My Candidacy For U.S. Senate

 It’s time for New Year’s resolutions so this year it’s to file as a candidate for the U.S Senate.  It culminates a decade of attempts to use the Voters’ Pamphlet, primarily to expose the failure of those responsible to reduce the area’s congestion.  As with the previous nine, this filing is with no expectation or desire to win but primarily to provide Puget Sound area residents with details of an inept Sound Transit Board and WSDOT.  

Filing for U.S Senate also allows me to provide residents throughout the state the option of voting for someone who shares their concern with Democrats dominating state and local governments and most of the media.  Doesn't believe "white supremacy is the country's top security threat".  Doesn't believe the country is systemically racist or that teaching the 1619 Project or Critical Race Theory benefits the country.  Who also recognizes the futility of the state's attempt to reduce CO2 emissions when the entire country only emits 15% of the total. That any CO2 savings from Electric Vehicles is largely offset by the emissions from the fossil-fueled power plants needed to provide the energy to charge their batteries.  (More on those concerns on later posts.) 

However, the most immediate goal is to inform area residents the Sound Transit Board continues its decade of failing to understand what’s needed to reduce congestion into Seattle. That reducing congestion requires attracting commuters to public transit with access to routes to their desired destination. That a decade ago they could have done so by adding parking with BRT routes along limited access bus routes into the city.  Instead Sound Transit plans to use Prop I extensions to replace current routes into Seattle, despite the fact many commuters don't like transferring to and from light rail for their ride into and out of Seattle. Reducing the number of buses on I-5 and I-90 reduces transit capacity into the city, does little to reduce HOV lane congestion, and nothing for GP lane congestion.  

The Northgate Link debut in October “likely” demonstrated that result. Sound Transit’s website had predicted 41,000 to 49,000 riders in 2022 and the Seattle Times Traffic Lab had heralded the debut as “Transit Transformed”, anticipating 42,000 to 49,000 riders with the Link's three stations.  Yet neither has released any Northgate Link results. The “likely” reason, without added parking for access, ridership is a fraction of predictions.  

The Sound Transit Board’s Dec 16th meeting to approve the 2022 Budget and 2022 Transit Improvement Plan (TIP) seemingly ignored the Northgate Link results.  (The Board stopped archiving videos of their meetings last February and there’s no indication the Seattle Times Traffic Lab watcher the meeting.)   Again, the likely reason, the October debut demonstrated that without added access, Prop 1 extension ridership will be a fraction of Sound Transit predictions.  That lack of ridership, along with higher operating costs with Prop 1’s longer routes, will dwarf farebox revenue, reducing operating cost recover to a fraction of Sound Transit 40% target. 

However, the lack of access is only part of the Prop 1 problem.  They are all routed through a DSTT which a 2004 PSRC study, funded by Sound Transit, limited capacity to 8880 riders per hour in each direction, a fraction of what’s needed during peak commuter.   Thus, during peak commute those with access to Northgate Link will reduce capacity for University Link riders.  Once access ends, the trains will be empty, exacerbating farebox revenue shortfall. 

Yet the Board’s Dec 16th meeting debut’s response was to continue the current 125 trips a day, approve $1.7 billion extending Prop 1 in 2022, and authorize $22 billion on TIP; completing the extensions with no money in either for parking. It’s a debacle they’ll continue to add $1.7 billion to the ~$8 billion already spent. lt’s a disaster they intend to spend $22 billion completing them without  adding any significant parking for access to even its limited capacity.  Especially with a Northgate Link debut portending similar results with all Prop 1 extensions. 

 It’s appropriate my candidacy this year is for the US Senate. The FHWA has been one of Sound Transit’s Lynnwood Link extension enablers. The "Federal Highway Administration Center for Innovative Financial Support"  provided a December 19, 2018, $1.17 billion grant with a $1.991 contingent commitment for the $3.12 billion Link.  It included a Sound Transit, “Project Profile: Lynnwood Link Extension” referring to a Lynnwood Link Extension Project Website with “Projected Ridership:  47,000 – 55,000 daily riders by 2026”. 

I'd previously emailed Senator Cantwell blog posts detailing Sound Transit's Lynnwood ridership projections were not only delusional they may be grounds for legal action for fraud.  Senator Cantwell ignored them as I’m sure Senator Murray would have. The Northgate Link debut results, when released, will demonstrate the lack of access reduced ridership to a fraction of 41,000 to 49,000 projections.  The Lynnwood Link extension does nothing to increase DSTT capacity and adds a mere 1000 parking stalls at North and South Shoreline Stations, a tiny fraction of added access needed for even its limited capacity.  

