak-operation 8-minute intervals, 10 hours of off-peak 10-minute intervals, and 2 hours of late-night 15-minute intervals.  That schedule requires 113 round trip routes each weekday so Northgate operation will add $88,000 to daily operating cost for 3-car trains.  (When East Link begins operation Sound Transit will be forced to use 4-car trains to make up for having only half the DSTT trains.  The additional car adds another $29,300 to daily costs)  

The added cost along with number of riders added at the three Northgate Link stations will establish a cost per boarding for the extension.  Their fare box revenue can be subtracted from boarding cost to determine subsidies needed to cover funding shortfall. 

The results will also "inform" likely results with other "Baseline" extensions.  Northgate Link ridership can be compared to Sound Transit's website projections for 41,000-49,000 daily riders by 2022. Whether transit riders are willing to endure the hassle of transferring to and from light rail for their commute into and out of Seattle.

The Northgate debut clearly "informs" on the Lynnwood extension operation. Sound Transit's website projects the extension will add 47,000 --55,000 riders by 2026.  Yet they don't add significant parking at any of the extension's 4 stations. Again using the extension to replace bus routes to provide riders into Seattle.

Yet Sound Transit already intends to force those willing to transfer to light rail to transfer at Northgate.  Rather than adding transit ridership, the extension simply  replaces bus routes from Lynnwood to Northgate.  Without added access to stations the Lynnwood Link will do nothing to increase transit ridership intoSeattle.

Using light rail to replace the 8.5-mile bus routes from Lynnwood to Northgate adds 17 miles to round trip.  The $30.13 cost per mile adds $512 per car per trip; $57,900 per car per day for 113 trips; $174,000 for 3-car and $231,000 per day for 4-car trains.  Again, without added access, to replace bus routes between Lynnwood and Northgate.  

Unfortunately it's doubtful anything can be done about the $1.7B Sound Transit will spend completing the extension.  However they could mitigate the operating costs by terminating some light rail trains at UW Station.  Use buses for the commute from Seattle to Northgate and Lynnwood after 7:00 pm.  Sound Transit budgets buses at $12.95 per mile. The 16 miles to Lynnwood and back would cost $414, a fraction of the $3100 for a 4-car train the 12.8 miles from UW to and from Lynnwood.

(While not a current "Baseline" extension, Northgate operation should end any attempt to extend light rail to Everett.  Spending untold billions for the 16.3-mile extension would add $982 per car to round trip costs.  Again, without additional access, primarily to replace bus routes to Lynnwood costing a fraction of light rail to operate.)

The Northgate Link debut will also "inform" Sound Transit's East Link.  Whatever capacity it demonstrates will be halved for the route to Bellevue.  While nothing can be done to increase that capacity, the results could be used to mitigate the damage by ending Sound Transit's "bus intercept" agreement to terminate I-90 bus routes on Mercer Island.  Allowing buses to continue into Seattle would add needed transit capacity into the city.

The Northgate debut will also "inform" the "Baseline"extension to Federal Way.  Whatever capacity it demonstrates will be halved when East Link begins operation in 2023.  How much does its capacity exceed projected needed Central Link capacity from Angel Lake into Seattle?  Does that available capacity justify Sound Transit spending $1.3B needed to finish the extension?  Especially since the 5.3-mile route adds $1280 to each 4-car round trip

The Northgate debut demonstration of the Sound Transit light rail spine's limited capacity could prompt expediting light rail extensions from West Seattle and Ballard.  The two routes are far shorter than those to Lynnwood and Federal Way, reducing operating costs.  Neither displaces current light rail riders.  Sound Transit estimates total daily ridership at 79,000 to 94,000.  Both would benefit from the 5 stations on each extension having 70-80% of riders within walking distance, far greater than the 25-35% for Federal Way, minimizing the need for additional parking.

The bottom line is the Northgate Link debut will "inform" whether Sound Transit should have extended light rail across I-90 Bridge or beyond UW Stadium station to Northgate. Does the DST have the capacity needed to reduce congestion into Seattle?  Will half that capacity make up for the confiscation of I-90 Bridge center roadway. 

Will replacing bus routes with light rail trains reduce I-5 or !-90 congestion?  Will light rail spine operating costs dwarf fare box revenue?  Should realignment expedite West Seattle and Ballard extensions not delay them?

Sound Transit should delay any realignment until Northgate Link operation answers those questions. Any realignment should result in extensions paid for in 2041 when ST3 taxes end.  Ending extensions beyond Lynnwood and diverting Federal Way funds to West Seattle and Ballard extensions would do so.