One of my goals as a candidate for US Senate is to expose how the Northgate Link debut portended Sound Transit's Prop 1 failure.  

Sound Transit's "Pretend Board" Incompetence

 Every resident within the Sound Transit service area should be concerned with the Sound Transit Board's Dec. 16th approval of the 2022 Budget and Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP).  It typified the actions of elected officials who've spent a decade pretending to be directors of a transit organization without understanding what constitutes effective public transit.  They've never asked questions and unanimously approved any requests.  (The Board no longer archives videos of meetings, minimizing exposing their "compliance".)

It's this "Pretend Board" incompetence that prompted this blog's ten-year attempt to expose.  That they never recognized reducing congestion required attracting commuters by increasing access to transit routes to their desired destination.  Central Link succeeded because large numbers of commuters lived within walking distance of stations or had access to bus routes to the stations.  (The Board refused to implement a transfer station at UW stadium that would have benefitted thousands of commuters from both sides of the lake with a 520BRT/light rail connection.)  They've delayed the Ballard to West Seattle Link that would've benefitted from commuter access to stations. 

However, all of the Prop 1 extensions beyond UW, across I-90 Bridge, and beyond SeaTac require parking for access.  Yet the Board has refused to add significant parking despite a 2016 WSDOT "Park and Ride Inventory" indicating lots with access to Prop 1 stations have been "fully in use" for years.  That without added parking transit ridership can't increase.

The "Pretend Board" also never recognized transit capacity is limited by the number of vehicles per hour and the number of riders in each vehicle. A 2004 PSRC study, funded by Sound Transit, concluded DSTT limited the number of vehicles and capacity in each vehicle to 8880 riders per hour in each direction. Prop 1 extensions beyond UW, across I-90 Bridge, or beyond SeaTac do nothing to increase that capacity.  Yet the Board approved a "2019 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget" predicting Link ridership would increase from 26 million in 2019 to 162 million in 2041.

Multiple blog post have opined the Northgate Link debut would finally demonstrate the validity of these concerns.  That Northgate Link ridership would be a fraction of the 41,000 to 49,000 predicted on the Sound Transit website.  The Seattle Times Traffic Lab had heralded the debut as "Transit Transformed" primising its "3 stations attracting 42,000 to 49,000 riders". Both should've been eager to report on the initial results, yet neither has done so.  The likely reason they haven't was the Link's ridership was a small fraction of predictions.

Prior to the Dec 16th meeting, I'd emailed the Board members the previous post detailing these concerns.  They denied  ever receiving any "Public Comment".  (There's no indication the Seattle Times Traffic Lab project that "digs into thorny transportation transportation issues" even watched the meeting.) Instead they proceeded to approve Resolution No. R2121-21 detailing the '"2022 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget" and 2022 Transit  Improvement Plan (TIP).  The budget included a $615 million loan and $1,767 million spending on Link.

The budget's list of system expansion projects neglected to include any additional parking. The budget also neglected to include a "Service Provided" section with predictions for trips provided, ridership expected, cost per rider, or farebox recovery.  The 2022 TIP included spending $22 billion on "authorized projects".  The resolution also claimed the "Proposed 2022 Budget and 2022 TIP are fully affordable within the agency's current financial projections".  The entire process took less than 15 minutes.  Again no questions were asked and R2121-21 was unanimously approved.

The bottom line is the entire area has already paid a heavy price for the "Pretend Board's" decade of failing to add parking with access to BRT routes into Seattle.  That the billions they've already spent on Prop 1 extensions will do nothing to increase transit capacity into Seattle.  The Board's Dec 16th meeting chose to ignore Northgate Link's debut results that "likely" demonstrated that failure. 

It's already a debacle the "Pretend Board" has allowed Sound Transit to spend another $1.767 billion next year extending the Link; adding to the $8-10 billion already spent.  It's a "disaster" they've been allowed to authorize spending $22 billion more over the next 5 years completing the extensions.  The former being enabled by an equally inept Seattle Times Traffic Lab with no indication they're interested in the later.

Sound Transit Board Ignores Northgate Link Debacle

The previous post detailed why a Seattle Times article resulting from the paper's Traffic Lab project "digging into" the Northgate Link debut's ridership would result in a headline "Northgate Link Debut Portends Prop 1 Debacle".  That the lack of access to the Link from parking near light rail stations or from near bus routes to stations limited ridership to a fraction of the 42,000 to 49,000 the paper had heralded as "Transit Transformed" prior to the debut.