Sound Transit Board's "Unbridled" Realignment

Previous posts have detailed how Sound Transit's Long Range Financial Plans are based on their contention ST3 passage constituted "voter approval of projects" not voter approval of ST3 taxes from 2017 to 2041.  Sound Transit's "2021 Financial Plan and Approved Budget" concluded ST3 passage resulted in "Projected tax revenues of $58.3 billion comprising 60.9% of total sources over 2017--2041."  It also included the need for an additional $17.9B in bonds for the period.  The result was a $25B, "Tax Based Debt" in 2041 with no ST3 taxes to fund payments in 2042.

Sound Transit's "Financial Plan Update: April 2021" increased cost, raising the 2041 debt to $34B, $7.9B more than the "Available Debt Capacity" they could borrow.  Their response has been delaying projects until the could borrow the funds needed.  The "Realignment" resulted in the need for funds for construction and added borrowing extending far beyond the 2041 end of ST3 taxes.

Sound Transit's basis for the borrowing is "Appendix A--ST3 Financial Policies", in their 2021 Financial  Plan and Adopted Budget.  It was adopted June 23, 2016,  giving the Board the following ability to borrow:

Similarly, the Board recognizes that bonds issued and loans incurred by Sound Transit will be secured by the pledge of repayment through revenues including local taxes.  When bonds are issued or loans secured, Sound Transit will enter a binding contract with its bondholders and lenders that requires first lien claim against pledged revenues for repayment and for maintenance and operation of the transit facilities and services funded by the bonds.  Stated differently, bondholders and lenders will have a legal priority to Sound Transit's local tax revenues to repay the bonds and operate and maintain the transit system.

Note it was adopted prior to ST3 passage in November and makes no mention of any constraints on borrowing.  The 2021 budget also gives the Board the following responsibility for "project scope", deciding how the money they borrow will be spent.

The LRFP assumes that future system expansion projects will retain the size and scope originally approved by voters under Sound Move, ST2, and ST3.  But as the system is built out the Board may determine that future projects' scope may need to be altered and potentially increased to meet voter approved goals, public concerns, or other reasons.  Such future expansion decisions cannot be know or captured in the current LRFP, and could potentially increase the Agency's financial risk.

Again, no mention of constraints on Board approved extensions, including those with"financial risk".  Instead the Board shows its disdain for ST3 ending in 2041 by funding the debt with 30-year bonds.  With "Realignment" resulting in funds needed for construction and new 30-year bonds issued beyond 2041. our grand children's children will still be paying.

Sound Transit Board's Realignment is best described as "Unbridled", free from any restraint.  It results from their contention ST3 passage constituted "Voter approval of Projects" rather than voter approval of ST3 taxes.  They assumed that prior to ST3 passage without informing the public of the need for taxes well beyond 2041.  

The bottom line is legal action is needed to limit Sound Transit "Realignment" to what can be funded by ST3 taxes.  At this point nothing can be done about the billions already spent on a "light rail spine".  The spine won't increase transit capacity or reduce I-5 or I-90 congestion into Seattle.  Any funds saved should be diverted to expediting not delaying Ballard and West Seattle extensions that will.   My King County Executive candidacy is an attempt to expose that reality.

ST CEO Rogoff/UW Agreement on Norhtgate Link Exceeding Vibration Limit

The first indication of Sound Transit concern over Northgate Link trains exceeding UW limits was the following "Risk Management" issue in their July 2020 Agency Progress Report":

Operation of the Light Rail system may exceed thresholds for noise and vibration or EMI as required by the U of W and are delayed to provide further mitigation for these impacts.

The concern was the result of a "Master Implementation Agreement" (MIA) between Sound Transit and UW regarding operation of light rail in a tunnel  under the campus.  Nearly eight years ago a post on this blog, "ST HighRisk/No Reward Northgate Extension" included the following regarding the need to meet MIA requirements for any light rail tunnel under the campus

Protects research and instruction by defining level of vibration and magnetic field (MF) thresholds which ST shall not exceed without advance approval by the University includes a monitoring program to assure real time compliance as well as liquidation damages if any threshold is exceeded by ST.

The result was the following stipulation in the MIA:

In no event shall Sound Transit commence Revenue Service on University properties if (Vibration and MF) Thresholds are exceeded.

The risks resulting in the following agreement in the MIA.

ST and UW agree up a lump sum payment of $20,000,000 by ST to the University as consideration for the terms, conditions and easements contemplated in the MIA.

Testing to determine compliance with MIA was included in Sound Transit's March 10th, January 2021, Agency Progress Report, "Key Project Activities"

Pre-Certification Vibration testing between University of Washington Station and U District Stations completed with K1 cars, Siemens Car testing planned 2/1/21 

However, as recently as the June 11th release, the April report included the following "Risk Management"issue:

 If there is a problem during vibration certification testing & analysis, acceptance by the UW may be delayed, thereby delaying RSD.