That even if they added access with parking, the DSTT would limit ridership to a fraction of what's needed to reduce I-5 peak commute congestion with nearly empty light rail trains during the rest of the commute.  That the Link debut demonstrated, what posts on this blog have been predicting for nearly a decade, that Sound Transit Prop 1 extensions through DSTT won't reduce congestion into Seattle.

That light rail routed through DSTT should have never been extended beyond UW station, across I-90 Bridge, or beyond SeaTAc.  The Northgate Link debut's ridership will demonstrate predictions for those extension in the Sound Transit 3 Map voters approved in 2016 were delusional.  That ST3 should have been limited to funding Ballard-to-West Seattle light rail with ridership within walking distance of stations.

Instead Sound Transit refuses to release Link ridership data.  Their October and November board meetings, during which initial Link results were presumably presented, were "off-air".  The November 18th Board meeting approved continuing the current 125 daily round trips in 2022, apparently satisfied with the result.  The agendas for the December 16th Sound Transit Board Finance and Audit Committee meeting and subsequent Board meeting show Sound Transit has chosen to ignore the Link debut's results.

The Finance Committees agenda included the following:

8 Business Items                                                                                  For Recommendation to the Board:                                                         B Resolution No. R2021-21: Adopting an annual budget for the period from January 1 through December 31, 2022.

The subsequent Sound Transit Board meeting agenda included the response:

7 Business Items                                                                                       C.  Resolution No. R2021-21: Adopting and annual budget for the period from January 1 through December 31, 2022.

 Clearly, Resolution No. R2021-21, adopting the 2022 Financial Pan and Proposed Budget, is destined for approval on December 16th.  The resolution was included in a 10-page summary entitled:

Adopting the Proposed 2022 Budget and 2022 Transit Improvement Plan

It detailed the proposed 2022 budget will spend $1,767.1 million on Link extensions, with $615 million for a TIFIA loan.  The 2022 Transit improvement Plan (TIP) will spend $22.2 billion on "authorized project allocations".  Again, projects that won't increases transit ridership into Seattle rather than on Ballard-to-West Seattle that would.  Yet the 2022 budget ignores Link results with predictions ridership will increase from 22 million in 2019 to 60 million in 2021 with TIP and to 160 million in 2046 with ST3.

The bottom line is the Sound Transit Board approval of Resolution No. R2021-21 will show they've ignored the Northgate Link results. Sooner or later they'll be forced to release the Link's ridership.  However, the Traffic Lab has shown no interest in "digging into" the Link ridership.   (Sound Transit's refused to release any ridership data since the Q1 2021 Service Delivery Quarterly Performance Report.).  Until they do Sound Transit will "likely" continue spending billions on Prop 1 extension that won't increase transit ridership into Seattle rather than on Ballard-to-West Seattle that will.

Northgate Link Debut Portends Prop 1 Debacle

 (The below post was prompted by the Seattle Times request for headlines readers would like to see in 2022)

Prior to the October 2nd Northgate Link debut, the Seattle Times Traffic Lab heralded it as "Transit Transformed" claiming it will "attract a combined 42,000 to 49,000 riders a day".  However, since the Link's debut, Sound Transit has yet to publicly release any ridership data.  In fact the Board has refused to release any ridership data reports since the Q1 2021 Service Delivery Quarterly Performance Report.

The Sound Transit Board held the October and November meeting "off-air" so the presumed presentation of the Link's initial results wasn't available to the public.  A Sound Transit presentation at the November 18th Board meeting maintaining the current 125 Link round trips in 2022 Service schedule was approved for implementation. A clear indication they were satisfied with the debut.

The Seattle Times Traffic Lab should use its purported responsibility to "dig-into" whether the Northgate Link debut's results support the Board's assessment.  Sound Transit would presumably feel "compelled" to give them access to the data.  When they do the likely result will be a Traffic Lab headline, "Northgate Link Debut Portends Prop 1 Debacle"

The reason being the article would "likely" report ridership was only a fraction of the 41,000 to 49,000 riders the Sound Transit Northgate Link extension website continues to predict for 2022.  The problem, a lack of access to the Link.  Not enough commuters live within walking distance of the three stations.  Those forced to drive to stations for access were limited to the 1525 parking stalls at Northgate.  