However, it wasn't included as a Risk Management" issue in the July 8th, May report.  Instead the July 8th Sound Transit Board System Expansion Committee meeting Agenda included the following as a Business Item, "For recommendation to the board":

Motion No. M2021-42:  Authorizing the chief executive officer to (1) execute an amendment to the Light Rail Transit System Operations and Maintenance Agreement for Vibration and Magnetic Fields on University of Washington Transportation Easement During Revenue Service with the University of Washington and (2) execute any necessary amendments to other agreements with the University of Washington to be consistent with the new terms of the Operations and Maintenance Agreement for the Northgate Link Extension.

It reads more like what a CEO like Peter Rogoff would have written rather than a Board of Directors.  Charts presented during the meeting showed Northgate Link train vibration levels had exceeded UW limits.  That the UW was willing to increase some threshold levels.  Comments indicated both UW and Sound Transit were working to "resolve" the issue.  The System Expansion Committee unanimously approved the motion.

However giving CEO Rogoff the authority clearly abdicates the Board's responsibility to the public.  The fact the Northgate Link debut remains as scheduled indicates an agreement has been reached.  Does it involve some limitation on Northgate Link operation or more funds to compensate UW?  (His predictions for 41,000 to 49,000 Northgate Link daily riders by 2022 are delusional)

The public surely deserves to know what's in the agreement yet the Seattle Times Traffic Lab ignores the issue.  

Northgate Link Debut Will Debunk "Rail Boosters"

The July 10th Traffic Lab article, "Rail boosters tell Sound Transit: Just say no to any project delays," epitomizes the Seattle Times slavish support for Sound Transit.  They continue allowing Sound Transit to claim ST3 passage was for "voter approved projects," not for ST3 taxes that end in 2041.

The need for delays is the result of Sound Transit not able to borrow the funds projects needed with current schedule. The delay allows them to proceed with light rail expansion plans resulting in "Tax Based Debt" in 2041 with no ST3 taxes to make payments in 2042.  The latest "Realignment" exacerbates the problem.

The "Rail Boosters" would be wise to await the results of the Northgate Link debut this October.  It will be the first demonstration of whether light rail routed through Downtown Seattle Transit Tunnel (DSTT) will reduce I-5 congestion.  Will it attract the public transit ridership needed to reduce the number of vehicles needed to do so?

The first ridership requirement is the need for added public transit capacity.  A 2004 PSRC High Capacity Transit Corridor Assessment, funded by Sound Transit, concluded the DSTT stations limited light rail capacity to 8880 riders per hour in each direction.  Extending light rail to Northgate does nothing to increase that capacity.  Thus riders added by the Northgate Link will reduce access for University Link riders.  Its debut will demonstrate whether it has the needed capacity.

The second requirement for increased public transit ridership is added access to the increased light rail capacity.  Commuters need to be able to walk to, drive to, or be dropped off near light rail stations.  Yet Sound Transit has refused to increase parking near stations or provide local bus routes to drop off commuters near stations.  Instead choosing to use Northgate to replace bus routes into Seattle, reducing total public transit capacity into the city.  The Northgate Link debut will demonstrate the likely result. 

The bottom line is Sound Transit made a monumental blunder with its decade of failure to add thousands of parking spaces with access to more bus routes along limited access highway lanes into Seattle.  They failed to recognize the DSTT limited light rail capacity to a fraction of what's needed to reduce I-5 and I-90 congestion.

They compounded that problem by refusing to add parking for access, choosing instead to replace bus routes, doing nothing to reduce roadway congestion.  Those forced to transfer may reject the hassle for their commutes into and out of Seattle.  The likely result will be ridership a fraction of Sound Transit's projected 41,000 to 49,000 ridership by 2022, and a huge increase in fare-box revenue shortfall.

The Northgate Link debut will finally demonstrate that to "Rail Boosters".

Class Action Complaint

The previous post detailed why legal action is needed to challenge Sound Transit's claim ST3 passage enabled them to implement "voter approved extensions" whose costs exceeded the funds available from approved ST3 taxes.  The result being the Sound Transit Board is currently considering a "Realignment" extending light rail construction costs and debt service payments well beyond the 2041 cutoff date for ST3 taxes.

This would normally be an issue worth "digging into" for the Seattle Times Traffic Lab.  Instead they've ignored it.  Another option should have been the state's Attorney's General. Yet AG Ferguson has spent a decade ignoring Sound Transit "misdeeds".  He allowed Sound Transit to confiscate the I-90 Bridge center roadway despite documentation the addition of the 4th lanes to outer roadways would not make up for the loss of the center roadway.