Sound Transit increased Link access by terminating bus routes at Northgate and Roosevelt stations.  However even those commuters needed access to parking near bus stops.  The lack of access to parking near bus stops or at Link stations limited ridership to a fraction of predictions.

It's only a question of when Sound Transit or the Seattle Times acknowledge the Northgate Link debut portends a Prop 1 debacle.  That it finally demonstrated Prop 1 won't attract the number of commuters needed to reduce roadway congestion. Not enough commuters live within waking distance of stations, could park near stations, or can be dropped off at stations.  That commuters dropped off at stations by bus routes also needed access to buses by walking to, parking near, or dropping-off at bus stops.

The vast majority of  riders will access Link from parking at light rail stations or from parking near connecting bus routes.  Yet Sound Transit has neglected to add significant parking for a decade.  The latest WSDOT "Park and Ride inventory" for the Sound Transit service area is for Oct-Dec 2016.  It indicated lots with access to Prop 1 light-rail stations or connecting bus routes not only didn't have the needed capacity, they were already "fully in use".  Publlc transit ridership can't increase without  added public parking for access.

The bottom line is Sound Transit should have never extended Prop 1 extensions routed through DSTT beyond UW, across I-90 Bridge, or beyond SeaTac.  That without added access to parking the extensions won't increase ridership. Even with increased access the extensions won't have the capacity needed for peak commutes and during off-peak train cars will largely be empty.  The result, Prop 1 extension operating costs will dwarf farebox revenue.  

A competent Traffic Lab article headlined "Northgate Link Debut Portends a Prop 1 Debacle" from lack of access could expedite Prop 1 demise.

Sound Transit's Northgate Link Debut Dilemma

 The Sound Transit Board decided to replace a review of the 2022 "Financial Plan and Proposed Budget" on the November 18th meeting agenda with the following:

7. Business Items                                                                                   A. Resolution No. R2021-19 Adopting the 2022 Service Plan, and authorizing the chief executive officer to implement recommended service changes in 2022.

The 2022 Service Plan schedule for October 2 2021--March 19, 2022 included 125 trips from Northgate.  A significant increase from the 84 trips the board had approved during the November 19th 2020 meeting.  The new schedule has trains every 8 minutes during  the 3 1/2 hour morning and afternoon peak commutes, 10 minutes during ~ 9 hours off-peak, and 15 minutes during early morning and late night.  The Board chose to have the meeting "off-air" so there was no way to learn why they implemented the 2022 service plan changes.   

Several posts on this blog have opined the Northgate Link debut would demonstrate Sound Transit should have never extended Central Link beyond UW station.  The PSRC in 2004 concluded the DSTT limited capacity to 8880 riders per hour in each direction, far less than needed to reduce I-5 congestion during peak commute.  Spending $2.7B over 5 years to reduce congestion on 5 lanes of I-5 with 4-car trains every 8 minutes has always seemed absurd.   Light rail car operating costs will result in the extension from UW to Northgate adding ~$1000 to round trip costs

The only access for the vast majority of commuters is parking near light rail stations.  Sound Transit has spent a decade refusing to add significant parking.  Instead choosing to provide riders by terminating bus routes at light rail stations.  Without added parking for access, many of the trains will have few riders, exacerbating average costs for those who ride.  Thus, if the Board wanted to reduce operating costs the 2022 service plan change could terminate many routes at UW.  Instead they chose to reduce frequency for several ST Express routes. 

Their dilemma will be how and when they choose to expose that the additional $125,000 in operating costs for the extensions attracted only a fraction of the 42,000 to 49,000 predicted.  The problem being only a fraction of that number had access to parking near stations or chose to ride buses requiring they transfer to and from light rail for their commutes into and out of Seattle.  

The bottom line is over the short term Sound Transit should have continued with the routes needed to accommodate the vast majority of those riding the Link.  Replace early morning and late night routes and some of the off-peak routes with bus routes to reduce operating costs. (A round trip from 5th&University to Northgate would cost less than $200.) Instead they chose to reduce far less expensive ST Express routes doing little to reduce operating cost.  The meeting being "off-air" there's no way of knowing why the Board's decision.

Over the long term Sound Transit needs to recognize DSTT limits on Line 1 capacity prevent it from ever having the capacity needed to reduce I-5 congestion during peak commute.  That extension to Lynnwood does nothing to increase that capacity, it only increases operating costs.   It's only a question of when the Board acknowledges the Link debut's implications for all of the Prop 1 extensions.  The Seattle Times Traffic Lab has shown no interest in doing so.

ST's Apparent Northgate Link Debut Debacle

l looked forward to viewing the November 18th Sound Transit Board meeting in hopes of seeing initial Northgate Link debut results. Countless posts on this blog had opined Sound Transit should have never extended light rail routed through DSTT beyond UW station.  However, prior to the debut, the Seattle Times Traffic Lab had heralded it as "Transit Transformed", claiming it "will attract a combined 42,000 to 49,000 riders a day".  

The November meeting could have answered how many had ridden the Link daily since October 2nd debut. It might also have provided the Board's response to the October 29th release of the "2022 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget". 

The 2022 budget review had been included in the September and October  meeting agendas.  However the November meeting agenda neglected to include any Northgate Link ridership results and replaced the 2022 budget review with the following:

7. Business Items

A. Resolution No. R2021-19  Adopting the 2022 Service Plan, and authorizing the chief executive officer to implement recommended service changes in 2022.

The October 29th 2022 budget hadn't included any service plan.  The Board was presumably referring to a 2022 Service Plan in an August 12th Transit Development Plan.  It included a schedule requiring eighty-four 4-car-train round trips from UW to Northgate and back.  (A substantial reduction from earlier 117 Central Link scheduled trips, increasing delay times between trains for commuters)  An October 11th post on this blog had used Sound Transit 2021 budget light rail car operating costs to estimate the 8.4-mile round trips would add $84,152 to daily operating costs.

Again, the November meeting could have answered how many of the 42,000 to 49,000 riders did the Northgate Link add, what prompted the 2022 service changes, and what were the recommended changes.  Whatever the answers they remain "unavailable" as the meeting itself was "off-air".

The Northgate Link results should not have been a surprise.  The Board should have been aware a "Sound Transit Service Delivery Performance Report 2021 Q1" concluded Northgate Link ridership was 58.7%  lower than 2021 budget predictions, clearly portending ridership was a problem prior to Link debut. 

The latest financial results prior to the debut, the "Quarterly Financial Performance Report Q2 2021" confirmed the result was a large increase in costs per rider.  Actual 2021 June  YTD operating costs per rider were $25.82, 43% higher than $18.10  budget predictions.

The Board should have been concerned a 4-mile University Link trip into Seattle or 10-mile trip from Angel Lake would cost an average of $25.82 per rider.  It's not clear how many miles the "average" boarder rode the link or the cost per mile for the ride.

The bottom line is the 4.2-mile Northgate Link doubled the University Link operating cost, adding $85,152 to daily operating costs with the 2022 Service Plan.  The Sound Transit Board's decision to have the November meeting for discussing changes to service plan "off-air" indicates the Link failed to meet ridership predictions.

That the Seattle Times Traffic Lab was correct with its claim the debut would be a "Transit Transformation".  Not because it would attract riders to light rail but because it didn't.  A clear warning for future Prop 1 extensions results. 

Replacing ST CEO Peter Rogoff

The Sept 24th Seattle Times headline "Sound Transit Board ousting CEO" was a surprise to many.   The board apparently made the decision to replace CEO Rogoff during their monthly Sept 23rd meeting with Sound Transit .  It must have been a surprise to Rogoff since the  Board meeting agenda had included the following:

9. Business items (Continued) A. Motion No. M2121-47": Authorizing the first of three one-year employment agreement extensions to retain Peter M. Rogoff as Sound Transit's chief executive officer.

Prior to the Sept 23rd meeting (and that meeting's agenda) the Board had given him authority to implement multiple actions and had unanimously approved those he had previously done.  Thus, it's not clear why they decided to replace him and include the following in their October 28th meeting agenda: (the meeting itself was "off-air")

F. Resolution No, R2021-18:  Establishing a CEO Selection Committee for the period of time necessary to develop a recommendation to the Board on a candidate to serve as the next Sound Transit CEO and appointing Board members to serve on the CEO Selection Committee in addition to their current committee appointments and leadership roles.