He also allowed Sound Transit to ignore RCW81.104.100.  It required high capacity transportation system planning include an "evaluation of a range of low cost, high capacity transportation system options".  There's no evidence Sound Transit ever considered implementing far less costly BRT on limited access lanes on either I-5 or I-90.  

The "likely" lack of normal legal action prompted the following "Complaint" to ClassAction.org regarding CEO Rogoff and Sound Transit Board "Realignment".  

In 2016 voters in the Sound Transit service area approved an initiative requiring residents to pay property, sales, and motor vehicle excise taxes from 2017 through 2041 to fund Sound Transit's expansion of public transit including extending their current light rail system.

Sound Transit has used the approval in their "Long-Range Financial Plan Analysis" in Sound Transit's "2021 Financial Plan and Adopted Budget" to claim the Board has the following ability to direct transportation system expansion.

Scope increase:  The LRFP assumes that future system expansion projects will retain the size and scope originally approved by voters under Sound Move, ST2, and ST3.  But as the system is built out the Board may determine that future projects' scope may need to be altered and potentially increased to meet voter approved goals, public concerns, or other reasons.  Such future expansion decisions cannot be known or captured in the current LRFP, and could potentially increase the Agency's financial risk.

The result of Sound Transit's "Scope Increase" is the costs of light rail construction and the need for debt service payments have extended well beyond the 2041 date voters approved for taxes.  A class action suit to enjoin CEO Rogoff and the Board from implementing the results of the "Scope Increase" would benefit millions of residents.

I'm awaiting their response. 

Legal Challenge Needed

 Several recent posts have raised the issue as to what voters authorized with Sound Transit 3 approval in 2016.  They have opined it only allowed Sound Transit to collect property, sales, and motor vehicle excise taxes from 2017 to 2041.  Thus, ST3 taxes could not be used for debt service payments beyond 2041 for the  $17B "Tax Based Debt" in CEO Rogoff's 2019 Long-Range Budget Plan for 2017-2041.

Sound Transit has used ST3 passage to claim it funded "voter approved projects". That the need to fund those projects outweighed the need to limit projects to what could be funded with ST3 taxes.  The first example of the result was Rogoff's 2019 long-range budget.  It expanded the funding available by 2041 from the $53.8B projected in 2016 to $96B projected in 2019.

However, even with that increase in funds available, costs had increased to where there was a $17B "Tax Based Debt" in 2041.  Thus, taxes would have to be extended well past 2041 to make debt service payments.  A financially responsible Board could have used that debt to justify rejecting the 2019 budget.  Instead they approved the budget and renewed his contract for three years with a hefty raise.

The "Long-Range Financial Plan Analysis" in Sound Transit's 2021 Financial Plan and Adopted Budget" amplified the problem.  It included the following with regard to the Board's ability to direct transportation system expansion:  

Scope Increase:  The LRFP assumes that future system expansion projects will retain the size and scope originally approved by voters under Sound Move, ST2 and ST3.  But as the system is built out the Board may determine that future projects' scope may need to be altered and potentially increased to meet voter approved goals, public concerns, or other reasons.  Such future expansion decisions cannot be known or captured in the current LRFP, and could potentially increase the Agency's financial risk.

Note their "Financial Plan" didn't include any need to limit projects because of cost constraints.  Instead giving the Board the option of allowing future projects that "could potentially increase the Agency's financial risk".

Sound Transit presented their "Financial Plan Update: April 2021" to the Board on April 22nd.  It included charts showing costs had increased to where the 2041 "Tax Based Debt" had increased from $17B in 2019 to $34B in 2021.  However, the program was deemed unaffordable, not because of the increased 2041 debt, but because the needed debt exceeded the "Available Debt Capacity". The shortfall began in 2030, increased to $7.9B in 2035, and remained at that level until 2041.  

That debt was presumably the reason for one of the Financial Plan Update's Key Considerations,  "Project scope discipline remains important".  At least "suggesting" the need to eliminate some of the extensions.  Instead, Sound Transit Board Chair Kent Keel's response was a plan to delay projects until the money needed could be borrowed.  

His realignment proposal was an agenda item during Sound Transit's June 24th Board meeting.  As no video of the meeting is available it's unclear what projects were delayed, for how long, and at what cost.  The result will undoubtedly be hundreds of millions will be spent on construction beyond 2041 and billions spent annually debt service payments for far in the future.

The bottom line is the Sound Transit 2021 Budget "Scope Increase" exemplifies why they should be legally challenged.  Let the legal system decide whether the Sound Transit Board has the authority to decide the need for "Voter-Approved Extensions" outweighs  the need to limit projects to voter-approved ST3 funding.  

It's something a competent Seattle Times Traffic Lab would advocate.  Their likely failure adds to why I'm a King County Executive candidate this year.