Sound Transit's problem is going to be finding someone competent who's willing to replace him.  It's not that he shouldn't have been fired, it's that he should have never been hired in the first place.  Rogoff's prior position with the FTA would normally have indicated extensive transportation system experience and competence.  However, it seems County Executive Constantine hired Rogoff because he agreed with his approach to light rail in a July 2015 post on this blog:

"What we can do is create light rail to take you where you want to go, when you want to go, on time, every time, for work, for play, for school"

Constantine clearly didn't understand the limitations of light rail in Seattle or the basics of transit system operation.  That a 2004 PSRC study, funded by Sound Transit, had concluded routing light rail through DSTT limited capacity to 8880 riders per hour in each direction.  Prior to the 2016 ST3 vote Rogoff  demonstrated similar problems with a Sound Transit 3 Map with ridership claims for "voter approved projects" that far exceeded DSTT capacity.

Those problems however preceded Rogoff's hiring.  Ridership claims for the 2008 approval for Prop 1  extensions beyond UW, across I-90 Bridge, and beyond SeaTac had also ignored the DSTT limit.  Sound Transit's decision to divert half the DSTT trains across I-90 Bridge to Bellevue was especially egregious.  It halved DSTT capacity to SeaTac and precluded two-way BRT on bridge with 10 times light rail capacity, 10 years sooner at 1/10th the cost.

Since Prop 1 passed Sound Transit had refused to increase bus transit capacity that could have reduced travel times into Seattle.  An additional 100 bus routes an hour on a restricted access lane could've accommodated more than 10,000 commuters, the equivalent of 5 lanes of freeway traffic traveling at 45 mph, reducing congestion on remaining lanes.   They'd also neglected to increase access to transit with added parking near stations, planning instead to provide riders by forcing current transit riders transfer to light rail for the commute into Seattle.  

The bottom line is the Seattle Times Traffic Lab heralded CEO Rogoff's "six years of accomplishments".  What he's done is exactly what Constantine hired him for,  spend those years continuing the fatally flawed Prop 1 extensions.  A fraction of the $10B he's spent on the extensions could have been spent increasing transit ridership with added parking with access to BRT routes into Seattle.

His position as CEO has resulted in the 25-year, $54B ST3 package voters approved in 2016  extended to 30 years with $113B in spending and taxes extending for decades beyond. When operational the extensions will replace bus routes, reducing transit capacity into Seattle, limit current rider access during peak commute, and incur operating costs that dwarf farebox revenue during off-peak operation.

Constantine's re-election with Seattle Times support for his policies, will likely result in Sound Transit continue implementing Rogoff's plans for  "the largest transit system expansion in the country".   Again, it's not clear why Sound Transit fired CEO Rogoff.  Their problem now is going to be finding someone who's competent that's willing to replace him.

What Sound Transit's 2022 Budget Didn't Tell Us

The previous post asked the question, "What is it Sound Transit's not telling us?",  They've refused to release any 2021 financial reports and their October 28th meeting was "off-air".  This post details one of the answers is the October 29th release of Sound Transit's "2022 Financial plan and Recommended Budget".

Sound Transit normally allows comments to the Board via emailallboardmembers@sound transit.com.  With this budget they limited public comments to between 9:30 and 10:00 a.m. on November 4th.  Doing so required going into Seattle to their "sign-up" window between 8:00 and 9:25 a.m. to comment on a first-come first-served basis.

Since the meeting was "virtual" those wishing to comment had to return home or someplace with access to website.  Sound Transit planned to record any comments and post on their website 24 to 48 hours after the meeting.  The likely result was very few chose to do so and I've been unable to find any video of those who did.

Yet the budget is surely worthy of critical comments.  The most blatant example is the fact the 199-page document includes a great detail on where they will get the money and how it will be spent.  However, it fails to provide any details as to the service each transit mode will provide, how many will chose to use the service, and how much  the service will cost.  Rather basic information for any transit system budget.

For example, Sound Transit's 2021 Financial Plan and Proposed Budget included "ST 2021 Budget Highlights" for each transit mode for 2019 actual, 2020 budget, 2020 actual, and 2021 budget predictions, (The 2020 actual results were, "preliminary and unaudited")  The budget highlights for each mode included "Transit Mode Service Provided". "Service Consumed", "Service Performance Measures" and "Financial Performance Measures".

Each of these was broken down with "Service Provided" detailing "Revenue Vehicle Hours Operated", "Revenue Vehicle Miles Operated", and "Trips Operated".  The "Service Consumed" included "Total Boardings" and "Average Weekday Boardings".  The "Service Performance Measures" included "Total Boardings/Revenue Vehicle Hour", "Total Boardings/Trip" and "On-time Performance". 

"Financial Performance Measures" included "Fare Revenue", "Operating Costs", and "Farebox Recovery". Again, the 2021 budget provided a detailed explanation of Sound Transit services, ridership, and cost for past, current, and predictions for the next year's operation.

By contrast, Sound Transit's 2022 Financial Plan and Recommended  Budget" neglects to include any transit system information regarding 2020 actual, 2021 budget, 2021 actual, and 2022 budget predictions concerning what service each transit mode will provide, how many will use it, and what will it cost.  

The likely reason is the same reason they've refused to release any "Quarterly Financial Reports" in 2021 and the Sound Transit Board's decision for an "off-air" response to the 10/21/21 "CFO Report" to the Board's Finance and Audit Committee.  It reported ridership YTD through August was 39% below budget and fare revenue 50% less than budget.  YTD farebox recovery for the Link, 6%, Sounder, 4%, and STX, 6%, were fractions of the 15%, 13%, and 15%,  in 2021 budget predictions and 40%, 23%, and 20% Sound Transit policy targets.

Clearly Sound Transit failed to provide the Board accurate budget estimates for ridership, fares, and farebox recover in their 2021  Financial Plan and Recommended Budget.  Again the CFO report is YTD through August.  Any 2022 budget should reflect Sound Transit's predictions for Northgate Link operation. not only in terms of 2021"actual" transit results, but 2022 budget predictions.

The bottom line is on October 29th Sound Transit released a 199-page 2022 Financial Pan and Recommended Budget that neglected to predict how many commuters will ride the Link and how much each ride will cost.  They did so because the Northgate Link debut finally demonstrated the failure of light rail routed through DSTT to accommodate riders needed to reduce congestion into Seattle.  Sound Transit compounded that problem by refusing to add parking for access, choosing instead to use the Link to replace buses. (A clear precursor to East Link debut with half DSTT capacity, again without adding parking.) That Sound Transit made a monumental blunder extending Central Link beyond UW, across I-90 Bridge, and beyond SeaTac Airport.

Their October budget is their attempt to continue doing so.  And the Seattle Times Traffic Lab continues to abet them.

What Sound Transit Is Not Telling Us

 The Sound Transit Board waited until August 11th to release the  "2020 Sound Transit Annual Report" and September 23rd to release the "2020 Fare Revenue Report".  They've yet to include any "Quarterly Financial Performance Reports" for 2021 on their list of "Financial Documents".  They've clearly been reticent in providing residents with up-to-date financial status.

Thus it's unclear what or when their response will be to Sound Transit's 10-21-21 presentation of a 13-page Q3 Financial report entitled "CFO Report" to the Board's Finance and Audit Committee.  It included YTD comparisons through August of tax revenue, ridership, fare revenue, and operating expense with budget predictions.

Tax revenue exceeded budget by 28% and operating costs were 6% less than budget.  However, ridership was 39% below budget and fare revenue, 50% less than budget.  Clearly Sound Transit failed to provide the Board with accurate budget estimates for ridership and farebox revenue.

The revenue shortfall is reflected in lower farebox recovery for all the transit modes.  The CFO cites Sound Transit  recovery policy targets as 40% for Link, 23% for Sounder, and 20% for STX.  Sound Transit's "2021 Financial Plan and Adopted Budget" predicted 15%, 13%, and 15% for the three modes.

Their 2021 budget predictions, far less than Sound Transit policy targets, still provided only 2% of 2021 budget's revenues.  The CFO's 2021 August YTD farebox recovery for the Link, 6%, Sounder, 4%, and STX, 6%, were fractions not only of Sound Transit targets, but 2021 budget predictions.  

The bottom line is the Sound Transit Board has been reticent in releasing financial reports.  The CFO Report shows the August YTD farebox recovery for the transit modes not only failed to meet target levels, they failed to meet Sound Transit predictions for pandemic's affect on 2021 budget.  

The CFO report was presumably a subject in the October 28th Sound Transit Board meeting.  It's unclear their response as the Board has gone from not providing a video of the meetings to having them "off-air".  It raises the question "What is it that Sound Transit is not telling us?".  It's something a competent Seattle Times Traffic Lab would "dig into" but hasn't.

ST Board Mtg. Agenda ignores Northgate Link Debut Results

Prior to the October 2nd Northgate Link debut Seattle Times Traffic Lab articles heralded its benefits, typifying the paper's more than decade long cheerleading of Prop 1 extensions.  The September 26th article, "Transit Transformation" described it as "Light rail ready to open at Northgate, changing more than just commutes".  It included the following regarding Northgate Link benefits:

Sound Transit has estimated the new Northgate, Roosevelt, and U-District stations that open Saturday will attract a combined 42,000 to 49.000 riders per day.

The article reported benefits included "neighborhoods are growing" with "additional housing units near stations at Northgate, Roosevelt, and UW".  The paper reported thousands participated in opening-day ceremonies.

The Sound Transit Board would seemingly welcome the chance to herald the results of nearly 4 weeks of this "Transit Transformation" in their October 28th meeting.  Tell the public how many of the 42,000 to 49,000 projected daily riders took advantage of riding the link.  How much those benefits cost per rider, the fares they paid, and whatever costs those fares failed to pay.

Yet the Agenda for the October 28th Sound Transit Board Meeting includes the normal "Consent Agenda" to approve 5 items, 6 "Business Items", one of which established a "CEO Selection Committee for the next CEO", and a "Reports to the Board" limited to "Review of proposed 2022 Budget & Financial Plan Projections"

There was nothing in the "Report to the Board" agenda concerning initial Northgate Link ridership, costs, or fares.  Any competent transit board would surely require the results of the Northgate Link debut to review 2022 budget and financial plan dealing with another year and $2-3 billion more in spending.  

The fact they didn't says they're not.  The fact the Seattle Times Traffic Lab apparently abets their decision says they're not alone.

Constantine's Incompetent Sound Transit Board

The Seattle Times October 14th front page article, "Constantine, Nguyen snipe over competency, urgency" and their subsequent Constantine recommendation  prompted this post.  The article credits Constantine, "With helping make possible Sound Transit's continued expansion", clearly failing to recognize the agency's decade of incompetence under his leadership.  The incompetence was the reason I was one of the "non-serious" county executive candidates in 2017 and earlier this year.  Not to win, but to use the Voters' Pamphlet to inform residents about Constantine's failure to select competent directors to the Sound Transit Board.

For example, the Board referred to Prop 1 approval in 2008 as "a gift to our grand children."  They either failed to recognize the need for transit capacity or that extensions routed through the DSTT lacked the needed capacity.  A 2004 PSRC study, funded by Sound Transit, concluded the DSTT stations limited light rail trains to four cars and that safe operation required a minimum of 4 minutes between train.

The resultant 60 cars per hour and 148 riders per car provide 8880 rider-per-hour capacity in each direction, far less than what's needed to reduce congestion.  Routing half the trains across I-90 Bridge halves that capacity to Bellevue and SeaTac.  The billions and years spent extending light rail beyond UW,  SeaTac, and Bellevue will do nothing to increase that capacity.  Yet Constantine and his board continue to approve budgets projecting annual Link ridership will increase from 22 million in 2017 to 162 million in 2041.

Since Prop 1 passed Constantine and the Board have refused to add bus routes to increase transit capacity into Seattle.  A hundred high capacity buses an hour could've easily accommodated 10,000 passengers an hour; and more could be added. (900 buses an hour use a bus lane onto Manhattan Island.)

The bus routes could have been facilitated using a lane limited to buses or vehicles willing to pay tolls.  Limiting traffic to 2000 vehicles per hour (vph) assures 45 mph velocities.  The tolls could be raised to limit traffic to 2000 vph with whatever additional bus routes are needed.  The 10,000 transit riders would've reduced congestion on remaining I-5 lanes and eliminated 10,000 vehicles an hour on city streets.  And more routes could have been added.

Constantine and his board not only failed to understand the benefits of increased bus capacity, they failed to recognize commuters need access to any transit mode.  All of the P&R lots with access to bus routes or future light rail stations have been full for years.  Yet Constantine and his Board have spent a decade refusing to add parking with no plans for significant additions until at least 2041. 

Instead, Sound Transit is generating ridership by choosing to use the Link to replace bus routes into Seattle.  While using light rail to replace bus routes may provide those with access more reliable commute times, doing so will do nothing to reduce travel times for those without access.  The benefits of reducing bus routes into Seattle pale in comparison to the benefits of eliminating 10,000 vehicles an hour into the city with an additional 100 bus routes.  Again, and more buses could be added.

The bottom line is Dow Constantine's selection of Sound Transit Board members have failed to demonstrate a modicum if public transit competence.  The Seattle Times crediting him, "With helping make possible Sound Transit's continued expansion,"  demonstrates the paper's decade-long failure to recognize the incompetence.